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 Prologue 
 
 
As I was not involved in the production of this book, I felt honoured when Karen 
Witsenburg asked me to write a prologue for it. She said she would like me to 
write one, even if I were too busy to read all of it beforehand. But I felt uncom-
fortable with the idea of writing some ritual laudatory remarks about something I 
had not really read, and so I asked her to send me the whole manuscript. I was 
immediately captured and read all of it. Often, collected volumes are criticised as 
being weakly integrated ‘bookbinders’ syntheses’, but this one is a very good 
book. 
Being a scientist (although only a social one) with an analytical mind frame, I 
wanted to find out why I found this book to be good; and, being a stubborn, pe-
destrian empiricist, I immediately started counting things. The following num-
bers are based on the unfinished draft of the book that I had at my disposal. 
How many theoretical frameworks are there? Just one! All of the authors ex-
amine conditions of security and insecurity in a mosaic of ethnic groups influ-
enced by national, regional and global factors. 
How many epistemologies are employed? Also just one. All authors are mod-
erate constructivists. That is, they are realists who take social constructs and their 
consequences seriously. They expect social constructs to change in response to 
social forces affecting them but not to change ad hoc and overnight. The authors 
seem to share this realist or pragmatic mind-set with the pastoralists on whom 
they are working. Material incentives and disincentives of warlike action play a 
major role in this volume. Although many anthropologists would rather be cruci-
fied than to admit that they have been influenced by rational choice theories, such 
an influence is clearly present in this book. 
How many overlapping themes link the single contributions, apart from the 
general one of insecurity? Prominent themes which are taken up by more than 
one author and which serve to establish a sort of dialogue among the chapters, 
include the effects of resource scarcity and resource abundance on the frequency 
of conflicts and the level of their escalation, the effects of the presence of arms 
and of unbalanced disarmament, and the workings of cross-cutting ties and dou-
ble affiliations. 
Next, I counted and analysed co-authorship, which is, perhaps, inspired by the 
now ubiquitous bibliographic analyses of what people like us are doing. Of the 
ten contributions, two have two authors and one has three. Of these co-authors, 
one also has an individual contribution, and three others figure as co-authors of 
more than one chapter. Author credits take the form of permutations of a finite 
 set of names. Taken together, then, the authors of the chapters in this volume are 
not individuals working alone and celebrating their originality but members of a 
team of people, who, in addressing a number of issues, divide the labour amongst 
themselves and complement each other in various ways. 
Evidence of the close integration of the volume can also be found in the refer-
ences. One contribution has ten references to other contributors to this volume, 
one has nine, others six, four, and three respectively (not even counting citations 
of other chapters in the volume, which do not show up in the list of references). 
This is indeed an intensive conversation. Contributors also share some of their 
reading background. The classical monograph by Peristiany and the more recent 
one by Bollig are cited in more than one contribution, and some of my own find-
ings are taken up by seven contributors. I cannot deny that this flatters me. But 
the point is, of course, that the authors share a framework of discussion, not that I 
am part of this framework. 
To reiterate, this is a good book. I claim, further, to have been able to show 
why it is a good book, perhaps with the effect of showing others how to proceed 
with their work, if they strive for similar achievements. What remains to be said 
is that I wish this book a wide circulation, both in the academic world and in that 
of politicians, local leaders and peace workers. To solve a problem one needs to 
understand it, and this book is a significant contribution to the understanding of 
insecurity.  
Günther Schlee 
Halle/Saale, September 2012 
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Spaces of insecurity 
 
Karen Witsenburg & Fred Zaal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” 
(W.I. Thomas & D.S. Thomas 1928) 
Introduction 
The question why people use violence against each other in certain situations is 
interesting and urgent. This book is the outcome of a seminar held in Nairobi in 
2007 where we questioned the rationale behind conflicts in rural Kenya. At the 
time, most contributions were characterized by the concern that many main-
stream explanations of violent conflicts do not suffice in understanding the prob-
lems between ethnic groups in the modern Kenyan state. Not much later, the 
elections in Kenya were held, and violence broke out, to the shock of a great 
many people. Even though what happened was horrific, the violence that oc-
curred did not develop into a civil war, like we have seen in other African coun-
tries. In Kenya, the majority of the people prayed for peace together, protected 
their neighbours, stuck to their inter-ethnic friendships and supported the peace 
efforts that the outside world offered eventually. The question as to why some-
times violence stops and people decide to keep peace is equally interesting. What 
constitutes a secure space?  
We hope we can compile a next volume that answers that latter question. This 
volume deals however with insecure spaces, and the need to look at old ideas in a 
new way. Resource scarcity, greed or grievance, ethnic diversity, the small-arms 
race, the crumbling of traditional norms and values cannot provide us with con-
vincing explanatory power to which we can ascribe the current violent conflicts 
in place.  
The causes of these violent conflicts will be found both in structural conditions 
and trends in the social, political and ecological environment, and in the way 
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people organise themselves to either solve these conflicts, or use them to cause 
conflict to their advantage. We will also see that modernisation and social change 
has often made this organising for peace impossible, and new ways of problem 
solving need to be devised. 
Several contributions in this book volume try to answer the question why 
some areas in rural Kenya are insecure. Violence and conflict have always been 
regular occurrences in Kenya. The question, however, whether the intensity or 
the nature of violence is changing is interesting, in the view of the most recent 
political turmoil after the 2007/2008 general elections.  
The development from a one-party from 1991 to a multi-party state, from a 
presidential to a presidential-prime ministerial state as from 2008, and from an 
essentially post-colonial state to a state with a new constitution has unfortunately 
also been accompanied by the development of the state from being repressive to 
being conflict-ridden (Posner 2005). With a multi-party system where parties are 
based on ethnicity, and where the supreme power is divided between a president 
and prime minister who also differ along ethnic lines, structural causes of conflict 
have entered the political centre, a centre that was always meant to be the arena 
of conflict mitigation. This situation at the national level mirrors conflict situa-
tions at lower political institutional levels. What is sometimes seen as an ethnic 
conflict is usually a general political problem. For instance, the post-election 
turmoil in 2007-2008 was not ethnically motivated (see Cheeseman 2007 and 
Branch & Cheeseman 2008), and the fact that most deaths occurred by police 
guns is quite revealing in that sense (KNCHR 2008). Even though it is hard to 
find hard data, several reports indicate that in many regions in Kenya over the 
years most violent deaths are caused by bullets originating from police guns (see 
BBC News, 14 January 2002). Even though this book deals with ethnic conflicts, 
in relation to state-sponsored violence, we should be careful not to overrate eth-
nic violence compared to state-sponsored violence (Kahl 1998).  
Some chapters in this book deal with violence as a result of conflict. The de-
mise of mitigating institutions and traditional systems, or the ineffectiveness of 
modern ones established by the state, prevents the political processes to solve 
conflict and prevent it from developing into full-scale violence. However, from 
the chaos that results, occasionally lessons can be learned. This boiling pot of 
conflicts in Kenya can also be considered a laboratory, where people try to invent 
means and measures that solve rather than instigate conflicts. We as researchers 
or the local population find lessons from conflicts that occur, whenever they oc-
cur, to explore their potential for conflict mitigation. This book tries to do just 
that by presenting and discussing a number of conflicts that have occurred in 
Kenya, and from which valuable insights can be derived that need exploring. 
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Those insights are desperately needed, not only in Kenya but also in many other 
African countries and beyond. 
The case studies presented in this book cover a range of conflicts. Some are 
resource access-based conflicts over the use of a specific geographical space for 
different forms of livelihood such as pastoralism, agriculture and wildlife. Some 
conflicts arise from public policy implementation whereby the interests of (parts 
of the) state elite and those of local people of different ethnic identities are at 
variance for various reasons. The latter conflict threatens to involve not only the 
population versus the state, but parts of the populations and their power elites 
against each other. What binds the chapters in this book is the special relation-
ship between the actor and structure, between individual and the collective, be-
tween space and subject. 
A framework for analysis 
Space 
We look at space from a geographical point of view; ‘space’ is a concrete area, 
identifiable on a map, with x and y coordinates, where things happen between 
people, where the natural environment is visible, where society interacts with na-
ture occur, where human structures are built, and where people move between 
concrete points. 
This particular definition differentiates our work from approaches where space 
is just an abstract social construct existing in the minds of people, or transna-
tional space that exists as a result of (global) networks, like terrorist or migrant 
networks, or like the digital space. 
This does not mean however that space is not at the same time a social con-
struct and natural phenomenon. In fact, spaces of insecurity are social constructs, 
but nevertheless localised and identifiable on a map. For the purpose of under-
standing how space and social behaviour are connected in this context, let us first 
look at the concept of insecurity (see Peluso & Watts 2001).  
 
Insecurity 
‘Insecurity’ usually refers to a condition of being unsafe, or being in a state of 
danger. The danger can be the risk to be robbed, or violated, or in the extreme 
case, being exposed to a life-threatening situation. The concept of ‘insecurity’ is 
stronger than the concept of vulnerability (see Brons et al. 2007), and is usually 
not restricted to natural environmental risks. There is a difference between ‘being 
insecure’, or ‘feeling insecure’. ‘Being insecure’ can be established by analysing 
some facts and statistics, calculating the chance of being robbed, violated, 
wounded or killed. Feeling insecure is a subjective perception about threats, 
about feeling unsafe or uncertain or less protected. Whether those feelings are 
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based on real facts or on the perception of the environment depends on what  
others say, do, and how they act. Feelings of insecurity are usually successfully 
manipulated by leaders, and do not need to be based on real exposures of risks. A 
space of insecurity is therefore as much a social construct as it is a concrete con-
text. What counts is when people define things as real, they become real in their 
consequences (Thomas & Thomas 1928). 
Individuals, in living and creating their livelihood, live in and create their own 
space. Spaces of insecurity are contexts of every day life, created, recreated, hin-
dering or advancing specific activities. The study of spaces of insecurity has re-
cently been progressing among geographers (see for instance Penny 2010 or 
Ingram & Dodds 2009). Theories on urban spaces of insecurity, the wars on ter-
ror and drugs, insecurity related to migration and resettlement have been devel-
oped. This volume does not pretend to provide a new theory on spaces of 
insecurity. It simply combines anthropological and geographical perspectives on 
spaces of insecurity. 
 
Spaces of insecurity 
Spaces of insecurity are created by people individually and in groups in their  
interaction with each other. A space is not necessarily insecure when it is devoid 
of human life. It may be insecure when a lot of people perceive it as such, even in 
the absence of real insecurity. People feel insecure when they lack information 
about other’s potentially violent behaviour.  
Let us, for the purpose of this introduction, imagine how it feels to enter a 
large, unlit town park in the night, which is known for incidents of rape and vio-
lent robbery. Alertness will be evoked, as every sound and movement can mean 
an attack. One would feel the need to be strong, mobile and fast. But why ex-
actly? Darkness alone does not scare people. Neither are people who are recog-
nisable during the day necessarily scary. It is a combination of the two; that is, 
the context of invisibility and remoteness that makes people apprehensive of 
people whose activities are doubtful. Context variables like invisibility and re-
moteness from effective social control are however advantageous for people who 
may want to harm others, because their actions are supposed to be unseen. The 
remoteness may also result in the absence of well-intending individuals who may 
help or protect others in a dangerous situation. Because one knows he or she is 
alone in a dangerous situation in a dark park in the night, one may only go in 
there when he or she is strong enough to fight someone, with one’s own strength. 
When one does not feel strong enough, he or she may feel more secure in a larger 
group, when collectively they can deal with the imagined enemy together. When 
one has more time, power and resources at owns disposal, he or she may be able 
to change the context of insecurity, by mobilising decision makers who act to 
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have the park lit and patrolled at night. However, whether someone is able to 
change the context of insecurity depends on his or her ingenuity and effective 
agency to find the right technology and institutions to cooperate with others and 
engagement in collective action.  
We have already summarised some important ingredients of survival strategies 
in a context of insecurity. Whether people alone or in groups can live and act in 
insecure areas depends on their ability to react to insecure situations, and their 
ability to change the context in such a way that they have more control. Both vic-
tim and perpetrator live and react to places of insecurity, sometimes in a similar 
way. 
Identifying the elements of spatial insecurity is important to understanding 
people’s strategies in insecure areas. The present Kenyan situation is however 
exacerbated by many factors: The criminal nature of the post-colonial state, the 
exploitative nature of the market, the scarce natural resources and the fact that 
otherwise illegal small arms are almost openly found in the possession of local 
people. This is not to say that conflict is a necessary outcome of the presence of 
these factors, or that violence is a necessary outcome of conflict. But this combi-
nation of personal social insecurity in a social context necessitates an approach to 
violence that combines the environment, the social institutions with individual 
actions that may make both violence and peaceful conditions possible  
We think that therefore a study on the relationship between natural phenomena 
and humans should not have a priori a structural or an agency approach (see 
Adano et al. 2012). A sole structural approach tends to ignore all the personal 
decisions and the opportunistic behaviour of individual actors (Felson & Clarke 
1998), while an agency approach would not take geographical and other variables 
into the analysis. As the case studies show, we need to combine both approaches. 
As Eaton (this volume) suggests, contextual explanations of violence strip the 
perpetrators of any agency. Yet they are the ones who chose whether to fight or 
not. Regions of insecurity (context) are inhabited and used by actors who may 
decide to change their context of insecurity, and who can, together, make it more 
insecure by using violence. Even a few individuals may be responsible for the 
state of insecurity of a large area. It probably takes more effort, more (financial) 
resources and more individuals to make an area secure and safe.  
All the authors in this volume deal with these ingredients, either separately or 
in relation to each other. The lessons learnt from them may lead us to strategies 
that may be used to successfully avoid, fight or redress conflict and violence. 
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The role of space and actor in resource-based conflicts 
Fighting for ownership and access 
The idea that violence in poor countries is triggered by lack of resources is wide-
spread. It has a strong imaginative power as this portrays a future picture of 
crowds of poor people fighting and killing each other due to limited resources or 
adverse effects of climate change. The question whether natural resource deple-
tion would be a condition behind much civil violence has been widely debated 
(Peluso & Watts 2001; Collier & Hoeffler 1998). Degraded or depleted renew-
able resources (Kaplan 1994; Homer-Dixon 1999) and mining of non-renewable 
resources (Collier & Hoeffler 2004) were both used as explanatory variables in 
violent conflicts. Limiting environmental variables negatively (Malthus 1798) or 
positively (Boserup 1965, Tiffen et al. 1994) impacting on human behaviour has 
received a new impetus by the worldwide concern about climate change. New 
predictions of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Boko et al. 2007: 
435) assess Africa as one of the most vulnerable continents to climate change and 
climate variability: 
[a] situation aggravated by the interaction of ‘multiple stresses’, occurring at various levels, 
and low adaptive capacity. African farmers have developed several adaptation options to 
cope with current climate variability, but such adaptations may not be sufficient for future 
changes of climate. 
This concern is not surprising, given the African context, where many people 
live in ecologically marginal areas and where concurrently many violent conflicts 
take place. Environmental marginality is the context for several studies in this 
volume. The conclusion of all these chapters is that scarcity itself does not trigger 
violence. It would in fact stimulate cooperation (Witsenburg & Adano 2009). 
On the one hand, people experiencing scarcity may not trigger conflict and 
violence. For some it may mean access rather than exclusion or the loss of access 
to precious resources. From the contributions in this volume the question arises 
whether violence and conflicts are disadvantageous to people’s welfare, or 
whether a situation of insecurity is purposely created to reach certain goals. It 
cannot be denied that large groups of people suffer when violent conflicts esca-
late. These situations are most visible, because they create fear, displacement and 
migration, a collapsed market economy, closed schools, and a large number of 
casualties in hospitals and/or burial grounds (see Martin, this volume). Those 
who suffer most are children who cannot defend themselves and who are left or-
phaned. Schools that are usually meeting grounds for people of different ethnic 
backgrounds become very insecure places, and many children face an insecure 
time from home to school (Witsenburg, this volume). 
Also women suffer as they face difficulties in defending themselves. Hospitals 
and dispensaries become more difficult places to reach, but in a time of insecurity 
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it is even more difficult. Women play however often a double role in conflict. 
They operate as mediators in times of peace, but also as instigators in times of 
war (Mieth 2006). Those women with a large herd who don’t need the market for 
survival may even profit from raids as their husbands may bring back booty and 
increase social ‘status’.  
Remote and marginal areas are attractive environments for certain types of 
violence and criminal behaviour. People belonging to a ‘warrior age-set’ hold a 
powerful position in society. When there is no state of insecurity they lose an im-
portant raison d’etre. It is no wonder that young men don’t mind breaking peace 
treaties as Eaton suggests (Chapter 3, this volume). This is in line with Fleisher, 
who observed in Southern Kenya no effective opposition to cattle raiding among 
herding communities because of recurring clan warfare. This locally legitimizes 
cattle raiding behaviour, and functions as a training opportunity for young men. 
It reinforces a climate of insecurity and lawlessness that is needed to raid effec-
tively, especially against certain groups in the absence of effective enforcement 
of the rule of law. Indeed as correctly put “War is good for thieving’ (a Kuria cat-
tle raider, quoted in Fleischer 2000, p. 750), or “opportunity makes the thief” 
(Felson & Clarke 1998). 
 
Fighting for the sake of fighting?  
Are pastoralists war-like? This claim has been widely debated in the literature. 
Several reasons have been put forward why raiding and counter-raiding take 
place in the pastoral areas (Osamba 2000; Gray et al. 2003). Martin raises also 
this issue in addressing the agro-pastoral conflicts in the Tana region. Orma and 
Wardei herders are seemingly in a constant preparedness for war, while the 
Pokomo farmers, on the other hand, need to be especially trained and drugged 
with herbal medicine in order to be able to kill. Does this mean that herders are 
culturally more inclined to use violence?  
De Vries argues that the Pokot herders are indeed seen as a fierce and warlike 
community. According to Mieth (2006) they prefer to be seen like that. For com-
munity building and feelings of internal cohesion and preparedness to stand up 
for each other, there is a ritual training and initiation for warriors. Mieth also de-
scribes how for the identification op Pokotness, a young man wants to be seen as 
a strong warrior. However, self-identification and perception by others is not stat-
ic. With the changing of traditions, and new generations being exposed to other 
sorts of education and new sets of norms, this (self-)perception of Pokotness 
changes rapidly.  
There is another dimension to the explanation why pastoralists are perceived 
to be in a constant preparedness for war. Ordinary life in pastoral areas often 
converges with factors that contribute to an insecure social climate. One may 
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wonder why it happens that certain crisis-prone pastoral areas are often situated 
straddle international borders, and coincide with the most marginal lands. Insecu-
rity and the incident of violent conflict may occur all over the world, but conflicts 
are usually concentrated in specific areas. By a way of comparison, in a metro-
politan area people know which streets are more dangerous than others. A state 
of insecurity is territory specific. Insecurity, like dirt and garbage, is a territorial 
aspect that is localized and affecting all people in that area. As Eaton (Chapter 3) 
& Mieth (Chapter 4) suggest the only way for current East African pastoralists to 
survive is by being armed. People are able to move into insecure areas, which 
otherwise would have remained unused and unoccupied, only because they own 
guns. Pastoralists are not protected by state power or accorded privileges of secu-
rity services, and hence have to protect themselves and each other. From this per-
spective it is not economically effective to disarm a group of pastoralists, because 
they would not either be able to defend themselves from aggressors or use the 
large dry lands in border areas. To leave range land ungrazed for an extended pe-
riod of time causes degradation because of unpalatable bush growth (Conant 
1982). Other lands may be overused because of a concentration of animals and 
people. An unhindered use of marginal drylands makes therefore economically 
and ecologically sense. As there does not seem to be an alternative in the short 
term, disarming a group of pastoralists while other neighbouring groups remain 
armed has only a negative impact on their security and livelihood.  
 
Space, territory and identity 
In Chapter 2, Kurgat explains that owning a piece of land is an important factor 
in the creation of ‘identity’. Land ownership instills a sense of belonging to a 
community, and creates the need to protect it against the ‘excluded’. This may 
explain why pastoralists, who have a strong sense of belonging to common prop-
erty resources usually strongly (and violently) oppose land titling programmes 
(see Martin, Chapter 8). Even if conflict is often called a herder-farmer conflict, 
in most cases in present-day Kenya the conflict is not about clash of lifestyles or 
cultures. It is simply because farmers are usually advantaged in titling pro-
grammes, and herders feel threatened that part of their collectively used territorial 
space will be permanently taken from them and non-negotiably owned by others.  
Kurgat argues how land is becoming a source of power, which again trans-
cends the direct territory, enveloping the space in which an ethnic group seeks 
cohesion, inclusion, and exclusion of ‘the other’. Thus, land transformations 
make land-based resources the nexus of the struggle between cultural identity 
and political-economic power. 
We delved out some aspects of survival strategies in spaces of insecurity; in-
security as a characteristic related to a place, yet created by individuals living 
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there. Such spaces often seem to be clearly marked and delineated. Space may 
seem physically clear and defined, but Kurgat’s paper shows that ‘space’ is as 
much a creation of the mind as is ethnic identity. 
Space therefore not only refers to a territory. Kurgat (Chapter 2) uses the term 
‘space’ to imply that the conflict over land parcels and the construction of identi-
ties go beyond the competition for the physical land but involves how that land 
can be utilized as an arena. In land are embedded various symbolic meanings and 
implications. Political competition, settlement patterns and the numerical weight 
of a particular ethnic group in this arena are likely to determine the ethnic leader-
ship in local society and automatically the loss of political space for another eth-
nic group. This power relation determines the governance of spaces of influence 
and whose culture dominates in an area. For instance during the violent conflicts 
in Turbo District (Kurgat, this volume), the Nandi did not contest individual 
ownership of someone’s land. They felt that their ‘space’, their area of govern-
ance and cultural autonomy was not recognized. Space goes therefore beyond ter-
ritory or individual landownership. In other words, one can own land and occupy 
it. Yet, if one is not allowed to perform own rituals, or govern that land according 
to his or her own preferences, it is not one’s political, cultural or religious space. 
‘Space’ is then contested and can trigger violence, and not the individual land 
ownership as such.  
The same applies to the emotional attachment to ‘space’. Someone’s territory 
or land can harbour values that belong to this notion of ‘space’. For instance, the 
Hurri Hills in north-western Marsabit district is not considered someone’s territo-
ry as such (see Witsenburg, Chapter 6). It is a common pasture, where everyone 
is in principle allowed to graze animals. The same applies to Forolle hills on 
Kenya-Ethiopia border. These places harbour a religious space of local commu-
nities, which goes beyond the notion of territory as such. In a similar vein, a 
church compound universally has this notion of a space where individuals should 
be safe and free from prosecution; for example many victims of post-election 
violence in Kenya (1991, 2007) found refuge and help in church compounds. It is 
a safe haven in times of turbulence and turmoil which also goes beyond territory. 
It is territory infused with belief, heritage, and becomes a space of religion, or an 
ancestral space of peace.  
 
Individual actions 
This vision on space among pastoral peoples raises the question whether old ex-
planations of conflicts still work. Adano et al. (Chapter 7) discusses the issue of 
violent livestock raiding in the context of extreme climate variability, and con-
cludes that the wetter the season is the more people die in violent livestock raid-
ing. Remoteness and inaccessibility of the terrain weaken government initiatives 
10 Karen Witsenburg & Fred Zaal  
 
to provide security, which shows it cannot deal with this kind of violence. During 
droughts, pastoralists deploy institutional arrangements that guarantee access 
rights to water to all, reducing violent conflicts. Violence is thus not scarcity in-
duced here. Rainy seasons are usually times of relative abundance, not only of 
pasture, water and milk. There is also a labour surplus unlike in the dry season 
when watering animals is labour intensive, which makes it easy for young men to 
engage in raiding. The conclusion that livestock related violence is therefore not 
scarcity induced is unavoidable. This finding confirms the importance of under-
standing both individual behaviour or collective action in violence as rational be-
haviour, and the phenomenon of cooperation to overcome climatic stress rather 
than indulge in violence conflict induced by scarcity.  
There are a number of interesting descriptions of the practice of violent live-
stock raiding confirming this hypothesis. Very illustrating are the accounts of 
Mieth (Chapter 4), Eaton (Chapter 3) and de Vries (Chapter 5). They all, inde-
pendently, asked raiders in the Pokot area for their motives, and looked at their 
practices, and their perceptions of insecurity. Their findings make clear that raids 
are organised by small groups, of which the whole ethnic group is not necessarily 
always informed. Approval of elders was often not sought. Therefore, a raid 
should not simply be called ‘ethnic warfare’ or ‘ethnic clash’ since it is not the 
ethnic group as a whole that is involved in violence. In addition, raiding parties 
consist of a small selection of warriors who have, or at least strive to achieve, 
some social standing in the pastoral society. They are often young, strong and 
certainly not the poorest. They value respect, bravery and earning a name, par-
ticularly among peer-groups. To be seen as a hero, and gaining the image of a 
fierce cattle raider is of immense importance to the warriors. Again, understand-
ing the intricate interaction between resources, livelihood systems, culture and 
social fragmentation sheds more light on conflicts as tools than assuming it is the 
outcome of structural processes of resource control. 
In Pokot, like in other dryland areas, keeping a region unsafe serves the raiders 
well. The raiders have not necessarily the same interests as others in the society 
who would like to live in a secure and peaceful community. Raiding can be seen 
as training for survival in insecure areas. Understandably, finding a partner who 
is able to fight is a matter of survival for girls in such a context. Eaton’s contribu-
tion sheds new light on the raiding practices; retaliation by small gangs. He talks 
of a culture of revenge, which again stresses the importance of individual choice 
of people whether or not to engage in violence. Especially in the absence of a 
strong state and any legal recourse for victims, retaliation will spiral off large 
scale violence endlessly. He also finds that the presence of small arms should not 
be overstated in explaining violence. Killing with spears is as lethal, if not more, 
as guns, because they are silent and an attack may take place in the night without 
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the surrounding hearing anything. Again, killing a person is as much a personal 
decision as it is prescribed by culture. A certain level of insecurity has helped 
shaping cultural ‘devices’ which in turn make such regions even more insecure. 
In turn, spaces of insecurity long served such communities against government 
control. 
Old and new institutions in the creation of peace and insecurity 
Traditional and new leadership  
In order to understand the situation in spaces of insecurity, it is equally important 
to look at why there is absence of peace. Peace is not always a desired ‘common 
good’ but since cultures have institutionalized ‘peace treaties’, arrangements, 
conflict solving mechanisms and ways for negotiation it can be assumed that now 
and again a situation of peace is desirable by some sections in society. 
Most pastoral communities are organized in age-grades (Spencer 1973; Tab-
lino 1999). The age-set system is a strong institution among pastoral groups, 
whereby one age-group of young men between 15 and 35 years old belong to the 
warrior age group. Even though most violence is organized or actually fought by 
the warriors, whether the elders are involved or not may influence the extent of 
the violence used in a conflict. As is vividly described in Chapters 3 through 6, 
and 9 the political situation in insecure areas is often capricious and not transpar-
ent. A coalition of formal governmental administrators and local leaders can be 
powerful and paralysing for local groups. In the Loita case, the coalition between 
political and civic leaders did not have enough power to monopolise the revenues 
of Loita forest. However, in many areas local elders feel their authority being un-
dermined by such coalitions. The coalitions responsible for the failures can very 
well be consisting of the ones who are frustrated by the modern coalitions of 
formal government administrators and local. At times, peace keeping activities of 
NGOs prove to completely lack local support, with insecurity actually increasing 
(see Eaton, Chapter 3). 
New links between old and new institutions supporting conflict 
and peace 
Collective action 
An interesting case is presented in Chapter 9, where Zaal & Adano describe how 
Loita pastoralists mobilised in a case against the government to secure access to a 
natural resource that was of vital importance to their livelihood. Individual and 
group actors, cleverly using new institutions to fight their case, won a conflict 
over forest resources non-violently. The potential resource grabber, in this case a 
government minister, could not win against the community, showing again the 
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strength of local initiators and actors in this particular conflict of interests over 
resource. Loita forest did not become a ‘natural resource curse’, because a mix-
ture of old and new institutional arrangements prevented it from being grabbed 
by a few rent seekers. Its revenues are now used and shared by a large number of 
producers. 
This case shows the importance of institutions and ingenuity in the question 
whether a natural resource becomes a curse or not. If the Loita forest would have 
been gazetted and only accessible for tourists, its foreign revenues would have 
been high and visible on the balance of trade. The government would give pref-
erence to this type of private land use over and above community shared use 
rights. But, natural resources that show high revenues are also very attractive to 
grabbing behaviour. However, the case of the Loita Forest shows how individual 
actors can be quite influential in starting conflicts, but the actual cause of this 
conflict being taken up and played out by social groups in society who must re-
main with wider confrontation within society. The underlying tension between 
Purko and Loita Maasai, dating back to well before the colonial period, but 
strengthened by colonial policies of population displacement and boundary estab-
lishment, proved to be a fertile ground for both Purko players to gain control, and 
Loita players to resist this usurpation. 
Interestingly, more modern sets of legal entities, both elected and non-elected, 
have been added to this conflict. The present status quo could not have been 
reached without a modern judicial institution, used profitably by the Loita 
Maasai through institutions such as development projects and a re-established 
Council of Elders. This fascinating case shows that old ethnic and sub-ethnic 
conflicts, as between the Purko and Loita Maasai, over a key resource, potential-
ly devastating at a regional scale, can be contained on the basis of complex and 
unexpected alliances. The Loita case, where new and old institutions were used 
to prevent conflict is contrarily to the Tana delta case described in Chapter 8, 
where all institutions failed. In the Tana case the traditional rules of war were 
violated, the government representatives failed to provide security, and took even 
part in the violence, and justice has not prevailed. Until today, the local commu-
nities struggle with the government and the corporate world for access rights to 
their own land. The threat of being evicted from the land was overruling any tra-
ditional form of war making. Therefore, human agency and collective action ul-
timately determine whether natural resources turn into a curse, but geographical 
information to inform about the potential threats and opportunities is much 
needed. 
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New administrative boundaries and land titling 
With the creation of administrative boundaries, whereby new districts (like 
Moyale District in 1995, Chalbi and Laisamis Districts in 2007 in northern Ken-
ya), new divisions and locations, are meant to mark ethnic ‘pure’ territories. This 
process is making it increasingly hard to maintain the traditional arrangements of 
water and land sharing that are so common among nomadic livestock keepers. 
The violence between Gabra and Borana in Turbi (2005), between Rendille and 
Gabra around Medatte (2007), and between Gabra and Turkana in Moite 
(2007/2008), can be seen in that light. In all these places, water points were ‘ter-
ritorialized’ after the creation of new boundaries, and traditional use rights were 
violated. This is in line with an earlier finding on creating clear territorial bound-
aries triggering violent conflicts (Witsenburg & Adano 2007).  
That creating clear ethnic divisions and territorial boundaries can be a very 
bad idea is clearly shown by recent work of Schlee (2011). This work points out 
that the assumption that there are group rights to territory fueled violence and 
that electoral politics is shaped around the idea that there are unique, indigenous 
or ancestral rights to territory. 
The current practice of creating administrative boundaries along seemingly 
clear ethnic divisions, thus territorializing ethnicity, is a complete break away 
from the traditional ways of neighbourliness, of opportunistic grazing and nego-
tiation patterns, of ethnic fluidity and vagueness in ownership rights. If there was 
ethnic differentiation in the past, with clanhood as most constant factor, it devel-
oped into a current situation of ethnic segregation and separation, leading to-
wards a state of ‘apartheid’ of a possessive nature, that potentially leads to ex-
clusion of the ‘ethnic other’. Were groups easily aligned, associated or integrated 
in the past, nowadays the boundaries will prevent such integration from happen-
ing. Why territorial separation of ethnic groups is the political outcome of current 
negotiations is therefore a question that demands more scrutiny. As Schlee, for 
instance, points out the tendency towards territorialized ethnicity in Ethiopia and 
Kenya follows a world-wide discourse on legitimizing group rights, indigenous 
peoples, minority rights etc. Schlee warns how ethnicization of politics and the 
tolerance towards or even promotion of ethnic violence is connected to this trend. 
The idea that every group has a ‘homeland’, and therefore has the right to expel 
minorities is a very dangerous step into that direction. In this volume, the prob-
lem of new administrative boundaries that are used to exclude the ‘cultural other’ 
are dealt with in Chapters 6 (Witsenburg) and 8 (Martin).  
Also land adjudication programmes are misused to this purpose. That this can 
create violence, is also clear from Martin’s chapter on the conflict between the 
Pokomo farmers and the Orma/Wardei herders. The adjudication programme fa-
voured initially the Pokomo farmers. Wardei/Orma used violence to show their 
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discontent. Lack of participation in decision making causes serious stress and ag-
gravates feelings of exclusion. It is furthermore obvious that the land acquisition 
procedures were related to modern plantation agriculture plans of the Kenyan 
government and the Tana River Sugar and Biofuels Company. Clarity in land 
tenure is preferred by the state and the corporate world in such situations; as it 
will ease the purchase of land, and speed up resettlement procedures. The current 
land grabbing problems arising all over the world can be seen in this light. 
 
Role of the state 
There is an interesting feed-back system of violent conflict and insecurity at 
work. Insecure spaces trigger violence, and violence itself creates a space of in-
security and lawlessness that can cross boundaries, creating new spaces of inse-
curity. In the perception of many pastoralists, scholars and NGOs the absence of 
state power can be partly held responsible for the escalation of violence in pasto-
ral areas. In certain areas there is indeed very few state personnel. Mieth (Chapter 
4) reports about the situation where the next police station is 80 km far away, 
which makes it virtually impossible for poorly resourced army and police per-
sonnel to respond adequately to a raid. Also during the escalation of violence be-
tween Gabra and Borana (Witsenburg, Chapter 6) the extent of violence was 
partly attributed to the non-responsiveness of the police. In this case however, as 
in many other cases ‘absence of state-power’ does not mean that the state-
representatives are not there. Police and army-officials are usually there, but they 
are inactive and non-responsive to warnings, complaints and worries of people 
who feel threatened. There are also examples where the state representatives, the 
army and the police contributed heavily to insecurity (Martin, Chapter 8; Kurgat, 
Chapter 2; Akong’a, Chapter 10). 
However, local security is also a normative concern related to the state. Should 
this type of violence for instance be seen as merely a localized cultural practice 
or as a serious issue of state security? We think there is reason to treat violent 
raiding more as an issue of state security. Firstly, from a human rights perspec-
tive, the state is responsible to protect all citizens from violent attacks and pro-
vide security. There is also a second reason why security should be taken as a 
matter of national concern. Violence creates a space of insecurity that may start 
to affect the whole country. Such spaces attract individuals from outside the re-
gion who thrive in insecure environments, where there is little or no effective 
state control. Insecurity also prevents the settling of peaceful individuals, firms 
and organizations. ‘Insecurity’ therefore transcends the region. In addition, flows 
of people, goods, information, money and weapons involved in violence, either 
directly or indirectly, are not hindered by borders. On the contrary, the presence 
of an international border with weak or ineffective control is an asset for smug-
 Spaces of insecurity 15 
 
glers and raiders. In a raid, tracing livestock is more difficult once they have 
crossed a border. In a globalized world, rebel or guerrilla movements with inter-
national support networks look for sparsely populated border areas for their train-
ing camps and their secret transport routes. Such insecure spaces also provide 
recruitment grounds for unemployed youths whose bravery and courage can be 
exploited and cultivated. A particularly difficult feedback mechanism develops 
when business and political elites link up with actors within these spaces of inse-
curity, to gain economically. A pseudo-state supported network may develop 
with sufficient incentives to prevent state-delivered security that may have vio-
lent conflict as a method and a goal. As a result, insecurity and violence deny 
components of economic and other forms of development and the opportunity to 
respond to peoples’ needs, thus making the state of poverty and impoverishment 
to persist.  
The feedback relationship between violence and poverty is important in ex-
plaining causality. It is not that poor people are more likely to use violence. But a 
situation of insecurity leads to lack of economic growth and opportunities, lack 
of new ideas. People with potentials leave the area, whereas only poor people 
who are unable to change their way of life remain. Insecurity, partly a context 
variable, attracts people who need insecurity for their own benefit, thereby ham-
pering overall economic growth, and reinforcing the state of insecurity and pov-
erty once again.  
Spaces of insecurity are created when people who share a space, do not uphold 
the norms and values in dealing with conflicts, not even the rules about conflict, 
and who have different opinions on crime and punishment. Akong’a (Chapter 10) 
addresses the link between feelings of insecurity and space, when describing 
how, in the last political violent turmoil in Kenya after the elections of 2007, 
churches and mosques were attacked and people killed. He remarks that such a 
breakdown of what is normally respected suggests is indicative of a gap between 
the old ways of dealing with conflicts and the modern, institutionalized ones. The 
intra-group mechanisms that Akong’a describes, like joking relationships, avoid-
ance behaviour and stock associates served society to manage conflicts. The 
more people share the same culture, the easier it is to create a safe space. Howev-
er, with the collapse of these old institutions, the modern arrangements supersed-
ing the old ones are eventually the hope of restoration of peace.  
Towards a new ‘collectiveness’ 
Akong’a touches upon the question whether the loss of traditional intra-group 
conflict resolving mechanisms is a necessary outcome of secularization. Howev-
er, there is reason to doubt whether secularization takes place in Kenya yet. The 
way current church religions are practiced for instance are reminiscent of the old 
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spirit and ancestor worship practices. The new religions (including Islam) seem 
to have replaced the old spirits with new ones. Certain principles behind the old 
rituals, such as ancestor and spirit devotion, exorcism practices, leader glorifica-
tion and charismatic preaching are quite similar to they way religions are prac-
ticed in Africa. Partly, these principles are broader in character than just being 
characteristic of the way religions are ‘organised’, practiced and experienced. In 
the secular world, the way politicians at the top ‘grab’ what they can, under the 
justification of old customs, shows how traditional mechanisms are still at work. 
In the modern states in Africa, this mechanism still works, but the other side of 
the medal: The responsibility and sharing that was also part of the role of the tra-
ditional leader, has not developed. The legitimacy of the leader is not affected by 
that situation. However, present-day leaders obtain their power from both intro-
duced democratic systems that have no place for this personal type of responsi-
bility, and from forces of global, non-transparent government fora and the 
opportunities of centralized commodity markets. Globalisation partly allows state 
leaders to become greedy without checks and balances, a situation that is often 
referred to as the ‘resource curse’. In Western societies there is some kind of con-
tainment mechanisms that stop leaders from being too corrupt, In Africa these 
mechanisms are quite often lacking (Wrong 2009). In Kenya for instance, the 
best thieves are considered heroes The Member of Parliament who is not ex-
tremely wealthy by the end of his term is considered a stupid weakling or a cow-
ard. This belongs to an ‘un-secular believe system’. 
The above process goes as far as the collective allows it to go. Traditional 
leadership roles as perceived by the communities and allowed by the political 
system that was introduced in the colonial period are still strong, despite the neg-
ative repercussions. There is however a trend of individualization taking place, as 
has been happening in Western societies. What the collection of chapters show in 
this respect, is an increase in individual agency. Individuals defect from the ‘tra-
dition’, about which the elders are mourning (Akong’a, Chapter 10; de Vries, 
Chapter 5). If the elders in the past control the behaviour of their community 
members by invoking traditional norms and values, they now have to accept that 
the younger generation, being exposed to other norms and values (through the 
formal school system or in modern religious institutions), defects at times. In a 
way, individual choice has widened and people can now choose whether to be-
have as a raider, to behave as a church/mosque follower, as a modern town resi-
dent, to combine roles, to adapt to various lifestyles at the same time (play 
multiple roles in different environments) or to one lifestyle or one role only.  
Given that the elders have less control over the behaviour of their youngsters 
(Baxter & Almagor 1978), this exacerbates spatial insecurity, since political cul-
ture and space or territory are so much intertwined. Shared culture, shared norms 
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and values and behaviour are necessary for collective action. People can improve 
the security of a space by mobilizing each other for protection. The elders cannot 
organize the collective anymore, neither are they able to change their environ-
ment (the space of insecurity) on their own. Their spatial insecurity has therefore 
considerably increased. There is always the danger of individuals behaving as 
free riders, or as disruptors of peace. The collective damage caused by such indi-
viduals is huge. Yet, if individuals have the choice to defect from the tradition, 
this means they can also refuse to take part in traditional raiding and age-set du-
ties. Defecting from the tradition can thus as well improve security. 
Akong’a (Chapter 10) further raises the important question how conflicts 
should be avoided in a world where traditional conflict avoiding mechanisms are 
disappearing, new forms are yet to develop, but where time and again violence is 
flaring up at local, national and global levels of scale. Is there one answer, in a 
world where people believe to belong to one political party, one ethnic identity, 
and one religion only? Should we look for a new ‘commonness’, new collectives 
in which citizen can find a new shared culture? Society cannot solve or avoid 
conflicts and violence if people do not share common norms and values, or have 
a shared opinion on crime and punishment in a just manner. Traditional institu-
tions that keep peace do not work at the intra- and inter-group level anymore, as 
the elders have explained. In a world where various legal systems exist side by 
side, partly overlap, or get overruled, and where state power is at times weak and 
partial, there is reason to be concerned about state of insecurity.  
As we argued earlier, security in the drylands in general, but of borderlands in 
particular, should be more of a national concern than it is currently seen. In mat-
ters of security and peace keeping, legal pluralism will not help in building 
shared norms and values. A shared culture of security is needed. The develop-
ment of a modern shared culture can be greatly enhanced by adopting supra-
cultural norms and values, as for instance are currently being articulated at the 
level of the United Nations, on the form of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. The question is how Universal Human Rights relate to and can build up-
on local peace-keeping traditions that are reminiscent of these universal norms 
and values. The search for ways to align these is worth the effort. It is only in 
certain overly culture-relativistic circles that this is denied. Most individuals will 
feel that universal norms must exist. A quote from Amartya Sen’s Identity and 
Violence (2006: xv, xx) book illustrates this point: 
Many of the conflicts and barbarities in the world are sustained through the illusion of a 
unique and choiceless identity. The art of constructing hatred takes the form of invoking the 
magical power of some allegedly predominant identity that drowns other affiliations and in a 
conveniently bellicose form can also overpower any human sympathy and natural kindness 
that we may normally have. The result can be homespun elemental violence, or globally art-
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ful violence and terrorism. … I try to argue as strongly as I can for a wider use of our voice 
in the working of the global civil society …. 
This book shows that in present-day Kenya, the illusion of the unique and 
choiceless identity is very prevalent. A wider use of voice, and the search for be-
haviour based on universal norms and values, can be built upon to achieve a situ-
ation where spaces of insecurity will diminish in extent and dry up for lack of 
incentives to continue their existence. Much can be gained if a transition can be 
achieved away from a territorial culture of identity, and towards a culture of di-
versity and inclusion based on a reworking of old and new traditions of responsi-
bility and accountability. 
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Many scholars have attempted to analyze the role of ethnicity in violent conflicts 
over resources. However, research on the role of space and place in the construc-
tion of ethnic identity and other associated boundary creation is still limited. This 
chapter attempts to examine how the organization and representation of territory, 
that is land is implicated in the construction of a Nandi identity that is malleable. 
The questions raised are as follows; how is land connected to ethnic identity? How 
has the national politics of space and place resulted in coalescence of ethnic 
group(s)? How has this resulted in the construction of different local identities? 
What state policies and practices are implicated in the politicization of ethnic 
space and the (re)constructing of group identity and boundaries? In an attempt to 
answer these questions, this chapter will examine the contestations around the 
shifting boundaries between the individual, the community and the state in relation 
to land and how these impacted on inter-ethnic relations. The theory that will 
guide this chapter integrates resource competition theory with a social constructiv-
ist view.  
Introduction 
This chapter examines the role of ‘space’ and ‘place’ in the construction of ethnic 
identity. The research analyses a case study of the Nandi in Turbo Division of 
Uasin Gishu District in Kenya. To do this, the chapter focuses on land and how 
over time it has impacted on Nandi identity. Land in people’s lives acts as a stage 
for political, socio-economic, cultural and environmental contestation. The chap-
ter therefore explores how land bestows on a people not only a sense of owner-
ship. Land also provides the feeling of belonging and security. The chapter in-
vestigates how issues of land, the most cherished resource in Kenya, contribute 
to the construction of identity and conflict. Land has remained core to the forma-
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tion of political and group consciousness. The chapter concludes that ‘place’ and 
‘space’ are social constructs and in themselves creates identity boundaries that 
are both stable and fluid.  
The Nandi people: An overview 
The Nandi people presently form a sub-group of the Kalenjin ethnic group. The 
term “Kalenjin” emerged in the 1940s, a people earlier referred to as the “Nandi-
speaking peoples” (Huntingford 1953; Kipkorir 1969; Mwanzi 1975; Sutton 
1976; Ogot 1977). According to Matson (1975), the term Nandi was derived 
from the Swahili word mnandi (the cormorant) coined by the coastal Arab trad-
ers. 
The original homeland of the Nandi is uncertain, like that of many other East 
African peoples. Lewis Greenstein (1975) supposed it was probably far to the 
north of their present location, perhaps in the Sudan. One reason for the uncer-
tainty surrounding the origins is attributed to the paucity of traditions among the 
Nandi, as compared with their Bantu-speaking neighbours. Matson (1975) offers 
several reasons for this. The final migration of the Nandi was through uninhab-
ited or sparsely populated areas and their expansion eastwards and northwards 
(after an initial southward migration) onto the Uasin Gishu plateau was similarly 
into unoccupied land. Thus, the accounts or events and conflict of migration and 
settlement that make up a large part of the traditions of other peoples are scanty 
in case of the Nandi. 
Prior to the establishment of British rule, it is assumed that the Nandi territory 
covered the Southern Uasin Gishu plateau, which was marked at the north by the 
mass of Mt. Elgon and the Cherangani Hills. The eastern edge of the plateau was 
delimited by the sharply defined western wall of the Rift Valley. The Nyando 
River valley, lying to the south and flowing into the Kavirondo Gulf of Lake Vic-
toria, marked the southern edge, with the western limit not clearly marked, with 
the exception of an escarpment approximately half-way between Mt. Elgon and 
the Nyando valley (Walter 1970). Snell (1986) observed that although the boun-
daries were fluid, the tribal lands proper were more or less stable by the advent of 
British rule, in what was later to be referred to as the Nandi Native Land Unit.  
There is however some reference to the role of territory in shaping the Nandi 
identity related to Nandi migration, conquests and expansion in their traditional 
folklore. As Matson (1975: 61) observed: 
The Nandi possess a much smaller body of traditions than many East African tribes, and a 
number of themes which occur in the traditions of other peoples have no place in Nandi rec-
ollections of their past. The expansion of the tribe from the original settlements in the south-
west and military operations against the Maasai and other tribes provide the principal sub-
jects of Nandi traditional folklore. 
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It is apparent that the Nandi claim to ownership of lands beyond the present 
Nandi district can be traced to these earlier migrations and conquests, and later 
colonial interventions. There were times when growing populations could expand 
into unoccupied lands, a time when there were truly empty spaces and ‘frontiers’, 
but as Kent et al. (1995) caution, when one group encounters others, in a more 
consistent and insistent manner, one person’s homeland may have become an-
other’s frontier. In Turbo, migration history has it that the area was probably oc-
cupied first by the Sirikwa, a tribe who lived on the plateau and built stone 
kraals. The remnants of these kraals can still be seen in the district. Who the 
Sirikwa were is contestable. Many Kalenjin and Maasai traditions agree that the 
Sirikwa were quite akin to the Kalenjin-speaking people, but some scattered 
Kalenjin sources contradict this by claiming that the Sirikwa were related to the 
Maasai (Sutton 1978; interview, Turbo, 16.4.2005). The Nandi recall that they 
were once expelled from their country by the Sirikwa. Indeed, who were the first 
occupants is unclear. Nevertheless, there exists an agreement that the Sirikwa did 
really inhabit the plateau. In the middle of the 18th century the Sirikwa were 
looted and driven out by the Maasai. Turbo (a division of Uasin Gishu district), 
once a former frontier, is now perceived by the Nandi to belong to them, thus a 
Nandi territory. The identity of the community changed over time however. The 
passage of time and the memories that go with it form the identity of people, just 
as the organisation of space and its use over time does. Land has been a symbolic 
base for ethnic mobilization, to use Nagel’s phrase (Nagel 1994: 152). 
Research area 
This chapter focuses on the Nandi living in Turbo Division of Uasin Gishu Dis-
trict of Rift Valley province. The division borders with Lugari, Kakamega and 
Nandi districts. The area has a relatively high economic potential because of the 
fertile soils and favourable weather conditions prevailing across the division. The 
division is in the eastern part of the district. It covers an area of 321 sq.km, with 
seven locations and ten sub-locations (Republic of Kenya 2002). The town of 
Turbo and later the surrounding area that came to be Turbo Division was named 
after a small Turbine that was installed by an American, L.A. Johnson, to work at 
a small flax factory, he and his friends erected at a nearby valley. The small town 
was christened Turbo, thanks to the turbo charged engine (Kamau 2004: 8). 
The area has a long history of hosting various identity groups. The Sirikwa, 
the Maasai, the Nandi, and the European settlers have all lived there, and after 
independence any person that was able to buy a piece of land in the area when it 
was opened up to multi-racial and ethnic settlement could come in. The rural part 
of the division however is predominantly inhabited by the Nandi. Within this 
multi-ethnic composition of the area, the basis of ethnic relations is the presence 
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and interaction of members of many different ethnic groups, but with one form-
ing the majority: the Nandi.  
An identity is generally based on the real or symbolic notion of the homeland 
and how over time the Nandi people have defended this ‘homeland’ strongly. To 
open up the discussion, an overview to the guiding concepts that will be used in 
this chapter will be explored first. 
Ethnicity as an identity construct 
The term ethnicity derives from the Greek ethnikos, the adjective of ethnos. It re-
fers to a people or a nation (Fenton 2004; Jenkins 2001). In its present form, 
‘ethnic’ still retains its basic meaning in the sense that it describes a group pos-
sessing some degree of coherence and solidarity, and is composed of people who 
are at least latently aware of having common origins and interests. Indeed, an 
ethnic group is not a mere aggregate of people or a sector of a population but a 
self-conscious collection of people, united or closely related by shared experi-
ences. Historically the word ‘ethnos’ contains an interesting double meaning; a 
people in general as well as a people which is different from the speaker. It is a 
term of in-group self-description and out-group ascription (Sollors 2001). 
According to Gorgendiere (1996) and Chazan et al. (1992), ethnicity is a com-
plexity of human existence and behaviour which defies simplistic definitions and 
explanations. It denotes perceptions of common origins, memories, ties and aspi-
rations as well as a sense of nationhood having its foundations in common values 
and norms. Glazer & Moynihan (1975) earlier associated this with a sense of be-
longing to a particular ethnic group, but characterized by a very special sense of 
pride. 
The concept ‘ethnic group’, like its base ethnicity, traces its scholarly source 
to Weber’s (1978) founding definition in Economy and Society. Weber (1978: 
389) postulated ethnic groups as: 
Those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of 
similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization 
and migration. This belief must be important for the propagation of group formation, con-
versely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists. 
Weber emphasized that the sense of commonality or ‘ethnic membership’ does 
not in itself constitute a group but facilitates group formation. The perception of 
common ancestry, both real and mythical, is important to outsiders’ definitions 
and to ethnic group self-definitions. These include rules for behaviour within the 
group and a shared sense of identity and belonging According to Cohen (1974: 
ix), “ethnic groups are a collective of people who share some patterns of norma-
tive (collective) behaviour and form part of a larger population interacting with 
the people from other collectivities within the framework of a social system”. 
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“Basically, an ethnic group is a community of people who have the conviction 
that they have a common identity and common fate, based on issues of origin, 
kinship ties, traditions, cultural uniqueness, a shared history and possibly a 
shared language and group obligations and benefits” (Thomas 2000: 58). Of im-
portance in this chapter is how the notion of ethnicity becomes pronounced when 
it is used to distinguish one social group from another in the division we are talk-
ing about. In the case of multi-ethnic areas like Turbo Division of Uasin Gishu 
District, group distinctions are likely to follow ethnic fault lines rather than any 
other, like class. 
The concept of identity in the social sciences has one of its main sources in 
psycho analysis, where the concept is connected and sometimes even used syn-
onymously, with ego and self. The term refers to a continuity of a person’s ‘be-
ing’ as experienced by him and by others. Identity thus is not an inborn quality 
which exists from birth. It develops slowly through interaction with the social 
environment and is identical with the socialization biography of the individual. 
Hence, identity is the “socialized part of the self” an attribute that has to be 
equally negotiated anew in each interaction by the participants. Indeed, “no indi-
vidual is a member only of one solidarity collectivity but a plurality”, the various 
identity attributes exist in ‘flux’ (Berger & Berger 1972). 
Stone (1962) conceptualizes identity as “the coincidence of placements and 
announcements”, a process that holds for individuals and collectivities, a which 
has always been a characteristic feature for human interaction. Issues of identity 
become more problematic and unsettled as societies become structurally differen-
tiated, fragmented and culturally pluralistic. Historical variations in the extent to 
which matters of identity are problematic do not undermine the two-sided proc-
ess of the reciprocal imputation and avowal of identities as a necessary condition 
for social interaction. Identities are rooted in the requisite conditions for social 
interaction over time (Giddens 1991 Castells 1997; Snow 2001). While individu-
als and groups look for ‘same’ they also construct the ‘different’ in the process. 
As Martin (1999: 2) puts it: 
The only way to circumscribe an identity is by contrasting it against other identities. Conse-
quently, identity is an ambiguous notion. It gets its meaning from what it is not from the 
other; like a word in a crossword puzzle, it is located in a place where uniqueness, defines in 
a negative way … meets a sameness which needs an else ness to exist. 
The above process can apply to ethnic groups, states and other group identifi-
cation. In essence, social identities are the identities attributed or imputed to oth-
ers in an attempt to situate them in social space and whatever their specific socio-
cultural base, social identities are fundamental to social interaction in that they 
provide points of orientation to ‘alter’ or  other’ as a social object. Jenkins (1997) 
observes that the existence of a group is not a reflection of cultural difference. 
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Ethnic groups imply ethnic relations, and ethnic relations involve at least two 
collective parties, they are not unilateral, what Hughes refers to as the outs and 
the ins. He thus notes: 
An ethnic group is not only one because of the degree of measurable or observable differ-
ence from other groups, it is an ethnic group on the contrary because the people in it and the 
people out of it know that it is one; because both the ins and the outs, feel and act as if it 
were a separate group (Hughes 1994: 91). 
There is need to conceive of identity as a process of continual negotiations, of 
claims and validation. An ethnic identity is thus developed and modified as indi-
viduals become aware of other groups and of the ethnic differences between 
themselves and others, and an attempt to understand the meaning of their ethnic-
ity within the larger settings. Although developmental processes (from childhood 
to adulthood) underline the formation of ethnicity, ethnic identity may be renego-
tiated throughout life in response to individual, contextual and historical changes 
(Phiney 2001). Ethnic identity can be high at one time and place and low (deem-
phasized) at another. The durability of an ethnic identity depends both on factors 
within the ethnic group and on the broader societal or historical context. Ethnic 
groups and their individual members may adopt different group identity modes, 
similar to modes of acculturation (Berry 1990). 
Internal or self-identification whether by individuals or groups is however not 
the only ‘mechanism’ of ethnic identification. People are not always in a position 
to ‘choose’ who they are or what their identity means in terms of its social con-
sequences. In the accomplishment of identity two mutually independent but theo-
retically distinct social process are at work, Internal and external definition 
(Jenkins 1997). Thus, while ethnic groups define themselves, their name(s), their 
nature(s) and their boundary(ies) as ethnic, characteristics are defined by others. 
Although identity formation therefore is regarded as both part and outcome of 
interactive bargaining and negotiation, the individual may be under considerable 
pressure from his social environment to develop a predefined identity, an identity 
to which he may fails to align (Conger 1978; Heidt 1985). The ethnic require-
ment assigned by one’s social environment is not always grudgingly accepted, 
but something eagerly searched for and considered normal. It satisfies the indi-
vidual’s needs for social and psychic security. 
The relevance and strength of the sense of belonging, of being an accepted 
member, depends on the trust of the individual that the social group functions 
and that one can rely on the members. The more consensuses there is about what 
is right or wrong within that group, the more secure the individual will feel, and 
the more likely he is to identify with and be loyal to that group (Heidt 1985). 
This individual loyalty on group level is what Parson (1973) referred to as a col-
lective identity. Parson maintained that the use of the collective pronoun ‘we’ in 
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essence indicates that the collectivity referred to has some kind of relatively defi-
nite identity and that the individual participant has a sense of ‘belonging’ to it, 
that is, a ‘membership’ (Parson 1973: 6). The collective representations of a 
group, the aggregate of all values, norms, knowledge, attitudes and ideas which a 
group has in common, influences if not determines how people think about what 
provides a frame for social construction of reality. In the quest to explain the 
processes of ethnic group formation, and the consequences that it has for integra-
tion or conflict in society, the chapter analyzes how competition for territory adds 
to the construction of an ethnic identity that is both inclusive and exclusive. This 
chapter will therefore use constructivism theory to analyze and enable us to un-
derstand ethnization of territory in Turbo Division.  
Constructivism assumes that the self or the self-identification with a group are 
variable. Identities depend on the historical, cultural, political and social context 
(Hopf 2000). What runs common with the ‘constructivists’ paradigm is that iden-
tity is created, reconstituted, or cobbled together rather than being biologically, 
preordained or structurally determined. From the 1980s a number of works have 
attempted to demonstrate that through reconstruction in history many identities 
that we take for granted today were actually social constructs (Anderson 1983; 
Hobsbawn & Ranger 1983; Banton 1983; Schlee 1984; Smith 1983, 1987; Sol-
lors 1989, 2001; Lentz 1995; Hutchinson & Smith 1996; Yeros 1999, Cohen 
2000; Fishman 2000). 
Constructivists emphasize that ethnicity it is not super-natural and quasi-
national membership in a group, but rather constructed under specific historical, 
political circumstances. The basic assumption of the constructivists exists only in 
the plural in the relationship between ‘us’ and ‘others’ (Lentz 1995). They em-
phasize the subjective, manipulability, flexibility and strategic quality of ethnic-
ity, but arguments and positions vary widely in detail (Banton 1983; Sollors 
1989). Indeed, there is an agreement that ethnic groups and identity are both dy-
namic and subject to modulation according to circumstances and relative position 
of the significant others (Barth 1969, 1994; Cohen 1992; Deverick 1995, 2000). 
In this case study, it is the Nandi being the majority with a relatively high pres-
ence of other ethnic groups. The process of access and ownership of land in 
Turbo will be used to demonstrate how Nandi identity is constructed around this 
resource. 
Land, politics, construction of identity and conflicts  
Like elsewhere in Kenya, land in Turbo has been a strong factor behind the con-
struction of identity. Land ownership evokes a sense of belonging to ones com-
munity, the need to protect it against the outside ‘others’. This probably explains 
why conflicts are referred to either as land or ethnic conflict interchangeably, 
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while in fact they are different. Land therefore becomes a resource, and a source 
of identity. Loss of land either through disinheritance or sale deprives not only 
the owner of his or her status but also his or her sense of belonging: Land endows 
the owner with an identity, or with being (as the Nandi refer to it) chi (credible 
personality). 
Land, like good jobs and other scarcities are ‘positional goods’ that help estab-
lish one’s place in the hierarchy of the community as the individual acquires po-
sition, money and space. Land therefore becomes a key to many doors (Holliday 
1986; Dietz 1996; Hirsch 1978; Kanyinga 2000). It is therefore important to note 
how changes in socio-political institutions which regulate access to land impact 
on inter-group relations. As Berry (1988, 1993) points out, social identities and 
other non-market factors play an important role in regulating access to resources. 
Berry accentuates the fact that access depends on the influence one brings to bear 
in negotiations over property rights, an influence that is enhanced by having fol-
lowers and the necessary social networks. This concurs with Schlee’s argument 
that any collective identity cannot fruitfully be studied without taking the prop-
erty relationship/ links between collective identities, property rights and problem 
of legal pluralism into account (Schlee 1999, 2000). This follows from the fact 
that collective property rights require definitions of the collectivities involved, 
while incentives and disincentives for manipulating the affiliation to a collective 
identity tend to be provided by different property collectivities (Schlee 2000). 
Strictly speaking, we are talking here about intra-ethnic processes. However, 
though in the process of state formation this issue has become inter-group, in 
most African societies, land has never been a commodity in the strict sense of the 
term within the territories of ethnic groups. It has become a national, inter-group 
phenomenon, and so land right disputes arise due to the plurality of laws. Intra-
group, there are de jure no secured property rights with respect to land. However, 
in Kenya as a collective of groups under national law, there is. Any person or 
group or person(s) can purchase land anywhere in the country (a constitutional 
right) given that a single state implies a single market for land, labour and capi-
tal. In reality, though its labour market may be a single national market, Kenya’s 
populations are encapsulated within ethnic and psychological boundaries. These 
were easy to spot on a map: They are District boundaries, which follow ethnic 
boundaries from the colonial period onwards. Ethnic boundaries have become 
very pronounced after the colonial government created these administrative units. 
This links ethnic with political-administrative boundaries. In political contesta-
tion, legitimacy is sought through an appeal to the territorialisation of identity 
rather than to class position. The implication of this in present political processes 
is that the presence of non-Nandi in and around ‘traditional’ Nandi lands and 
towns means the politics of the place will be controlled by perceived ‘outsiders’. 
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Indeed, access and security of land tenure is linked to the overall security of 
the social formation. Land tenure systems must then be seen as part of both the 
broad socio-political and the economic context of local society. Group economic 
interests and capitalist approaches to land issues have frequently caused socio-
political divisions in the political arena. The use of land (territory) in most cases 
has become a political-social act, in which people communicate and cooperate, 
within different positions of command, and with different rewards. Ethnic group 
interests in land, though in principle economic in nature, has tended to influence 
political alliances (Kanyinga 2000; Dietz 1996). Land rights have always gener-
ated political conflicts. Land is an integral part of social networks and local poli-
tics. Consequently, keeping land rights flexible allows for possibilities to adjust 
the interpretation of law (and custom) to the changing local power structures, its 
politicization (Neubert 2000). 
Norms and customary rules on which communities (groups) base their self-
identification and which are used to define the identity of individuals and groups 
are continuously being invented or reinvented through the interaction of devel-
opments taking place at the local and national level, but so have the inter-ethnic 
political consequences. Ethnic communities in Turbo like elsewhere in Kenya 
have therefore been pre-occupied with land hunger, land struggle and an unre-
lenting pursuit of territoriality. As Miller & Yeager (1994) argue, for a century 
now, a central theme running through the Kenyan experience has been intense 
competition for prime farming land, land to bequeath to kindred and to be with-
held from strangers.  
In Turbo, conflicts between communities over land resources have been main-
ly blamed on the political elites. Competition for state power has always divided 
ethnic communities along party loyalties. These parties have a core ethnic leader-
ship and representation. Elites act as political entrepreneurs appealing to ethnic 
sentiments, though it is hard to differentiate: ethnic, political, administrative and 
even class boundaries are often aligned. However, to say that ‘elites act’ is not to 
maintain that the masses as merely passive actors in ethnic/ political/ administra-
tive/ class conflicts, performers of the will of the elites. The masses are not at all 
a political group, waiting to be incited by their political leaders. In reality the 
type and course of conflicts, is determined by the struggle of various identity 
groups within territories, be these territories ethnically homogeneous or not. The 
role of elites in conflict therefore can only be understood by examining their ac-
tions in the struggle within social groups and the struggle between these groups. 
Political behaviour can be grounded in both class and non-class organization and 
solidarity (Horowitz 2000). Identities such as those of kinship and ethnicity con-
stitute alternative and very powerful bases of solidarity. Political entrepreneurs 
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have to realise these varied sources of group consciousness, and can not be sim-
ple cynical manipulators whose activities are governed by self-interest alone. 
At times in social analysis, there is a tendency to exaggerate the degree to 
which a population can be or has been aroused to action. An analytical approach 
should be taken to avoid a blank acceptance of the claims of the leaders as a true 
reflection of the realities on the ground. Nevertheless, there is need to acknowl-
edge the impact of interaction of such leaders with grassroots protest. Though the 
masses have often been brought into the question not as activists themselves but 
as individuals that can be manipulated, they are generators of popular grievances 
on which the elites base their action. In an ethnic conflict, both elite and mass 
behaviour is explained by its passionate, symbolic and apprehensive aspects: 
Group entitlement conceived as a joint function of comparative worth and legitimacy does 
this – it explains why the followers follow, accounts for the intensity of group reactions, 
even to modest stimuli, and clarifies the otherwise mysterious quest for public signs of group 
status. (Horowitz 1985: 226) 
According to Horowitz (1985), ethnic conflict arises from a common identify-
ing significance accorded by groups that are subsequently played out in public 
rituals of affirmation and exclusion. Effective political authors can recognize this 
and present a desired future for their relevant public as a project that builds on 
the triumphs of a living past or avenges defeat (Lonsdale 1992), which may be 
very much linked to ethnic identity. Images of the past can seize and recast a 
memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger. They can help ignite political 
passion in even the bleakest of situations (Ibid.) and as Horowitz (1985) ob-
serves, the ambiguity of ethnic loyalties suggests the existence of varied needs to 
which they put to use.  
Indeed, on the one hand, ethnic interests in a given situation demand leader-
ship; on the other hand, leadership can use the ethnic identity card to its own ad-
vantage (Cairns & Roe 2003). For this, an important concern is that of estab-
lishing the outer limits of who is included as “one of us”. This has much to do 
with the choice of strategy and the relative appeal of ethnicity, political interest, 
territorial history or class consciousness in a concrete situation. In the 1992 eth-
nic conflict in Turbo, elites in their political propaganda strategy appealed to the 
emotions that went with both ethnic and territorial identity. With the threat of a 
new political competition occasioned by the 1990s global wave on multi-party 
democracy, anxiety swept the leading elites. The state institutions and the ethnic 
elites owning them sought for whatever group identity was most appealing and 
none served like revisiting the ethnicity-land nexus. As the state had given out 
land for patronage to members of the ethnic groups dominating the state appara-
tus, the opposition capitalized on this. They maintained there was a need to re-
form the land laws that had allowed this to happen. A perceived sense of loss of 
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ethnic land and identity had enhanced the construction of a sense of community 
under siege among the Nandi. With construction being an ongoing process, here 
historical truth was merged to contemporary facts and future visions of ethnicity 
being threatened. 
The Turbo ethnic conflict was thus not purely due to the possibility of multi-
party conflict, but had other underlying forces. The most important one was of 
unresolved conflicts over land access and land rights. These were determined by 
State law, but the state was seen as an actor in the ethnic-political conflict. The 
relationship between land reform and the rule of law is a complex issue in Kenya. 
The law has historically been used to dispossess certain identity groups (race, 
ethnic, class, gender, generation) of access and ownership of land. As Okoth-
Ogendo (1976, 1982, 1991) observed, most prime land was appropriated by the 
state or the private sector. This has brought into question the moral authenticity 
of land laws. Kenya’s legal history has shown that in land law, ethnic identity 
competes defiantly with state identity. This is corroborated by Anderson (1983) 
and Alonso (1994): nationalism and ethnicity are constructed reciprocally, be-
cause patriotism is not about loving one’s fellow nationals in such a case. It is 
about disagreement, and hating a fellow national or at least condescending to tol-
erate others within national space. 
A crucial point in time of course was the moment of independence for Kenya. 
The Lancaster conference and the agreement that followed was only achieved 
after a compromise on how the regions were to share power with the central gov-
ernment, strongly guided by a regional land control policy. As Bates (1989: 55) 
explains: 
The groups incorporated into KADU wanted as much of the land vacated by the Europeans 
as they could get; they feared the competition of the Kikuyu, who as tenants and labourers 
were established on the ground, were numerous, … driven by ‘land hunger’, and ... rich. 
KADU responded by advocating the adoption of a federal constitution, in which regional 
barriers would be created to land settlement, within these divisions, the land market would 
be allowed to operate subject to oversight by regional political authorities. 
Rothchild (1968) observes that the minority ethnic groups feared being 
swamped by other ethnic groups, the central government, or by a combination of 
these forces. The result was that fears of land seizures “caused many a minority 
leader to urge the establishment of majimbo as a protection of his stake in soci-
ety”. The concession arrived at at the Lancaster conference was simply an effort 
to speed up the process of achieving independence. A regional land control pol-
icy was never given a chance by the newly independent Kenya government 
dominated as it was by one ethnic group. They wanted a unitary system. The 
state-dominating ethnic political abhorrence of a majimbo (quasi-federalism) sys-
tem, was casued above all by the infeasibility of such a system of for a national 
land market transfer to the dominant ethnic groups and to state directives. Large 
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tracts of land did not only remain in the hands of a few European settlers, but a 
big portion of those changing hands was either bought by the ethnic elite domi-
nating state institutions or given to their less well-off group members under reset-
tlement schemes, given to state bureaucrats or simply gazetted as state (public) 
land. 
The vesting of land control in the hands of the central government has become 
a catalyst to land conflict in Kenya. The modes of settlement of the landless in 
the 1960s through the harambee settlement schemes, private purchases of large 
farms by co-operatives or companies to presidential ‘handing over’ of large 
farms to hundreds of assembled people at well publicized ceremonies, led to 
large scale immigration especially of the Kikuyu to the Rift Valley, which is re-
garded by the various Kalenjin groups as traditionally theirs (Leys 1975; Widner 
1992; Wanyonyi 2000). In the 1970s it led to a strong politicization of the land 
market (Njonjo 1977). According to Widner (1992), the majimbo constitution 
having been scrapped had opened up land in the former Maasai reserve, in Keri-
cho, Nandi, Uasin-Gishu, Trans Nzoia and Nyandarua. This limited land control 
by the ethnic groups ‘traditionally’ living in the Rift Valley. KANU instead had 
urged central control of the region in an effort to forestall local legislation re-
stricting land transfer to those born in the area and to maintain the foothold of the 
party’s Kikuyu supporters in the Rift Valley land markets (Widner 1992). Ac-
cording to Harbeson (1973) the land transfer scheme started at the eve of inde-
pendence had already been resented for its impartiality of settling the landless 
members of the Kikuyu community. According to Bates (1989: 94): 
In many areas in the Rift Valley, Kikuyu migrants sought to establish settlements, and local 
political leaders opposed their land claims … among the most virulent of these disputes were 
in Nandi which represented one of the wealthiest of the Kalenjin speaking areas. It was Moi 
who negotiated with the leaders … and quietened their militant opposition to the Kikuyu in-
cursion … Moi thus proved a valuable ally to the KANU elite. And following the withdrawal 
of the radicals from the party, Jomo Kenyatta promoted Moi to the vice presidency of 
KANU and the nation. 
In these land struggles, Kenya’s future ethnic relations translated to what 
Atieno-Odhiambo (2002) referred to as the fears of Kikuyu domination. Accord-
ing to the Rift Valley leaders, especially the Nandi, the question arose on how the 
same government was settling ‘others’ through government assisted programmes, 
while denying communities the right to buy land in their own areas. Arguments 
had been given that land was being set aside for government projects and Trans-
national investments.  
According to a World Bank agreement, a total of 23,000 acres of forest land 
had to be planted, about 18,000 acres in Turbo and the balance in other areas to 
be identified later (KNA 1970). This was part of the ‘million acre scheme’ that 
would produce wood for pulp and paper. In Turbo, the project led to a conflict 
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between squatters (landless Nandi) and the afforestation programme. The East 
African Tanning and Extract Company (EATEC) management resorted to the use 
of provincial administration and police to ensure that the squatters did not en-
croach on the EATEC land. Demolition of squatter houses was carried out in 
Manzine, Forrestal and Coopers schemes in 1971 (KNA 1971). The Ministry of 
Natural Resources in response to EATEC action, declared that the people could 
not be considered as squatters but as trespassers, who awaited stern action. The 
Nandi felt that there was little government sympathy for their need of land and 
decided to sent a delegation to the prime minister (Jomo Kenyatta), who on his 
part sent Tom Mboya to Kapsabet to meet six Kalenjin elders from the six Kalen-
jin districts. Mboya had to assure these leaders and their constituencies that they 
would be given alternative settlement opportunities (KNA 1971). That assurance 
was never honoured by the government. 
Indeed, the government went on with the forestation programme and by 1966, 
most forest plantations producing pulp were located in the Rift Valley (KNA 
1966). The target acreage for the million acre scheme in Turbo was drastically 
reduced in 1965-1975. State land originally set aside and totalling 27,898 acres 
was handed over to the Ministry of Natural Resources. According to a memoran-
dum to Her Majesty’s’ Government on the Turbo afforestation scheme, June 
1966, it was officially declared that “after full consideration the Kenyan govern-
ment has decided that the national interest would be served better by establishing 
forestry plantations in the area, which are essential for an economic pulp and pa-
per mill, rather than continuing with high density settlement as planned” (KNA 
1966: 3). It was argued that the forest/pulp project would employ more people 
than the high density settlement scheme. The then permanent secretary in the 
Ministry of Lands, Peter Shiyukah in his letter to the permanent secretary, Minis-
try of Treasury and Settlement, pointed out that government’s double standard 
policy had caused outright public agitation against the afforestation scheme. Shi-
yuka wrote  
… there is no doubt that if the afforestation project is proceeded with, it will be impossible to 
contain the local feelings without purchase of additional land for the settlement of those who 
would otherwise have been settled on the afforestation area, including those areas earmarked 
for settlement, but not actually purchased. This creates a disproportionate problem since as it 
is the present policy of government that in the selection of settler’s priority shall be given to 
legal labour already on the land. It means that an area very considerably in excess of that 
originally earmarked for settlement in Turbo area will have to be purchased if both the legal 
labour on it and the Nandi who would otherwise have been settled are to be observed …, the 
Nandi want to be land owners and not forestry employees, and this is a problem which has to 
be faced, and which has been made particularly difficult …. Persons concerned have been 
firmly under the impression that the land at Turbo was earmarked for settlement by them 
(KNA 1966: 1-2).  
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The sentiments captured in Peter Shiyuka’s argument reflected the true per-
ception among the locals, especially with regard to the settlement programmes. 
On the contrary, further land in Turbo was proposed to be transformed from the 
ownership of the central land board for the development of a National Youth 
Service (NYS) camp. The NYS was meant to be a buffer zone to prevent further 
illegal encroachment from the Nandi people who always grazed in the area (KNA 
1965). A Nandi delegate to the meeting on the land transfer reminded the gov-
ernment representatives that the Nandi have been waiting for Europeans to leave 
Kenya so that the land taken from them in 1924 could be returned, adding that in 
the Carter Commission report of 1930, the area was included and recognized as 
being within the Nandi area. In response to the delegate views, the government 
representative stated that, “although the government of the past might have 
promised that after the Europeans’ departure, the land in question would be 
handed back to the Nandi, the present government is thinking of developing the 
area in a way that will benefit the nation as a whole” (KNA 1966: 3). He also ad-
vised the area MPs that they did not necessarily had to agree with their electorate 
on everything (Ibid.). The same view was expressed by the then Minister of 
Lands and Settlements, J.H. Angaine. Angaine had told the Nandi elected repre-
sentatives in a meeting in Turbo that settlement and afforestation were all gov-
ernment projects (Ibid.). 
In reality, the loss of settlement area to the afforestation programme not only 
impacted negatively on the socio-economic activities because people in the area 
became landless for decades but it became a bond between the people and their 
representatives, acquiring a political dimension. The community had lost their 
kaptich (grazing grounds) to their own government, a sense of loss that was later 
felt in the politics of the area. Alonso points at how past nationalist policies pro-
duced by those in control of the state system, appropriate and transform local and 
regional histories and the memories of particular groups.  
The construction of hegemony by agents and institutions of the state was chal-
lenged by alternative and oppositional traditions of the affected community that 
disputes governments’ dominant articulations of space, time, and substance. The 
difference between the concepts of nation and state are made obvious here. This 
difference explains the silence of the Kalenjin and the Abagusii in the area over 
land acquisition, which was “a sign of those too satisfied with land to complain 
over anything” (Oucho 2002: 164-165). 
Elite political contestation in Turbo and other ‘contested’ Nandi lands in gen-
eral has largely been guided by the Nandi land question. The community’s alli-
ance with Kenya African Democratic Party (KADU) and their support for a 
majimbo system had more to do with their aim to control their access to land than 
with simple power sharing. In the post-independence period, whoever openly ar-
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ticulated the need for the Nandi community’s access to land was assured of po-
litical support. On the other hand, the politicians who took a neutral stand or sup-
ported government projects were seen as ‘sell-outs’. Daniel arap Moi, in whose 
tenure as the Home Affairs Minister the Turbo afforestation scheme was dis-
cussed and passed was seen by the community as having exchanged the commu-
nity’s rights for his political interests. In post-colonial Kenya, state power has 
been used to acquire and distribute resources from ‘above’ by a small ethnically 
homogeneous elite. Indeed, ethnic conflicts rotate around land and other related 
resource issues (Kurgat 1996). The failure or weaknesses of government policies 
on land have given way to ‘redistribution from above’ and ‘land grabbing’ 
(Kanyinga 2000; Klopp 2000).  
A counter process developed that instrumentalized land for community/group 
survival. In essence, the politics of dissent among the Nandi in the last four dec-
ades of independence have mostly been woven around the land issue. This ex-
plains why elites fighting for power and political survival in peripheral regions 
go back to the theme of loss of land. In the Turbo conflict it led to calls to re-
move madoadoa (the ‘non-indigenous’ a Kiswahili word meaning ‘spots’) who 
were perceived to be a threatening political group. According to the Parlia-
mentary Report Committee (Republic of Kenya 1992), the violence that rocked 
the Rift Valley was presided over by politicians in Kapsabet on the 8
th
 of Sep-
tember 1991, and in Kapkatet on the 21
st
 of September 1991. According to these 
politicians, pro-opposition groups should be ‘crushed’ or not to be tolerated in 
Kenya National Party (KANU) zones. ‘Outsiders’ were warned that they would 
be required to go back to their ‘motherland’. In the subsequent violent phase of 
the Turbo conflict, this was taken very serious indeed.  
An important line of reasoning in conflict studies states that the members of 
society are constantly in competition with one another for valued resources. Out 
of their struggles, social order develops, either because one side wins a conflict 
and becomes the dominant force or because contending parties reach a balance of 
force and neither side is able to gain further advantage over the other. Hypo-
thetically, in Turbo like in other settlement areas in Kenya, scarcity of prime land 
has influenced the construction of identity by communities. There has been agita-
tion against past injustices to justify their present rights to a particular territory 
while concurrently attempting to build barriers against competitors from the con-
structed ‘other’ (Kurgat & Kurgat 2006).  
Conflict is about the legitimate distribution of future costs and benefits. It of-
ten arises because somebody benefits at someone else’s expense. However, in 
reality the situation is more complicated. Whether this distribution is changing or 
not may not be the true issue, it is the perception of change that is the issue. The 
notion of ‘legitimacy’ is vitally significant. As De Reuck (1984) argues, legiti-
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macy depends upon existing relationships, upon people’s identities and with 
whom they identify – in a word, their identity-based definition of the situation. 
Legitimacy is a value placed upon a relationship and like all values it is sub-
jective. Values may seem to be objective factors, but they are not. They are as-
sessments and they may change. In Turbo, ethnic and land conflicts are conflicts 
over legitimacy, over perceptions of change, and it is the construction of identity 
around land which legitimizes the struggle for access to resources. 
Territory and identity in Turbo 
There is a close relationship between land and the formation, representation and 
construction of a Nandi identity in Turbo Division. The uncertainties over sus-
tainable access to land in a multi-ethnic environment have been reflected in the 
need to authenticate ones ‘true belongingness’ to the place in a process of ‘get-
ting ownership’. Groups have found power and promise in maintaining that land 
represents ethnicity and identity.  
Among the Nandi a particular identity might be expressed by individuals and 
the community as registered on different occasions and situations. An example is 
the question of who is Kalenjin or Nandi. The term ‘Kalenjin’ is used to describe 
a conglomeration of eight sub-ethnic groups (Sutton 1976), whose history and 
language although interlinked are distinct. The group from ‘outside’ seems ho-
mogeneous, but each is different. The term ‘Kalenjin’ is derived from a word 
‘Kalenjin’ which means “I tell you”, or “I say”, common to all the seven groups. 
The shared similar heritage of traditions, culture and language enables one to 
stress his ‘Kalenjinness’ at a given time, and be a Nandi, Marakwet, Keiyo, 
Tugen, Sabaot, Pokot or Kipsigis at another time. Thus, the ‘we’ when referring 
to the Kalenjin is indeed crucial when ‘Kalenjin’ are competing with non-
Kalenjin, while being Nandi becomes advantageous in competition with the other 
Kalenjin sub-ethnic groups. 
In Turbo in particular (or more precisely in this context the Manzzine settle-
ment scheme) and Uasin Gishu in general, the Nandi harbour a grudge not only 
against non-Kalenjin but also against their ‘cousin-Kalenjin’ especially Keiyo 
and the Tugen, whom they perceive were favoured in the allocation of the forest 
land by the Moi administration. The degazzetment of Manzzine forest (1996) and 
the settlement in 1996 of ‘squatters’ on the degazzetted Manzzine forest is often 
pointed out as an anti-Nandi gesture. The majority of those settled were resented 
as not only being from outside (not Nandi) but they were not locals known to be 
landless. We can therefore argue that access and ownership of land are inter-
woven to other rights as demonstrated by Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 Perception of land ownership and access in Turbo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 attempts to illustrate the boundary definition between the intra and 
inter ethnic relations to land. In Turbo, land is perceived first as Nandi land; sec-
ond as Kalenjin land; third as individual (private) land and fourth as Kenyan 
land. Nandi land seems to engulf all the other access and ownership rights, dur-
ing times of intra and inter-group competition. Territorial boundary and the ac-
ceptance of the ‘other’ keeps on shifting according to what is at stake however. 
During election politics for example, focus is on the first level of space (for local 
representation – Nandi). This may be followed by the second level, to counter the 
‘others’ that do not fall under the Kalenjin cluster group. The third and fourth are 
totally underplayed or negatively contrasted with the first and second. The imag-
ined Nandi land boundary is utilized to construct the political space. 
Land conflicts during election amplify the various layers of identity. Local and 
national politics are driven by the interaction or indeed conflict between local 
loyalties (intra-group), inter-group (Kalenjin vs. ‘others’) and national (when al-
liances are forged with groups beyond or outside the resident area). Thus, within 
the division, several internal ‘frontiers’ exist, to use Kopytoff’s phrase (1987), 
with land, politics and identity reinforcing each other.  
The hardening ethnic boundaries (having a real-life meaning when they be-
come political/administrative) and shifting of ethnic frontiers in Turbo like else-
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where in Kenya is common. Lonsdale (1992: 267), writing on ethnic groups and 
boundaries in Kenya, observed: 
These common tribes inherit internal solidarity, guard mutual boundaries, organize competi-
tion against rival teams for public good and reduce contemporary politics to functional con-
flict … [Nonetheless] there is creative achievement unresolved internal competitions to build 
political community. The inner and outer faces of identity are admittedly inseparable. To il-
lustrate what is ‘our own’ darkens the shadow of the others but the relative balance and his-
torical enquiry profoundly affects one’s view of the formation of political identity, how 
unquestioning or critical it may be, how exclusive and unchanging or inclusive, contingent 
and contractual. 
The above observation supports our view that ethnic groups appear monolithi-
cal from the outside but in essence they suffer from problems of identification 
from within. The Turbo case study showed that inter-ethnic competition is not as 
straightforward as it is sometimes assumed. Rivalry cuts across and can take eth-
nic, sub-ethnic, clan or even inter-generational dimensions. A similar observation 
has been made by Klopp (2002), with regard to the sale of East African Tanning 
and Extract Company (EATEC) land in Uasin Gishu in the 1990s, in what she 
referred to as “moral ethnicity … political tribalism and the struggle for land and 
nation” (Klopp 2002: 1). The same applies to the factor time. The narrative is 
useful to authenticate the ‘true owners’. It is common to hear Nandi speak of land 
conquered by “our” forefathers from the Maasai, fought over with and taken back 
from the Europeans and bought with “cattle money” (cattle sold to buy shares) 
after independence (interview, Turbo, 2005). The narrative does not only serve to 
justify the right to ownership but a sense of identity pride, a pride that not all pre-
sent residents are allowed to indulge in. It belongs only to the Nandi. It moved 
from a type of pride that implies respect for others, to a type of pride which cre-
ates hostility towards others (Martin 1999). Thus, whenever there is conflict of 
interest between the Nandi and the other identity groups, it is the ‘other’ that is 
found neither respectful to the Nandi people who feel they ‘belong’ nor adaptive 
to the ‘place’. This attitude may permeate life in general, and not be restricted to 
specific conflicts. The conflicts between neighbours in 1992 and 2008 bear simi-
lar characteristics. The examples of conflicts given in Box 2.1 illustrate how 
spaces are linked to perception and sense of landownership. 
The 1992 ethnic conflict shaded another dimension of interethnic relations. At 
the height of conflict families shared not only the brunt of violence but whatever 
little they had for survival. Mothers from Ngenyilel a village in Turbo narrated 
how while in hiding in the bush from the attacks they sought comfort with each 
other and shared food (interview, Ngenyilel, 2004). A Nandi mother could send 
her young male relatives home at night to fetch milk from het cows, which was 
shared with her neighbour, a Luyia. Another Nandi mother provided flour for  
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Box 2.1   Space- and territory-related conflicts 
 
Apart from the large scale violence of 1992, there were incidents associated to the mentioned 
attitudes. Four examples are cited below. 
 
Incident 1 
In 1992 a fight broke out between children playing. Their parents took sides and began to ac-
cuse each other for the poor upbringing of their children. Stereotyped accusations followed. 
Neighbours were divided further and at the end of the day houses in the village had been burned 
along ethnic lines (interview, Tapsagoi Location, 2004). 
 
Incident 2 
In 1992 in Chepsaita two men in a social gathering, drinking local brew argued over a female’s 
relationship. The two in their drunken status started fighting. With each receiving sympathy and 
physical support from his side of the community, the fight turned into a violent conflict between 
two communities (interview, Chepsaita, 2004). 
 
Incident 3 
In 2004 a resident in Kamagut who is not from the dominant community was given a house to 
live in and a piece of plot to plough by the title owner (local). After planting his maize he fenced 
the area, but his neighbour destroyed the fence so as to access his house instead of following the 
surveyed route (interview, Kamagut, 2004). An elders’ intervention was sought through a 
baraza (meeting) 
 
Incident 4 
In 2006 near Jua Kali shopping centre a schoolboy picked young tree twigs from a farm belong-
ing to a person not from the dominant community in the area. The owner was enraged and 
physically punished the boy. His family and neighbours took revenge by uprooting the trees and 
destroying the fence. In response the m atter was reported to the police and the parents of the 
boy were arrested. Their neighbours raised bond money and bailed them out of custody .The 
case is still in court. The neighbours are still angered with the farm owners’ action and have 
sworn that they will never allow him to access and use his farm. (Interview, Jua Kali, 2006). 
 
The verdict in all the four cases was that ‘foreigners’ had refused to integrate into the commu-
nity (interview, Kapkeben, 2004). In incident 1 and 2 property was destroyed and residents per-
ceived as ‘outsiders’ were ordered to leave. In incident 3, through the intervention of the title 
owner and the elders the affected was allowed to continue residing in the area. Incident 4 is still 
an ongoing conflict.  
 
 
making porridge. In a number of cases non-Nandi families were given ‘protec-
tion’ and were not attacked. Specific properties of social relations are involved. 
Many of the families from other non-Nandi ethnic groups who were known to 
participate in community events like circumcision, wedding ceremonies, burial 
rites and other community works were deemed as ‘good neighbours’. For those 
who had inter-married or had a family member who had undergone the rite of 
passage of the local Nandi community were accepted as “belonging to the place”. 
One such example was the family of Kamagut farm. Their grandson, though of 
Luo ethnic parentage, lived with his parents and grew up with Nandi children. 
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The name of this person, being a short version of a Luo name, was pronounced 
with a Nandi accent. After passing the Nandi rite of passage like the rest of the 
Nandi youth, he was given the name Arap Tuwei (black bull). According to the 
Nandi tradition, this young man and his extended family are no longer ‘foreign-
ers’ but owners of the place. The social meaning of the name binds to the Nandi 
culture of cattle keeping. Through various avenues like these, individuals and 
families are adopted. 
The aforementioned examples agree with our observation that in narrative, 
ethnic identities are far from being statically characterizing isolated groups, but 
are constructions in progress. This social construct of the ethnic group brings 
meaning and value to a relationship or a set of relationships with others (Martin 
1999), and brings risks (when groups are excluded and seen as ‘outsiders’, or can 
bring harmony and security (when they are seen as ‘insider’ to some degree). The 
construction of identity has created relations of affection and of serious conflict. 
The 1992 ethnic conflict in Turbo showed that the constructed ‘other’ of ethnic 
groups was countered by another construction, the ‘other’ is ‘ours’ at another 
much more personal level. It is at this personal level that hope lies for the future 
of conflicts such as these. 
The other issue is the question of access, sale and ownership of land. At times, 
Nandi individuals sell their land to those perceived to be outsiders while oppos-
ing the same type of sales in public discussions. This situation reveals how rela-
tive and flexible boundaries can be. Ethnic meaning arises only out of the 
interactions of individuals whose expressions of ethnicity can be confirmed by 
the presence of ‘others’. Groups and group identities are products of social envi-
ronments. Eriksen (1999) points out that people are loyal to ethnic, national or 
other imagined communities not because they were born into them, but because 
such foci of loyalty promise to offer something deemed meaningful, valuable or 
useful.  
In Turbo, heightened ethnic consciousness and the desire to ‘protect’ land 
from other ethnic groups became most pronounced during political transition 
years of general elections. The physical boundaries collapsed with the socio-
political boundaries of the ethnic communities. Ethnic groups, like nations in 
most respects other than their lack of a formal state apparatus and international 
recognition, are arenas of political debate (Lonsdale 1992). The majimbo debates 
that have dominated Rift Valley politics since the 1960s for example, attest that 
attempts have been made to not only devolve power but territorialize identities 
too.the debates have raged in newspapers around the country.
1
 The majimbo de-
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  East African Standard, February 2, 1963; East African Standard, September 26, 1963; Stan-
dard, June 22, 1992; Standard, July 18, 1992; Daily Nation, January 30, 1993; Sunday Na-
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bate was again becoming a major campaign tool in the 2007 general election with 
two political parties, Orange Democratic Party and Orange Democratic Party of 
Kenya. The two parties draw leadership and membership mainly from Eastern, 
Coastal, Nyanza, Rift Valley and Western provinces. The situation in Turbo, 
presently an opposition stronghold (ODM), is relatively peaceful in comparison 
to the eve of the 1992 general elections. 
Violence in Turbo: 1992 and 2008 
The 1992 violence in Turbo took place prior to the general elections. The conflict 
was between the Kalenjin, particularly the Nandi who are the majority, on one 
hand and the Luhya, Kikiyu, Luo and other ethnic groups on the other. These 
were communities that supported mostly the opposition parties (Forum for the 
Restoration of Democracy, Democratic Party of Kenya, Social Democratic Party 
of Kenya and others).  
The 1992 ethnic conflicts in Turbo was an extension of the widespread 1991-
1992 conflicts in Kenya advocating for majimbo system of governance. Many 
people saw it as deliberately initiated to counter the calls for the introduction of 
multiparty politics. The triggers of conflict in Turbo were basically arguments 
that began purely as non-political, but mainly social in character. However, they 
quickly degenerated into political conflict given the already charged environ-
ment. The people who were not targeted protected and cared for are those re-
ferred to as the accepted.  
In the 1992 conflict, property, not people was mainly targeted. There is no of-
ficial number of people chased away from the division. According to the Report 
of the Parliamentary Select Committee to investigate ethnic clashes in Western 
and other parts of Kenya 1992, 159 people died, 138 were injured and 4,000 peo-
ple were displaced in Turbo (Republic of Kenya 1992: 85). The majority of them 
moved to the main towns and shopping areas within the division and engaged in 
business activities. Others sold their land while still others exchanged theirs, es-
pecially the Nandi and Luhya. The Luhya moved to Lugari and Kakamega dis-
tricts bordering the division and the Nandi crossed over. Land was valued and 
money added to any party that thought the value of his/her land was higher than 
what they got. The 1992 violence was mainly restricted to the rural part of the 
division. For those who did not want to sell their land and were also not willing 
to resettle, the only options left were to plant crops but settle elsewhere, and to 
                                                 
tion, June 27, 1993; Weekly Review, December 17, 1993; Weekly Review, January 7, 1994; 
Weekly Review, July 15, 1994; Daily Nation, July 26, 1994; Economic Review, October 10-
16,1994; Kenya Times, June 10, 1995. 
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hire the land out to other people, or to leave it unused. In the latter case, nobody 
settled or cultivated these pieces.  
The mechanisms that were put in place to reconcile the people in Turbo were 
mainly carried out by the local population and did not include all communities. 
Some of the methods used were to appeal to Elders to assist the affected commu-
nities. This was only done to those families that their neighbours ‘vetted’ were 
good neighbours. Another method was through traditional cleansing. This was 
mainly done between the Kalenjin and the Luhya, who have had this type of rela-
tionship for longer. Thirdly, various NGOs took charge. Churches – like the Na-
tional Christian Council of Churches and the Anglican Church of East Africa – 
and NGOs – like World Vision and Oxfam – sponsored justice, peace and recon-
ciliation committees. These were organizations that provided relief services dur-
ing the conflict and after the violence resorted to organizing peace committees 
and sponsoring peace meetings. The Catholic Peace and Justice Committees for 
example used the Catholic Small Christian Communities (Jumuiya) to try and 
teach the people on the need to co-exist. However, given the fact that violence 
broke out again in 2008 the attempted reconciliation methods did not bear fruits 
for very long. As for the traditional cleansing and commitment ritual, since it was 
done between the Nandi and the Luhya, it is difficult to pass judgment since the 
two communities in 2008 were allies in the conflict that erupted that year.  
Luhya and Kikuyu were reinstated as landowners in two ways: By acknowl-
edgment of the title deed or with the provision they could use it but not own it. 
though the constitutional claim to land based on ownership of title deed remained 
valid, the indigenous claim (based on a perception of what was once Nandi terri-
tory) usurped the constitutional claim to land, hence the recurrent evictions of 
people (actual owners in law) with title deeds. 
The Turbo registration and the issuing of titles have been going on. Those who 
acquired plots from the 1970s to 1990s have or can now get their titles. The ma-
jority have not acquired theirs, mainly due to the lengthy process and the fee that 
is quite expensive to many. For example, in Kamagut location out of 4,000 titles 
only 1,000 have been collected. In Kapkong the former Manzzine forest was de-
gazzetted and allocated to people for settlement. The process of formalizing title 
deeds is still going on. In general, the increase in land sales and purchases means 
that many people are yet to receive titles. A cross check revealed that quite a 
number of people use informal means to formalize their agreement during land 
sales. They use a simple paper signed by the parties and witnessed by two or 
three people. These papers act as evidence of ownership and it might take many 
years before the parties inform the land board.  
The role of the Land Board is dubious. Officially, the role of the land control 
boards is to regulate sales, transfers, lease, mortgaging, partitioning or other dis-
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posal of, or dealing with any agricultural land within a land control area. Apart 
from the divisional control boards are the provincial appeal boards and the cen-
tral appeal boards. Despite the mentioned role, the boards have little power in ar-
bitrating land rights and issues associated with ownership since most cases come 
to their attention when it is too late for intervention.  
The post-2007 elections violence had some similar characteristics with the 
1992 violence. Again, destruction of property was the aim at both instances. This 
time, apparently there was no prior organization or planning of violence. In the 
two incidents of violence in 2007/2008, the youth seem to have been defiant of 
the elder’s reprimands with regard to looting of property at the time of conflicts. 
It was in both cases not the plan to kill. Many victims were allowed to leave their 
houses and were escorted to safe havens (for instance the district officer’s office 
and Turbo police station). In both situations the role of youths was quite promi-
nent. Most of them were school dropouts and unemployed. They mobilised them-
selves rather than being mobilized. For the majority, the chaos provided an 
opportunity to loot. 
In 2008, however, ethnic alliances had changed. The Kalenjin, Luhya, Luo, 
Somali and other groups allied against the Kikuyu and Kisii. The first group be-
longed to the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) supporters, the latter were 
Party of National Unity (PNU) supporters. The alleged flawed elections pitted 
the groups against each other. PNU was declared the winner in the election poll. 
The violence began initially as anti-election results protests but when the gov-
ernment barred all protests and any public gathering it degenerated into riots and 
destruction. It gained momentum when ethnic groups were accused of ‘aiding 
and stealing the election’, and subsequently countered with revenge attacks. 
Both the Kenyatta and Moi regimes were perceived to have contributed to the 
influx of other ethnic group to the area. During the 2007 political campaigns 
there was rumour that President Kibaki was arranging to hive off part of Moi 
Barracks, a settlement scheme started by President Moi and settled by squatters, 
to be given to Kibaki’s political supporters. Clearly, blame was not restricted to 
only one regime, and so violence was not restricted to one group: It was directed 
against non-Nandi in the one and against non-Kalenjin in the second instance. 
The violence against the Kikuyu, it was argued, stems from their support of their 
‘own’ candidates in the district during elections and the accusation that they were 
never supportive of local Nandi leadership. 
The assumption of this study is that land provides and symbolizes the ‘space’ 
and ‘place’ of engagement in the struggle for national leadership, particularly 
given the fact that political parties in Kenya ‘belong’ to ethnic groups or a coali-
tion of ethnic groups. In the 1992 and 2008 conflicts, the Nandi residents were 
willing to co-exist with others despite their perceived land loss. Nevertheless, the 
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Nandi strongly argue that when it comes to leadership, others have their own an-
cestral lands and therefore their ‘own’ leaders within their own territory; the 
Nandi should not be an exception. According to the Nandi, the proverb “too ki-
boi” (a visitor should allow the host to govern) becomes pertinent. Buying land is 
not enough to gain all rights to govern. One can own land for own use, as a resi-
dential plot, a business premises and a farm, but the politics of the place should 
be the prerogative of those who trace their ancestral roots to the place. 
Conclusion 
This chapter investigated the relationship between territory and the construction 
of identity. An overview of the Nandi history showed that there is a strong influ-
ence of ‘place’ (the physical environment) on peoples’ lives. Narratives of terri-
torial ownership do create and produce an identity. This identity is used to create 
and mobilize groups toward the attainment of particular goals. With regard to 
land, territory is used as a boundary to ‘other’, and when given in use or sold, is 
also used as a symbol of acceptance. The study showed that narratives of identity 
produce change and cannot be understood as expressions of social homogeneity 
or representations of immutable social realities. There are several identity narra-
tives in competition in the same space, and the inhabitants can choose among 
them and even reconstruct new ones from the old. 
That strong sense of belonging to the group at a particular time by the Nandi 
featured in the study carried out in Turbo Division. It revealed that primarily eth-
nicity as a phenomenon is a social construction, a product of human thought and 
action .The most powerful influences on the space and shape of ‘we’ and ‘they’ 
is constructed by territoriality, which consequently impacts on socio-political 
boundaries. The societal, political and historical process and circumstances are 
determinants in constructing ethnic groups. In Turbo, we agreed with the con-
structivism argument that ethnic groups and identity are both dynamic and sub-
ject to modulation according to circumstance and relative position of the sig-
nificant others. In this case, the Nandi are the majority with a relatively high 
dominance over other ethnic groups, especially the Luyia and Kikuyu. The proc-
ess of access and ownership of land in Turbo demonstrates how Nandi identity is 
constructed around land.  
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In the aftermath of Kenyan election violence from 2007-08, many authors have 
connected cattle raiding with political violence over land. While this is helpful in 
some instances, this paper contends that the majority of cattle raids are the result of 
the inability of the state to resolve minor stock thefts through effective policing. 
Using the breakdown of a peace between the Pokot and the Matheniko Karimojong 
as an example, this paper provides a detailed case study on how perceptions of who 
is responsible for a theft can lead to asymmetrical retaliation, and how this can in 
turn lead to the collapse of a carefully negotiated peace. While an example from 
Nauyapong provides reasons to believe local forms of conflict resolution can main-
tain peace, this paper ultimately suggests that without proper policing violence in 
north-western Kenya is unlikely to end. 
Introduction 
North-western Kenya has long been the setting for numerous cattle raids. These 
raids are widely believed to have increased recently, an escalation attributed to a 
variety of factors including small arms proliferation (Mirzeler and Young 2000; 
Bollig & Österle 2007), resource scarcity (Dyson-Hudson 1966; Ocan 1992), the 
criminal nature of the post-colonial state (Knighton 2003), and the gradual spread 
of commercial livestock markets (Eaton 2010). More recently, election violence 
in Kenya has led scholars to argue that cattle raids are part of elite-orchestrated 
ethnic conflicts aimed at acquiring land (Straight 2009; Boye & Kaarhus 2011; 
Greiner et al. 2011). Although some analysts suggest elites exercise less instru-
mental control over land clashes than is commonly assumed (Lynch 2010), terri-
torial gain has become the focus of literature on Kenyan cattle raiding.  
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As ethnicity and land are increasingly linked through notions of autochthony 
(Geschiere 2009), it seems likely that ‘political raiding’ will grow in significance 
in the future. Politics has also played a key role in the calculations of cattle raid-
ers; the protection of patrons like Francis Lotodo and Nicholas Biwott, for exam-
ple, encouraged Pokot raiders to believe they could act with impunity against the 
Luhya and Marakwet in the mid-1990s (HRW 1993; KHRC 1998). However, the 
vast majority of raids in places like West Pokot are far less dramatic, and revolve 
around issues quite different from those linked to election violence. The process 
of “state informalization” under President Moi has left the police in north-
western Kenya completely incapable of investigating stock thefts (Branch & 
Cheeseman 2008; Mwangi 2006). This has forced pastoral peoples to deal with 
stock thefts independently (or with the dubious assistance of NGOs, see Eaton 
2008b), and this has proved deeply problematic. Local solutions to cattle thefts 
are often quite creative (Pkalya et al. 2004), but without proper policing Kenyan 
pastoralists have struggled to avoid cycles of violence that can lead to large-scale 
suffering.   
Stock theft and escalation 
Writing about the 2005 Turbi massacre, Bilinda Straight argues that “cause and 
effect are indistinguishable. Within this fraught crucible, the question of ethnicity 
paces back and forth uneasily” (Straight 2009: 24). This issue of how to sort out 
the relative importance of ethnicity among a variety of other potential causes of 
raiding is deeply frustrating. In a 2008 article, I argued that structural explana-
tions for cattle raiding such as resource scarcity and small arms proliferation are 
inadequate. After concluding that the causes of minor stock thefts are as varied as 
the thieves themselves, I suggested that “a more fruitful avenue of exploration is 
the series of decisions made by both sides in the aftermath of a theft” (Eaton 
2008a: 106). This section will expand on how ethnicity can play a role in these 
calculations at a local level, hopefully without presenting the violence as either 
“timeless” or completely instrumental.  
Once livestock have disappeared, pastoral Pokot have to decide whether to 
seek compensation from the suspects (either through violence or negotiation) at 
the risk of triggering a larger conflict, or to ignore the provocation and suffer the 
loss of badly needed animals. This choice is heavily influenced by nebulous per-
ceptions of the ethnicity of the thieves, the willingness of other communities to 
assist in recovering the stolen livestock, and the existence of local alliances 
across ethnic lines.  
Major raids usually take place only in retaliation for an earlier theft. Time and 
again raiders explain their actions in these terms. The motivation is sometimes 
vulnerability to poverty; without replacements for the stolen livestock, some 
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people fear they will be condemned to destitution (de Koning 2004: 23; Inter-
view #11). But in many other cases, the reason for a retaliatory raid is anger (In-
terview #197). J.T. McCabe, writing about his Turkana informants, notes that 
“the Pokot had killed children, wives, brothers and sisters of many of the 
Ngisonyoka whom I came to know well. One may be able to identify some un-
derlying ecological or economic factors that help explain the perpetuation of 
raiding, but when members of another group kill those you love, the relationship 
becomes personal. Exacting revenge is a powerful motivation, and it is not easy 
to persuade those who have lost a loved one to pursue a course of peace” 
(McCabe 2004: 98). This sentiment was reflected in many of my interviews in 
West Pokot as well (Interview #18, 113). 
Cycles of violence can be created by even the most seemingly insignificant 
thefts. Two raiders in Mbaru described how a minor theft can escalate:  
There are those people with few cattle like two, three or four cows so when it rains he will 
ask himself how he can make himself the same as other people with many cattle. Thus he 
will form his gang and raid those people who will be relaxed knowing there is nothing to fear 
as there is peace. Those people will revenge by raiding the innocent because they don’t know 
who stole their cattle, they only know the specific community who raided them. (Interview 
#146) 
Even the recovery of the stolen animals is no guarantee against further retalia-
tion. In Katilu we were told “maybe your cows were five and you have recovered 
them, you will claim they were six, you lie and that is the beginning of a fight” 
(Interview #199). In these circumstances the potential for violence is enormous, 
and it is little wonder that the North Rift has witnessed countless raids throughout 
much of its history. 
The decision to retaliate for an earlier theft is rarely made by an entire ethnic 
group. Instead, this choice is a struggle between the victim, his close acquaint-
ances, and his self-appointed ‘friends’. This decision can have a disproportionate 
impact on the security situation, and for this reason the community attempts to 
exert some influence over this process, usually through respected elders. How-
ever, among fiercely individualistic pastoralists there are few effective sanctions 
capable of preventing a raid should the victim decide to respond. In the words of 
one Ngisonyoka herder “ordinarily Turkana’s believe that if anything happens it 
is God, but it’s an individual decision as to whether or not one retaliates” (Inter-
view #197). 
Further complicating the issue is that other members of the victim’s ethnic 
group may wish to retaliate ‘on the victim’s behalf’. In the Cherangani Hills, an 
offer by Pokots from Kasai was accepted by the raid victims; “after they 
(Marakwet thieves) took the animals we did not follow as we have no guns. After 
one week our brothers from the lowland came up to revenge. They raided Kap-
sangar, Keptabok, up to Tapach and they took the cows. Many people were 
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killed” (Interview #108). Involving outsiders can improve the chances of success, 
but the raiders have their own agenda, which usually is to acquire as many live-
stock as possible while exposing themselves to very few risks. As a result, they 
will rarely pursue the stolen animals directly since the thieves will be expecting 
pursuit, and instead try to raid the community held broadly responsible for the 
theft. (Interview #117) Retaliation is not an exact science.  
Occasionally the victim will object, usually because he knows he will not per-
sonally benefit from the proceeds of the raid (Interview #125) and will likely face 
the brunt of any subsequent retaliatory attack. In a discussion about an ongoing 
conflict between Kapcheripko Pokot and Sebei herders from Bukwa, one ex-
raider observed that “these Pokots from Kadam were planning to attack the Se-
beis but Pokots from Losidok refused to allow them to do so because should they 
do this, then the Sebeis will come to us and will say Pokots are Pokots and attack 
us. We hence refused the Kadam people to attack Sebeis, they had to go back” 
(Interview #47). In the above example, the credible threat of Sebei retaliation 
helped avert a potential raid. This is the main communal benefit to retaliatory 
raiding, and given the absence of an effective police force in north-western 
Kenya (Eaton 2008c: 280-288), it is a very valuable one. However, the need for 
both sides to maintain such a threat makes even a minor stock theft potentially 
dangerous, and cycles of violence can escalate very quickly. Indeed, many elders 
and raiders conceded revenge attacks do little to prevent future violence (Inter-
view #112). 
Immediately after the theft, the trail left by the livestock will be followed. 
Usually, this also takes the victim further from his network of friends and family. 
The North Rift is home to at least three mutually unintelligible language groups 
and eight to ten distinct dialects; this often means trying to gather information 
without being able to speak to the majority of the people living there. Further-
more, the need to carry firearms for protection (in case the tracks lead one to the 
thief) makes it difficult to enter a new community without arousing suspicions. 
Most trackers must announce themselves to the locals who then decide whether 
or not to assist in the pursuit. This is a crucial and risky choice. With assistance, 
the thief is much more likely to be caught and the stolen livestock, but the tracker 
could be lying about the number of animals stolen, or even be scouting out en-
emy territory in preparation for a future raid (Interview #73). The long history of 
raids, government atrocities, and failed peace negotiations also means few people 
will side with strangers against a member of their own ethnic group. Among the 
Karimojong, this is called kimuk ekile, or ‘covering the man’. The term refers to 
the Karimojong practice of protecting young men accused of crimes by outsiders 
or the government (UHRC 2004: 20). It is also important to note that a surprising 
number of people benefit from the general insecurity in the region and are thus 
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disinclined to offer genuine aid. These not only include other thieves, but also 
corrupt chiefs who receive a percentage of the stolen cattle (Interview #175), eld-
ers who accept an animal in exchange for non-cooperation with pursuers or for 
sanctioning the raid, and livestock ‘traiders’ who can make a large profit by pur-
chasing raided cattle at a deep discount (Eaton 2010). As such it is very rare for 
trackers to receive unconditional help, and in some cases may even be attacked 
themselves (Interview #63, 161). But even with assistance, it is not always easy 
to recover the stolen animals. Once away from the scene of the crime, the thieves 
will quickly divide the livestock and return to their homes with them, scattering 
the tracks in all directions (Interview #125). These tracks will also be mixed with 
those of other livestock as soon as possible, and most stolen animals are 
promptly sold in distant markets (Interview #54). Once this happens there is vir-
tually no chance of finding the original animals.  
Good trackers can occasionally reveal those truly responsible for a theft. In 
this example, a group of Kapcheripko Pokot raid victims, having been robbed by 
unknown thieves, tracked them towards Karimojong territory: 
When the Pian agreed on peace immediately the thieves hit us. In fact, we are confused not 
knowing who we made peace with and who are these striking. We do not blame the Pian be-
cause when we follow up we find that our stolen calves go past them and even they are cry-
ing they have been raided like us.  
Those who raided the calves had realized that the cattle are under tight security and so 
opted to steal the calves knowing they are only guarded by children. Again their trick is to 
drive the stolen livestock towards the Pian’s territory only to change direction so that those 
who follow the livestock may suspect the Pian. (Interview #64) 
This is a common tactic among thieves. One group of Pokot raiders told us 
they raided the Matheniko via the territory of the Tepes, a separate ethnic group 
with whom the Matheniko had a peace agreement (Interview #157). A similar 
example can be found on the border between Trans Nzoia and West Pokot, where 
Luhya thieves “use a tricky route which would otherwise cause Pokots to think 
that the raiders were the Sebeis …” (Interview #28). This ruse is used by raiders 
who wish to spare their families the threat of retaliation or to increase their 
chances of successfully escaping with the livestock, but in the process they can 
create bitterness between their victims and neighbouring groups. One group of 
elders told me that thieves will “jeopardize peace at all costs” (Interview #109). 
By deliberately manipulating their tracks, thieves add more fuel to the fire of 
conflict in the North Rift.  
It may seem excessive to attribute major raids to extremely minor thefts. But 
this is not as far-fetched as one might imagine. The Murkutwo massacre in 2001, 
which resulted in the deaths of over fifty innocent people, had its origins in a se-
ries of escalating raids which took place after the murder of an administrative po-
lice officer in Marakwet. (KHRC 2001: 13-23) In the absence of effective and 
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impartial policing, seemingly insignificant thefts can escalate rapidly, creating 
cycles of violence that become increasingly difficult to arrest. This, I would ar-
gue, is responsible for the majority of cattle raids across the North Rift.  
Asymmetrical retaliation and the peace of Aramtori 
The nature of stock theft creates enormous problems for peace makers in the 
North Rift. Thieves do not always act with the approval or awareness of the eth-
nic group within whose territory they are based, but when they steal livestock 
their tracks run in that direction. This leads to misconceptions as to who is re-
sponsible for the theft, and can lead to unnecessary violence if the victims (or 
raiders acting on their behalf) launch a retaliatory raid. Owing to the range of 
views regarding who is ultimately responsible for a theft, the extremely broad 
spectrum of targets which can legitimately be targeted as revenge for a prior 
theft, and the obvious desire among the raiders to be successful, many retaliatory 
attacks are consciously directed against people who are obviously innocent of 
any wrongdoing (Interview #145). As one Luhya farmer told us “you see, after 
yours is stolen, because of anger you just take any on your way [ie while raid-
ing]” (Interview #36). This sort of attack can accurately be termed ‘asymmetrical 
retaliation’, and it subsequently provides a legitimate grievance for the bewil-
dered and enraged victims, another retaliatory raid is launched, and the cycle of 
violence begins anew. Asymmetrical retaliation ensures peace is exceptionally 
hard to make and equally difficult to sustain.  
The complex relationship between retaliation, ethnicity and conflict was quite 
apparent during my fieldwork in 2005 and 2006. At the start of this period the 
Angoromit Pokot, under the auspices of kraal (or cattle camp) leader Aramtori, 
were at peace with the Matheniko territorial sub-group of the Karimojong and 
had been for many years. This peace had greatly improved the economic situ-
ation in the region. Amudat, a Ugandan town on the Kenyan border, enjoyed an 
unprecedented economic boom, and livestock numbers were widely considered 
to be on the increase. This peace was credited to Aramtori, who had approached 
the Matheniko (a territorial sub-section of the Karimojong), convinced them and 
the Angoromit Pokot to accept the arrangement, and then moved his cattle to 
Torokinai, a kraal located directly between the Matheniko and Pokot (Interview 
#14, 62). Aramtori’s ability to exercise authority south of Moroto is considerable; 
even among members of the rival Pian Karimojong territorial sub-group he is ac-
knowledged as “another President Museveni” (Interview #79). For this reason his 
gesture eased worries as to whether this peace was sincere or merely strategic, 
and many Matheniko moved to Torokinai to live with Aramtori’s Pokot follow-
ers.  
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By October 2005, the situation had changed dramatically. Although the peace 
had not technically broken, it was barely holding and most people in the region 
expected it to collapse during the next rainy season. Several key things had 
changed during the year. The most important change was a major division within 
the Matheniko over whether or not they should ally with Aramtori. Pokot herders 
living adjacent to Aramtori’s kraal offered the following explanation: 
[Aramtori] has made peace with the Matheniko and is staying with them. Sometime re-
cently, the majority of the Matheniko moved to Pokot manyattas where Aramtori stays, but 
later they divided themselves after a misunderstanding. One group stayed with Aramtori 
while the other went away. This is the group that is raiding us. There are other Pokots ac-
companying them. When we ask Aramtori why his people are raiding us, he declined saying 
those are just chelolos (thugs). (Interview #62) 
The Matheniko had effectively divided into two distinct groups. The first can 
be called the Loputuk Matheniko, named after a major kraal near Moroto and al-
lied with Aramtori. The other group became known as the Lorengedwat Mathe-
niko, and were based close to the town of the same name further south (Interview 
#73, 155). When we interviewed Aramtori he claimed that the Lorengedwat 
Matheniko wanted peace, and that only a smaller Matheniko sub-clan called the 
Ngitomei continued to trouble him. In either case the Matheniko, which in theory 
was a united territorial sub-section of the Karimojong, were deeply divided on 
issues related to peace with the Pokot.  
This division created a nightmarish situation for Aramtori, since the Loren-
gedwat Matheniko were accused of involvement in a number of thefts from the 
Kapcheripko Pokot living to the south of the Angoromit. Normally a peace 
agreement between the Pokot and Matheniko would allow the victims to trace 
these cattle deep into Matheniko territory, but the Lorengedwat Matheniko re-
fused to cooperate. The Kapcheripko Pokot then asked Aramtori to help them re-
turn the livestock, but he could do little since the Loputuk Matheniko with whom 
he was living had no authority in Lorengedwat (Interview #155). In some cases, 
the Loputuk Matheniko were also the victims of thieves from Lorengedwat who 
were probably working in tandem with the Bokora, another Karimojong territo-
rial sub-group located further west (Interview #63). Aramtori desperately tried to 
hold the peace together by preventing his Pokot and Matheniko from retaliating 
after small thefts; one peace worker in Nakapiripirit described this as the kraal 
leader’s most important contribution to peace in the region (Interview #92). 
While Aramtori and the Angoromit Pokot had successfully come to terms with 
the Loputuk Matheniko, this peace was useless to Pokot elsewhere. Despite his 
efforts, tensions escalated with every theft. 
The Kapcheripko Pokot increasingly saw the peace with the Matheniko as a li-
ability instead of a benefit, and began looking elsewhere for allies. They quickly 
found one in the Pian, another Karimojong territorial sub-section. The Pian were 
 Revenge, ethnicity and cattle raiding 55 
 
sick of being targeted by raiders (probably including Aramtori’s Pokot and 
Matheniko at Torokinai), and they reached an arrangement to hold joint livestock 
markets at Namalu with the neighbouring Kapcheripko Pokot. These markets 
proved quite popular, and were well-attended in 2005.  
Aramtori had little choice but to accept this agreement, since any raid by the 
Angoromit Pokot against the Pian could lead to the accidental killing of a Kap-
cheripko Pokot, a situation Aramtori was desperate to avoid. His decision to ac-
cept this second peace turned the local strategic situation on its head. The 
Matheniko, including the Loputuk, were livid with Aramtori that the Pokot and 
Pian had come to terms, and feared that this alliance was directed against them. 
One group of Pokot raiders described the arrangement as follows: 
Around Alapat we have peace with the Pian, but there is no peace with the Matheniko. The 
Matheniko refused to make peace saying what should we do with our bullets? The thing is 
this – the Pokot made peace with the Matheniko first and then made peace with the Pian. So 
the Matheniko got annoyed with Aramtori. They asked him, why did you make peace with 
the Pian, where do you want us to raid? So the Matheniko started raiding the Pokot one by 
one, though they are friends. (Interview #44) 
Tensions increased further during the summer of 2005 when a group of Kap-
cheripko Pokot and Pian from Nabilatuk together killed a number of Matheniko 
raiders involved in attacking the Pian (Interview #62). 
The use of the term ‘Matheniko’ as opposed to the more accurate ‘Lorenged-
wat Matheniko’ is justified because at this point neither the Pian nor the Kap-
cheripko Pokot seem to have fully understood that the Matheniko were divided. 
Aramtori himself made this point when we challenged him on whether his people 
were stealing from the Pokot:  
These people of Kapcheripko are not good. There is no single cattle stolen from their place 
that has been brought here. These people are planning to raid my people (his Matheniko sup-
porters). And if there were some who raided them, then they were Ngitomei (a Matheniko 
sub-clan based near Lorengedwat). The Ngitomei also steal from our Matheniko; the Bokora 
also steal from Matheniko. Now if Kapcheripko want to quarrel with me because of the 
peace I have made, then that is not good. They are staying with Pian, but I have not bothered 
them; so why are they after my peace with the Matheniko? Do they want to spoil my peace? 
I have told them, if they want, let them go and raid Lorengedwat, but not my people. The 
Kapcheripko do not differentiate between the Karimojong; they think all are the same … (In-
terview #74) 
This simple misunderstanding extended to the Pian as well. For this reason, 
the Pian were not impressed with Aramtori’s self-proclaimed status as a man of 
peace; one Pian elder bitterly observed that “he isn’t a peace maker, he is an ally. 
Once he allies with the Pokot or Matheniko they always raid their neighbour …” 
(Interview #87). Another Pian herder suggested that he “catalyzes misunder-
standings between two enemies” (Interview #88). This was a common sentiment 
among the Pian; time and again Pian elders mentioned how Aramtori situated 
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himself between the Turkana, Matheniko and the Pokot, reached an agreement 
with the one of these groups and then together they raided the others.  
The exact ethnic identity of the thieves plaguing this part of the North Rift was 
not clear. One interview contained a fascinating exchange between Pokot elders 
and youths in Akorkeya. In response to a question on where these enemies were 
from, the following debate took place: 
Old man:  We think they were Bokora. 
Youth:  No, they were Matheniko. 
Old man:  Why are you people separating these people? I think a Karamojong is a Kara-
mojong, no separation. (Interview #7) 
This was a revealing moment. Most Pokot elders tended to side with Aramtori, 
and indeed helped the Loputuk Matheniko when a group of Pokot youths stole 
their cattle (Interview #153). The elders often felt it was in their best interests to 
support Aramtori’s peace, and as such they were more likely to attribute petty 
thefts to the distant Bokora. The youth, on the other hand, saw little benefit to the 
peace with the Matheniko since they had no herds of their own, and had less to 
lose if the peace broke down. For this reason, they seem to have been more will-
ing to blame the Matheniko for the insecurity. In this case, identifying the ethnic-
ity of the thieves proved highly contingent upon the age of the observer.  
Most Angoromit Pokot, especially those living nearest the Matheniko, were 
willing to accept that the thieves were living on their own and could not be con-
trolled by Aramtori (Interview #75, 161). The thieves were no doubt from a 
whole host of ethnic groups, and despite the fact that some of their individual 
identities were known they were able to evade capture. Aramtori himself knew of 
five Pokot thieves who were operating together with the Lorengedwat Mathe-
niko. The Kapcheripko Pokot asked the Loputuk Matheniko to arrest these 
thieves but they refused, saying the Pokot should deal with these dangerous men 
themselves. The Pokot in turn were not willing to risk killing the thieves since 
they were unsure if their families could subsequently demand compensation (In-
terview #73). The lengthy debate over who was responsible for the thieves did 
nothing to ease the frustration of their Kapcheripko Pokot, who repeatedly traced 
stolen animals back to Matheniko territory. They became more aggressive with 
the Angoromit Pokot, whom they now accused of spying on Kapcheripko herds 
for their Matheniko relatives (Interview #148). One aggrieved Kapcheripko 
Pokot elder assessed the situation as follows: 
They [Bokora] together with Matheniko and Lotikomut [Aramtori’s Pokot and Tepes fol-
lowers], these people come to that ridge and go beyond the hills and steal from the Pokots. 
They were recently confronted as to why they pretend to be Pokot … They were warned that 
soon they will be killed if they continue to pass by this place since they are spies … They 
pretend to be peaceful and come home, then stay out spying every moment in the villages 
and later raid. (Interview #41) 
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The Pokot followers of Aramtori had so angered the Kapcheripko Pokot that they 
described the Angoromit as a “Karamojong blend” (Interview #41). This was 
highly significant since Pokot generally refuse to attack each other. By suggest-
ing that the Angoromit Pokot were not ‘real’ Pokot, the Kapcheripko were mak-
ing a thinly veiled threat.  
Aramtori, despite the divisions within the Matheniko, had little choice but to 
defend them against allegations of theft; after all, if hostilities were renewed, his 
cattle at Torokinai would be directly between the two sides. To this end, he re-
fused to allow raid victims to follow their cattle into Matheniko territory; no 
doubt he feared that they would take the first Matheniko cattle they found as 
compensation, something which could well inspire a retaliatory attack. He also 
tried to restrain his Matheniko followers from antagonizing their neighbours; one 
Matheniko warrior managed to trace a stolen cow back to the Bokora but after 
consulting with Aramtori decided not to pursue the issue further (Interview #63). 
Given the circumstances, Aramtori did his best to try to hold the peace together, 
but minor thieves continually undermined it, and the peace gradually became ob-
solete. As evidence grew stronger that Matheniko were involved in thefts from 
Kapcheripko Pokot, they decided to launch a retaliatory raid. Aramtori heard 
about this attack and warned his Matheniko followers, who moved away from the 
danger area with their cattle (Interview #75). This infuriated the Kapcheripko 
Pokot further, and they began to act independently against the Matheniko without 
informing Aramtori.  
The dynamics of power between the Pokot, Pian and Matheniko are extremely 
complicated, and a strong peace between two of those groups is generally under-
stood to be directed at the third. One Pokot raider described the issue in terms 
that resemble a form of ethnic ‘geopolitics’: 
You know when we made peace with the Pian the Matheniko didn’t like the idea since the 
Pian were their enemy. That is why they want to spoil our peace. The idea is to separate us 
from the Pian so that we do not enjoy peace. (Interview #62) 
When threatened by possible encirclement, the obvious solution is to try to tear 
apart the unity between the rival powers. And to this end, the isolated ethnic 
group will often allow thieves to operate from their territory, using them as a 
weapon to try to break up the peace agreement between the other two. Broadly 
speaking, some Matheniko felt threatened by the new alliance between the Pokot 
and Pian, and due to this began trying to break it apart. The Bokora saw things in 
similar terms, and collaborated in this endeavour. By allowing thieves to operate 
out of their territory while protecting them from enemy trackers, the Bokora and 
Lorengedwat Matheniko were able to create enormous tension in the region. In 
the end, this proved sufficient to break the Pokot-Pian alliance and led to several 
raids between the two groups at the start of the 2006 rainy season.  
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If the circumstances surrounding Aramtori’s peace seem confusing, that was a 
view shared by most of the Pokot and Karimojong involved. Ethnicity is a fluid 
concept, and in the North Rift perception is often as important as reality. Most 
pastoralists are aware that ethnic groups in the region do not act as homogenous 
units when it comes to cattle raids. However, nuanced information on divisions 
within an ethnic group is not always widely available. For reasons of kinship, 
geographical distance, or linguistic skill, certain people know more than others. 
And from Aramtori’s peace, one can see that the less someone knows about the 
situation, the more likely they are to hold a larger group of people responsible. 
On the border between Kenya and Uganda, this helps create and sustain cycles of 
violence. 
Aramtori’s peace work is perhaps the most critical of any in the region; con-
trolling the urge to retaliate among aggrieved raid victims is a difficult, thankless 
task. Unfortunately, his inability to orchestrate the return of stolen Pokot cattle 
through negotiations with his Matheniko allies increased tension between the two 
groups as well as between the Kapcheripko and Angoromit Pokot. In this in-
stance, the chaos created by the thieves overwhelmed the good will which existed 
on both sides, and eventually two significant peace agreements collapsed.  
It should be clear that knowing conclusive evidence as to whether a thief was 
Bokora, Matheniko, or Pokot did not exist. The most useful sources of informa-
tion were the tracks of stolen cattle and rumours about those involved, both of 
which were manipulated to achieve different aims. For this reason, ethnicity in 
the North Rift contributed to the process of asymmetrical retaliation. In the end it 
appears a group of multi-ethnic thieves operating among the Lorengedwat 
Matheniko orchestrated the collapse of a truce between the Kapcheripko Pokot 
and Pian as well as the Angoromit Pokot and Loputuk Matheniko. Even with lo-
cal kraal leaders making a sincere effort to bring people together, determined 
thieves were able to undermine and shatter two peace agreements in less than a 
year. This is a sobering reminder of the fragile nature of peace in the region.  
Asymmetrical retaliation does not always lead to further violence, however, 
and local forms of conflict resolution can occasionally achieve real results. The 
peace between the Turkana of Lorengipi and the Pokot of Nauyapong provides 
an excellent example of how cycles of violence can be prevented. The peace 
started due to a drought in Turkana in 1989, but for three years theft was still fre-
quent throughout the region. By 1992, both sides were fed up with the situation, 
and in a dramatic meeting a significant breakthrough was accomplished; the 
Lorengipi Turkana and the Nauyapong Pokot agreed to help each other locate 
thieves and track stolen animals. This peace agreement held during 1999 despite 
a devastating raid by the Turkana on Pokot living in nearby Apuke. With help 
from the Amukuriat District Officer (DO) and sympathetic local Turkana, the 
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stolen animals were traced to a location deep within Turkana District. Since the 
neighbouring Turkana were not involved, the peace held. In 2005 it was still 
holding, and intermarriage between these two communities was common (Inter-
view #12, 70, 146). 
However, the Pokot and Turkana were still having their animals stolen on a 
frequent basis (Interview #70, 71). Although these thefts were small, usually in-
volving fewer than ten raiders, they were a major aggravation and kept tensions 
high. Nonetheless, the peace held. The Pokot in Nauyapong told us that “we are 
at peace with the Turkana around Lorengipi. Those from Lokiriama, Kosipu, and 
Murua Ngithigerr are killing our people and taking away cattle. Up to Loiya are 
good people. Otherwise those who are attacking us … they are not the usual Tur-
kana raiders we know, they are thugs” (Interview #12).  
The Turkana likewise recognized that the Pokot living nearby “stay peace-
fully” and were not responsible for the frequent petty thefts (Interview #70). Im-
portantly, elders on both sides were also cooperating to bring the real thieves to 
justice (Interview #13). Understandably, people who lost livestock and were un-
able to recover them became upset, and there was considerable scepticism on 
both sides about the prospects for peace over the long term (Interview #204). But 
during the past twenty years a measure of tranquillity has taken hold in what had 
previously been one of the most violent corners of the North Rift. 
The two examples above certainly suggest it is extremely challenging for local 
communities to maintain a long-term peace agreement. In these cases, however, 
what is not said is perhaps of even greater significance. Except for the brief and 
unexpected intervention of the Amukuriat DO in 1999, at no point did any in-
formant indicate government forces played a major role in either creating peace 
or perpetrating violence. In north-western Kenya the state is conspicuous in its 
absence, and from 2005 to 2006 few people seriously considered referring crimes 
to the police or military. Improved police investigations and more effective 
cross-border cooperation between Kenya and Uganda could contribute to the 
resolution of many of the stock thefts described above without need for retalia-
tion, but without additional resources, closer administration, and an end to puni-
tive disarmament (which has widely eroded trust in government authorities; 
Mkutu 2008: 124) this is unlikely in the near future. 
Conclusion 
While scholars like Boye and Kaarhus are correct to argue that politics can in 
certain circumstances lead to major eruptions of violence in the North Rift, this 
article contends that other, more mundane issues may be of greater importance 
on a day-to-day basis. In particular, I would argue that small-scale thefts occur 
constantly in arid and semi-arid regions. How people respond to these minor 
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thefts is crucial to understanding the constantly fluctuating levels of violence. In 
the absence of effective policing, raid victims must decide whether to pursue 
their animals or suffer their loss, and in many cases the latter option is unaccept-
able. In other instances members of their community or ethnic group opt to re-
taliate on their behalf in an effort to deter future attacks, or also to obtain 
livestock for themselves. In an area where the police and the army are either ab-
sent or exceedingly feeble, pursuing the animals through the vehicle of the state 
is not an option. The weakness of the state in the north-western Kenya enables 
the cycles of violence I have described above.  
Thieves often undermine whatever fragile peace agreements exist. As one 
raider told us, “the idea of raids is complicated because when there is peace 
amongst the two communities there are people amongst us who don’t want that; 
thugs take advantage of peace so that they can get animals easily” (Interview 
#44). In some cases, this is an intentional effort to tear apart peaceful communi-
ties, as it was for the Lorengedwat Matheniko and Bokora who felt threatened by 
the agreement between the Pian and Pokot. In others, it is a simple matter of ex-
pediency, since people at peace are less likely to be alertly watching their herds. 
These thieves are exceedingly difficult to track since they will usually take an 
indirect route, thereby slowing pursuit and allowing them to quickly sell the sto-
len livestock.  
However, the desire for revenge often leads to asymmetrical retaliation against 
people living near the escape route of the thieves. These people may be innocent 
of wrongdoing, and for this reason will perceive the attack against them as en-
tirely unprovoked. If they respond in kind yet another cycle of violence will have 
been started, and the painstaking process of resolving the grievances of both 
sides must begin anew. I would argue it is this process which is behind the ma-
jority of cattle raiding violence in the North Rift. Efficient, politically-neutral po-
licing capable of nipping these cycles of violence in the bud is necessary to 
preserve peace along the Kenya-Uganda border. 
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The apparent decline of East African pastoralism has been of interest to a large 
number of scholars and researchers from various disciplines. A phenomenon that 
has been discussed extensively during the past ten to fifteen years is the impact of 
automatic weapons on the livelihoods of pastoralists. The militarization of these 
societies has, so it is argued, contributed to an escalation of violence in the entire 
region, to power shifts within the societies in favour of young men, and to the 
commercialisation of cattle raiding. But while there exists a great amount of lite-
rature on such recent changes of these societies, there is little information available 
about how the pastoralists think about this themselves. This chapter presents such 
local views and explanations, for the case of the Pokot agri-pastoralists of North-
western Kenya, it scrutinises local perceptions of and attitudes towards external in-
terventions of states and NGOs. It will be demonstrated that local perceptions 
differ significantly from those of outside actors, which is mainly rooted in a differ-
ent understanding of violence and conflict. The findings presented here will not 
only contribute to a greater understanding of the situation the pastoralists see 
themselves in, but they also help to explain why external interventions – and espe-
cially peace building activities – have so little success. The empirical data used in 
this chapter has been collected during a fieldwork period of three months, which I 
have spent in a small Pokot community in the border region of Kenya and Uganda 
in early 2006. 
Introduction1 
Much has been written about the decline of East African pastoralism, which is 
supposedly not only rooted in the increasingly unsustainable way of the pastoral-
                                                 
1
  This chapter draws on parts of my Master’s thesis “Defying the decline of pastoralism: Pokot 
perceptions of violence, disarmament, and peacemaking in the Kenya/Uganda border region” 
(Mieth 2006). 
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ists’ form of living – due to advanced degradation of the environment, for exam-
ple – but more and more related to their engagement in inter- and intra-ethnic 
conflicts. Authors who concentrated on this latter aspect often conclude that the 
availability of small arms represents one of the greatest threats to pastoralism in 
the region: “We argue that an entire mode of existence seems to be endangered 
because of the failure to cope socially and politically with the introduction of 
automatic guns” (Österle & Bollig 2003: 132). Others state that “… AK-47 raids 
currently represent the single greatest risk to the persistence of the pastoralist 
systems … and to the continued survival of pastoralists themselves” (Gray et al. 
2003: S21).  
However, as I will demonstrate in this chapter, the pastoralist perception dif-
fers significantly from the situation portrayed in recent academic literature and 
consultancy reports. While researchers primarily focus on the effects of small 
arms on pastoralist warfare, they tend to overlook that many pastoralists do not 
see guns as a cause of increasing violence in the region. What is more, through-
out my fieldwork few of my informants agreed with the fact that violence had 
actually increased after the introduction of automatic weapons. The motives of 
warriors to participate in cattle raids and thefts, the two most common forms of 
inter-ethnic conflict in the research area, have not changed in any significant 
way. “The difference is only in having guns, but the fighting is the same, there is 
no difference. The hotness of the killing is the same” is how Kokoroi, an older 
warrior, put it.
2
 It is thus of crucial importance to reveal what pastoralists think 
about their situation, not only in order to find an answer to what the pastoralists 
do perceive as problematic but also to learn more about their way of thinking and 
the resulting actions needed to address violence and its impact. 
A further, important aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how futile external 
interventions have been either to disarm the pastoralists or to facilitate peace in 
the region. Both Uganda and Kenya have initiated numerous disarmament opera-
tions, which have usually led to mass migrations of pastoralists across the inter-
national border in order to escape disarmament. Moreover, the operations were 
often followed by periods of heavy raiding after one group had been disarmed 
and left without security – only forcing this group to quickly reacquire guns to be 
able to counter-attack. So far, the two governments have acknowledged that only 
joint disarmament initiatives will be successful in the long run, but there has not 
been a serious attempt to coordinate activities on the ground. Peace building, on 
the other hand, is on the agenda of numerous NGOs working in the area – with 
equally negligible achievements. NGOs realise that only days after they organ-
                                                 
2
  In order to protect my informants, I have chosen to change all names as well as the name of 
the research location. 
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ised a peace workshop and initiated peace talks between enemy groups, the  
warriors are out there raiding each other again. But even traditional peace agree-
ments are said to be broken more often than in earlier times, and this pheno-
menon demands a closer look at what difficulties the groups themselves experi-
experience in peace making. In the latter sections of this chapter, I will therefore 
examine external interventions and their effects on the local population. 
The research area 
The centre of Kenan, the research location, is situated about five kilometres away 
from the border to Uganda (Map 4.1). Most villages in the area look like Kenan: 
half a dozen shops along the road and some stone houses make up the centre. 
Around it, blending into the landscape and widely spread out, lay the manyattas  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 4.1 Map showing the area around Kenan 
(Adapted from United Nations Map No. 4187 Rev. 3, December 2011) 
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of most of the community members. There is not just a geographical split; most 
of the villages consist of a ‘traditional’ and a ‘town’ community. The traditional 
community members almost exclusively rely on agro-pastoralism, i.e. livestock 
keeping, combined with growing maize or sorghum on a small field, the shamba. 
Most of the town people work for churches, schools, dispensaries, or run one of 
the shops in the centre, and the majority send their children to school. Some 
families were able to afford to build ‘iron’ houses (clay houses with roofs of cor-
rugated iron) in the centre, and the majority still relies on farming and keeping 
some livestock. Traditional community members referred to themselves as ‘pas-
toralists’ or ‘traditional people’, the latter they used to distinguish themselves 
from the town people. In this chapter I will use these terms accordingly.  
It is thus only the traditional people that actively engage in the conflicts. This 
needs to be stressed, especially since it is rarely mentioned by NGOs, media, or 
scholars. This is not to say that this difference has not been noticed so far, rather, 
it has not been sufficiently discussed. Some scholars, and even more so consult-
ants (for the case of NGO-funded studies), either presuppose that their readers 
know about this and only write about the traditional community, or they do not 
consider it as an important distinction to make. But it is important for the pastor-
alists. At the latest, this became clear to me as some respondents were noticeably 
amused about NGOs trying to convince town people to live in peace. This chap-
ter is thus about the traditional community, but I will address the relationship be-
tween the two groups and its consequences where necessary. 
Pokot perceptions 
“Remember, we are adapting (to this life). We might not feel well, but this is common here, 
it’s how we live, and we can’t do anything about it.” (Alicia, older woman) 
It is the expression of a pragmatic and almost indifferent attitude that I encoun-
tered throughout my entire fieldwork, and it will be recognisable in many quotes 
I use in this chapter. The respondents usually divided ‘society’ into three groups 
– warriors, old men and women – categories that I found useful for my descrip-
tion as well.  
 
Warriors’ doubts 
To be a warrior in Pokot society means to establish yourself in the community. 
Young warriors need to acquire cattle in order to marry, and they are even more 
under pressure as the age of marriage decreases – it was common in Kenan that 
15-year-old warriors were married already. Their main objective is to obtain in-
dependence; that means to be able to have and maintain one’s own boma, 
shamba, and of course a respectable cattle herd. Warriors develop very close 
friendships with each other, and these friendships are ritually strengthened, for 
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example by giving each other (raided) cattle.
3
 Warriors orientate themselves 
much more towards their peers than to their families, and many of them felt they 
had to get married when one of their friends did.
4
 
To be regarded as a hero and to gain status in the community is of immense 
importance to the warriors. Unanimously, all warriors agreed that raids are un-
avoidable, and so is death: “Death is compulsory among us. You go there for ap-
preciation of others, they say this is a hero, he brought a lot of cattle, he killed an 
enemy; that is why we are out there, we don’t have another trade” (Lodukwi, 
young warrior). If a warrior dies “in the cattle trails”, he augments his and his 
family’s status enormously. In the same way, if he proves to have poor skills he 
will be teased with no mercy. Other warriors will think of songs to humiliate him 
and his family, and he will be called a ‘woman’.5 To describe the unity the warri-
ors feel when opposed with an enemy, Simonse (2003: 250) has developed the 
concept ‘enemy complex’: ‘Violence aimed at an enemy is not only socially ap-
proved, it also marks the progression to full membership of the society’. 
However, not all warriors are very confident with the idea of a life based on 
male heroism. There was often doubt among them and some of them seemed to 
realise that their current behaviour is not sustainable. When asked what they look 
for in life, many young warriors avowed that they want to have big families and a 
comfortable life and the period of raids is seen as a means of reaching this status. 
Remarkably enough, such a doubtful attitude was more often articulated by 
younger warriors while especially older warriors were regarded as the most stub-
born raiders by their wives and other warriors.
6
 Their explanation was simply 
that they saw the raids as a supplement income as few of them actually needed 
the animals:  
“Well, I only know the positive sides of raiding. We need something to eat and we have to 
look for that. We want to get married. I don’t know the negative side of it. Somebody knows 
himself well, he will resign when he is too old. You believe in yourself, you will still go.” 
(Longon, older warrior) 
 
Old men’s loss of power 
Ritually, elders are the most powerful actors in Pokot society and they have 
gained this power because of their age. They are supposed to make decisions 
concerning society, culture, issues of daily life, and they are responsible for 
                                                 
3
  For an explicit description of bonding between (young) Pokot men and how this is expressed 
in economic relationships see Bollig 1992: 89-92. 
4
  An exception to this is warriors that have an older brother – they did not feel pressured, be-
cause the older brother needs to be married off first. 
5
  Similar observations have been made among the Eastern Pokot (Österle 2006: 25).  
6
  Here, I am referring to warriors who I estimated to be older than 30 years.  
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peacemaking. In Kenan, the major problem articulated by old men was the lack 
of respect for them by the younger generation:  
“Oh, this age of today is very bad, they don’t respect you. They don’t know who is an elder. 
You will be pushed, beaten; they lack respect!” (Lokui, old man)  
Yet, the impression I got during fieldwork was that elders made extremely little 
effort to change the status quo. Why were they so passive? Did they not see any 
solutions? Did they think the situation was hopeless?  
A range of scholars agrees that rapid militarization of pastoralist youth has un-
dermined the traditional power of elders in many societies (see Österle & Bollig 
2003; Simonse 2003; Mirzeler & Young 2000; Abbink 1994). And indeed, many 
elders considered the guns to be a threat to their power – they often mentioned 
that nowadays a son could just shoot his father in an argument.
7
 Moreover, old 
men realised that if they discourage their sons to go on raids they would not get a 
share of the raided cattle, and this caused some older men too refrain from open 
criticism.  
“In the old days we would talk more with each other. Nowadays you have a gun, and that 
decides many things. You let the gun talk.” (Apaloyaka, old man) 
However, to ascribe this apparent loss of power of elders solely to the militari-
zation of the younger generation is a hasty and uncritical conclusion. Pokot life 
has changed profoundly in the past three decades, not only because of the influx 
of weapons but much more so because of ‘development’: the current generation 
did not only grow up with automatic weapons, but with dispensaries, schools, 
fundraisings, politics, money, relief food, and so forth. Older people, especially 
those that had a son or daughter in school, were starting to feel lost because sud-
denly the younger generation knows how to ‘do things’.  
“Some years ago, a person that gave his child to school, you know that man will not suffer in 
times of drought because his child knows where to find food. The rest of us, we just don’t 
know, even to go to Kapenguria,
8
 we don’t know how.” (Longon, older warrior) 
Elders did not only see a loss of their own power, they also realised that Pokot 
society as a whole is losing its independence. The pastoralists can no longer 
solely live off their livestock – the ideal situation many elders still use as a point 
of reference – and after incorporating agriculture in their way of living, they now 
see themselves depending on relief food, medicines, and under increasing pres-
sure to send their children to school.  
                                                 
7
  However, no one could remember this ever happened in the research location. 
8
  Capital of West Pokot District. 
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While this might explain the pessimistic and often indifferent attitude of elders 
that I so often encountered, it does not give a satisfying answer to why they 
seemed so passive. And indeed, elders had their own explanation:  
“This is a natural change; we call this a new generation. We were told, the generation will be 
different now, and people will know vegetables. That’s why we call it the green generation. 
See, even your child cannot fear you, even if you are his father or mother, they will not hear 
you. We did not live this way. [The prophet] said, ‘the younger generation, the kakariakech, 
will have no respect, not even something like humbleness, even the cattle is reducing, and 
people start chewing vegetables.’ This generation was predicted by the prophet but the man 
is dead now. He predicted things of the earth, not of heaven, they are all true.” (Apaturkan, 
old man)
9
 
This younger, ‘problematic’ generation has thus been predicted long ago. It is 
a natural change, as Apaturkan put it, and it explains why elders do not see 
themselves responsible for changing or even interfering with the activities of the 
kakariakech. Consequently, for some there was only one way to solve the prob-
lem – to wait for the next generation: “Let us leave this generation until their 
children come, and then we will see the difference” (Limangole, old man).  
Yet another reason why older people refrain from criticising their children is 
that, because they are no longer in charge of societal changes, they cannot offer 
better solutions. For example, many older people disapproved the early marriages 
of their children. But, as one old man mentioned, maybe the young people are 
just adapting to the ‘new world’:  
“We came to realize that to have a person grow older and older before he marries; that is not 
the kind of living today. We will be killed instead of having children. I don’t know if this is 
good …” (Ngorakamar, old man) 
To summarise, the loss of elder’s power seems to originate from both sides 
rather than from the side of the power-seeking warriors only. Guns might support 
the young men’s struggle for independence, but the idea of a ‘bad generation’ 
among older people as well as the challenging confrontation with structural 
changes of the whole society have both contributed much more to the passive-
ness and declining influence of elders.  
 
Women’s influence 
The traditional Pokot society is a patrilineal and patrilocal society, two features 
common to most East African pastoralist societies, and usually women are not 
involved in decision-making. In some cases, e.g. concerning the marriages of 
their children, mothers will be asked for an opinion, but only within the house-
hold sphere they exercise a certain amount of power. The realm of cattle, raids, 
security and conflicts have, on the other hand, remained purely the business of 
                                                 
9
  Kakariakech is not a specific generation name; it means ‘younger generation’.  
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men. However, in recent literature women have been ascribed a greater – sup-
porting – influence than previously assumed (Watson 2003; Masinde et al. 2004). 
Here, I want to discuss how the Pokot women saw the issue themselves. Do and 
can they encourage or discourage their sons or husbands to go on raids? And are 
the ideas of men about women’s roles in conflict positive or disapproving?  
Similarly to the statements of men, most women thought that the raids simply 
belong to the life of a Pochon (singular for Pokot), as does fear – for example 
that the husband could be killed – and this is the way they are used to live. Many 
women felt that the raids are unavoidable, and did not bother thinking about 
causes or solutions. Consequently, they seldom talked about the raids with each 
other, which they also explained with the fact that none of the pastoralists’ wives 
were educated enough to understand these issues.  
Like men, women of different ages thought very differently about the raids. 
Clearly, older women were more assertive in stating their opinion. The majority 
of older women openly complained about the negative effects of the raids, and 
they often mentioned they wanted to convince their husband or sons to stop raid-
ing. This openness might have been a result of their higher status in society, as 
opposed to unmarried girls or younger co-wives. However, none of the older 
women felt that they could do anything to change the situation – beyond com-
plaining about it. Younger women, on the other hand, were quite ambiguous 
when we talked about the raids. Some said that they did not like their husbands to 
go on raids and some even claimed they do not appreciate that they bring raided 
cattle into the household. However, the majority of younger women had a sup-
portive attitude towards their husbands’ activities, arguing that there was no al-
ternative to survive in the region:   
“See, the majority of us, we lack pasture and food, and we will be raided by enemies. That is 
when we encourage [them], and we ask then men, if possible – because they can get killed – 
to go and bring the cattle back. If our cattle have been raided, what can you do, if all has 
been taken?” (Olivia, middle-aged woman) 
Moreover, co-wives seem to encourage each other, not least because they are 
‘competing’ for the same man. A younger wife referred to the typical cheering 
for raiders who come home: 
“Well, you don’t keep quiet because they bring the cattle. Even the other wives can laugh 
about you, they can say, our husband brings home some cows, and you, you stay quiet?” 
(Janet, recently married girl) 
When talking with men about women’s role in raids and conflict, most of the 
answers coincided with women’s statements. Especially young warriors asserted 
that girls were encouraging their raiding activities, because they liked to be the 
wife of a respected raider. Others simply said, their wives told them to participate 
in a raid because they lacked milk cows and the children were hungry. Having 
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said that, old men firmly disagreed that women could have any supporting or dis-
couraging role at all; women are not supposed to disagree with their husband nor 
should they concern themselves with men’s issues: 
“Since women are not talking to us, you know, they are not supposed to stand in front of 
men or talk, they don’t influence the men to go on raids. They are young, and we call them 
children. You know, how do you expect that the children will advice the elder?” (laughs) 
(Lomuria, older man) 
It can be concluded that the role of women in conflict remains marginal in 
‘public’ society. In the household sphere however, especially young women tend 
to support the raids rather significantly. Generally, one could assume that no war-
rior would accept the humiliation of his wife complaining to him and his fellow 
warriors how small their herd is.
10
  
Who rules this land?11 
In Pokot society, similar to many other pastoralist groups, the warriors are re-
sponsible for community security and each community has its own strategy of 
securing its territory.
12
 Older warriors are supposed to scout the area before the 
herds go out and after they come back at night, while younger shepherds herd the 
cattle. Cattle are grouped in medium-sized herds, allowing smaller households or 
households without guns to profit from the protection of others. Among the west-
ern Pokot, similarly to other pastoralist groups in the region, a group of warriors 
and old men organises a security meeting every morning to decide about the 
grazing routes of the day.
13
 Generally, the pastoralists thought their current way 
of securing the area was relatively effective.  
Women, of course, saw the issue of security from another angle; as their duty 
was to run the household with all its different chores, while their husbands’ were 
responsible for securing this household. Consequently, many women stated that 
they felt most secure when the herds were in the cattle camps and the chance of 
attacks was small. Other women criticised the state:  
“We are not seeing the government around. There is nobody who can make us feel secure, 
who will even ask us.” (Alicia, middle-aged woman) 
                                                 
10
  Similar findings have been made by Watson (2003). In the report, Watson describes in detail 
how women indirectly contribute to pastoralist conflict, for example by performing certain 
(secret) rituals, or even by nagging or abusing their men at home (Watson 2003: 18-20).  
11
  Full quote: “Who rules this land? Only soldiers? We don’t even have soldiers now. And we 
don’t have strong soldiers; it is only the warriors we have” (Losilang, old man). 
12
  See de Koning (2004) for the Jie, Simonse (2003) for the Karimojong, Bollig (1992) for East 
Pokot. 
13
  De Koning op cit. 
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And indeed, Kenan could not have been more remote in terms of state repre-
sentation and protection. Except an assistant chief, a position that is usually held 
by a community member, there was no government official or institution situated 
anywhere near to the village. The next Kenyan police post, consisting of one AP 
officer,
14
 was about 30 kilometres away, and the next army base, court, or gov-
ernmental administrative institutions were more than one hundred kilometres 
away. There was a police station and an army base located in the neighbour 
Ugandan community, but these institutions have proved to be of little help in pro-
tecting the communities. 
The Kenyan government has tried to improve the security situation in such 
remote areas by setting up the Kenya Police Reservist (KPR) programme. For 
more than two decades now, ‘homeguards’ are being assigned and provided with 
government guns. Nevertheless, this did not change much in the security situa-
tion in Kenan, as the majority of the KPRs were pastoralists and their activities 
were not at all different from what warriors would do when protecting the com-
munity. If the community had been raided, a group of warriors would chase after 
them and try to get as many animals back as possible. In fact, the KPRs criticised 
that they were not allowed to take the government guns across the border into 
Uganda when following Karimojong raiders. This situation leaves the KPRs with 
two options; either to illegally take the guns into Uganda or to have a second (il-
legal) gun for such missions and for conducting raids.
15
 
Informants usually described the relationship between Pokot and the govern-
ment as one based upon suspicion and mutual mistrust.
16
 On the one hand, many 
respondents articulated that the government was not interested in them, and con-
sequently did not expect any help at all. The government was then referred to as 
yet another enemy, albeit one that cannot be defeated. On the other hand, many 
pastoralists criticised both governments of ‘letting them alone’ out there, and 
forcing them to defend themselves.  
There has not always been such a lack of state presence in Pokotland and there 
was – not surprisingly – a nostalgic feeling towards colonial times among older 
                                                 
14
  Administration Police (AP) officers are untrained and supposed to assist the DC and used to 
be recruited locally (Dietz 1987: 189). However, all officers I met during my stay were 
members of the dominant Kikuyu or Coast ethnic groups in Kenya.  
15
  It must not be assumed that the KPRs feel connected to the state in any way, as the ‘selection 
process’ does not necessarily involve government officials other than the chief of the loca-
tion. KPRs are not paid, but most of them consider the gun as payment. Some of the respon-
dents of this research were KPRs; their opinions did not differ from that of other 
respondents. Furthermore, the unusually high number of KPRs in the research location dem-
onstrates a great deal of Pokot pragmatism.  
16
  I am using the term ‘the government’ because most Pokot did not see a difference between 
the Ugandan and Kenyan government.  
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community members. They remembered colonial times and the years shortly 
thereafter as a time of ‘enforced’ peace and order, even though they were re-
stricted in their activities:  
“When the wazungu (whites) were here, and the Karimojong came and took the cattle, or 
even when Pokot took cattle, they would have to pay back. The wazungu would go and find 
the cattle and return it. … There were no complaints, you just saw your cattle being taken 
away by wazungu. They brought them to [the village in Uganda] and returned it to the peo-
ple that lost it. But that doesn’t happen now. You know, last week, we heard our cattle were 
taken by Karimojong and I am only praying to God to help my cattle there.” (Losilang, old 
man) 
Elders also remembered that they felt more secure because of this state pres-
ence, especially during times when both armies were stationed along the borders 
of Pokot and Karimojong territories. 
Nowadays, however, Pokot seem to have lost any respect for the government. 
Again, it would be misleading to assume that this is a consequence of the pastor-
alists’ militarization. In the eyes of Pokot, the image of the government had suf-
fered substantially because of its inability to manage local problems. It is inte-
resting, for example, that the current government is seen as a part of the 
kakariakech generation: 
“In our time it was better because the government, they respected themselves, they were 
hearing each other. Nowadays, they themselves start killing each other, those are the stories 
we will hear when we go to Kapenguria, you hear a soldier has been killed in Nairobi or in 
other big places like Nakuru, they kill each other. This is now the generation that was long 
predicted, for a long time, and now we know they have come.” (Apaturkan, old man) 
With amazement the pastoralists realise that nothing happens when a police 
officer or soldier gets killed in a fight with warriors. The lack of interest on the 
part of the government and its increasing ineffectiveness to deal with it’s ‘own 
problems’, so the Pokot reason, have led to an inability to deal with the pastoral-
ists’ situation:  
“See, because we take each other’s cattle, the government is not in charge of the situation.” 
(Lokui, old man)
17
  
 
Disarmament 
“We disagree with the government and we fight with them. We were disarmed twice and 
when our neighbours saw us disarmed they came and took our cattle. We disagree to give 
                                                 
17
  The situation is not much different in areas where the state is present in form of executive 
forces. In the village across the border in Uganda, despite the presence of police and army, 
Pokot saw themselves left alone by the state: “Ah, the government is doing nothing! Even 
four days ago, the Karimojong came to [the village in Uganda] and even to the centre, and 
they were taking goats from somebody. That man was calling for alarm, and they were fol-
lowing them on the main road, but the soldiers were not doing anything! Not even a sign 
from them.” (Lomuria, old man) 
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our guns that we have bought for a lot of reasons, like insecurity and self-defence.” (Ngora-
kamar, old man) 
Trying to summarise the Pokot attitude towards disarmament, I could not have 
said this any better. After numerous unsuccessful and often chaotic disarmament 
attempts by Kenya and Uganda, Pokot have become suspicious of just about any 
intervention by both governments. When asking Pokot about their perceptions of 
disarmament, the answers were similarly resolute like the quote above; and no 
single respondent considered disarmament as a possible or even legitimate solu-
tion to any of the problems we talked about. Although some women and elders 
mentioned that they would like the warriors to be disarmed, they could not trust 
the government in disarming other pastoralist groups at the same time, and thus 
concluded that it is indeed better to keep the weapons. Even households that were 
not armed showed a great deal of irritation about the government plans to disarm 
them: 
“I think badly about it, because they disarm the people over there (points westwards). These 
people are the ones protecting us and if the government disarms them we will die together. 
Remember, while we are sitting here, those people are protecting us. If they did not do that 
we would not walk the way we are walking. We depend on those people, what do we have to 
protect ourselves?” (Abele, middle-aged man)18 
For the Western Pokot, the single most memorable disarmament operation was 
the one of 1984, when the pastoralists felt for the first time that their own gov-
ernment saw them as enemies. The Kenyan army confiscated about 8,000 head of 
cattle in order to force the pastoralists to surrender their guns. Helicopters were 
used to round up the animals and to bomb homesteads or places where people 
were thought to hide. Only 1,000 animals were returned more than two months 
later, after the army had sold and eaten part of the herd, and let the majority of 
the animals starve to death. This happened shortly after a prolonged drought and 
many Pokot lost all the cattle they had (see Dietz 1987: 191). This event still sig-
nificantly shapes the negative opinion the Pokot hold of the government. 
While many respondents thought that such a disarmament operation would not 
repeat itself, the fact that the government was still trying to disarm them demon-
strates their lack of understanding of the local situation. Many informants argued 
that disarming the pastoralist groups does not solve the problem of the illegal 
arms trade in the region. Similarly, warriors could not understand why the gov-
ernment would not make an effort to stop them from acquiring guns and instead 
actually fuelled arms trade in the region:  
                                                 
18
  Contrary to some estimates, not all male members in Pokot society own weapons. This 
household, for instance, was still suffering from a lapai punishment imposed on them three 
years ago. Because they were not able to acquire cows since then, they could not pay for a 
gun.  
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“The government, they don’t know where the guns come from. If we have to deliver a gun 
we can just go to that place – and we are not telling where that is – and we can get a new 
gun.” (Loberun, warrior) 
Other respondents simply did not understand the reason for the recurring disar-
mament operations, which also indicates that these interventions are carried out 
without effective prior sensitisation. Some respondents came up with bewildering 
explanations for the operations, for example, that they are carried out because the 
government lacks funds:  
“The government took our protection for no reason! We wonder and we want to say, that the 
government of Museveni (Uganda) was missing money and that is why they were taking the 
guns from us. We don’t see the reason, we did not fight with the government!” (Lomuria, old 
man) 
Another idea shared by many respondents is that of discrimination. Although 
most Pokot know that other pastoralist groups are equally marginalised compared 
to the agriculturalist ethnic groups in Kenya, they still have the idea that they are 
treated worse. The neighbouring Turkana – who have more members in parlia-
ment, so it is said among villagers – seem to be more resourceful:  
“See the government only comes to take guns after something happens. Last year, a lot of 
Turkana were killed. Then the Turkana NGOs complained to the government and they 
started to disarm the Pokot.” (Ngoratepa, shop keeper)19 
Disarmament is genuinely perceived as useless by the Pokot and disarmament 
is an issue that arouses incomprehension, irritation, and anger in the community. 
On the one hand, Pokot cannot understand the reason for disarmament exercises 
while guns are freely available. On the other hand, it seems that such operations 
are just another example of the government taking advantage of its power vis-à-
vis the Pokot. This, combined with the criticism of the government as such, more 
than explains the poor cooperation in disarmament operations. At the same time, 
it predicts that any future disarmament will be equally useless and only aggravate 
the relationship between Pokot and the two states.  
 
Powerful actors 
As it becomes evident that the post-colonial state remains absent in Pokotland, it 
is crucial to look at who are powerful actors in the communities instead. The two 
most dominant actors in the research area were missionary institutions and politi-
cians. In the West Pokot and Nakapiripirit Districts, missions have often pro-
vided services that would normally have been the responsibility of the state. 
                                                 
19
  This is a very typical situation. Pokot are very secretive and usually do not talk about their 
ideas and wishes openly, let alone their emotions. Few complaints (e.g. when they have been 
raided) reach the ‘outside’, be it through NGOs or MPs, and unlike the Turkana, they seem 
less assertive.  
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Their power and authority must not be underestimated: “In many fields, missions 
can be regarded as ‘semi-states’. As soon as the local government in West Pokot 
or Karamoja gives permission to build a missionary station … the freedom of ac-
tion is virtually unrestricted in practice” (Dietz 1987: 207). These observations 
were made in the early 1980s, but they still hold true for the region. The role of 
the mission in the village of Kenan has been fundamental in the 1970s and 1980s 
and only because of this mission – and therefore foreign funds – the village has 
grown to a considerable size; it now has a centre, a church, a school, a dispen-
sary, and several stone houses. The mission did not only provide water by drill-
ing boreholes, but it was the only actor to decide where these boreholes would be 
drilled; a decision that did have great influence on relationships between com-
munities. 
The government must have been aware of the fact that missions could also use 
this power in ways that undermine the sovereignty of the state. One mission in 
the area was reported to actively support the armament of the Pokot, by both pro-
viding weapons and assisting the pastoralists during disarmament operations.
20
 
With time, however, the role of missions concerning security matters has become 
less eminent; they now concentrate on providing relief aid and supporting devel-
opment projects.  
The importance of politicians, on the other hand, is a rather recent phenome-
non that needs to be scrutinised with even more earnestness. During my field-
work I experienced the Ugandan parliamentary elections (and, more importantly, 
the campaigns), which gave me a unique insight in both the role of politicians in 
the area and how politics can be interconnected with conflict. In order to analyse 
the role of politicians in the area it is helpful to look at what Pokot understand as 
‘politics’ first.  
Generally, Pokot do not expect that the government will assist them. There-
fore, their understanding of a ‘multi-party democracy’, the political system in 
Kenya and Uganda, differs significantly from Western interpretations. For the 
community members, to have an MP in Nairobi does not mean that they will be 
represented in the national parliament. Rather, it means that this MP is the con-
nection to ‘Kenya’ and the wazungu, to sources of money, and to other influential 
people. Hence, both MPs and their challengers will be approached with all kinds 
of enquiries; they are supposed to help community members with financial prob-
lems, to raise money for the (few) children who go to secondary school, or to 
provide jobs for the ones that have completed school. Furthermore, they are sup-
posed to attract donors for development projects and the like. Especially to the 
                                                 
20
  See Dietz (1987: 208) for a quote of a Kenyan newspaper stating that the missionary im-
ported automatic weapons into the area. 
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traditional community members, the MP is seen as an asset to the community 
himself, and little is thought about what he could – and should – do for the com-
munity in the realm of national politics.
21
 Politicians, on the other hand, know 
how to benefit from this understanding of politics. Not only do they give out food 
or alcohol during election campaigns, but it has also become common to hand 
out money to prospective voters – a development that has been stimulated by the 
increasing demands of the pastoralists.  
A more alarming development, however, is that politicians are more and more 
concerned with their votes than with solving the conflicts. I am being suggestive 
when I claim that politicians are ‘using’ raids for their own purposes in that they, 
albeit indirectly, show the warriors that they will not be punished for breaking 
the peace. And in fact, this appeared to be the case when I was conducting this 
research. The peace between Karimojong and Pokot was not expected to last for 
much longer, it was thus no coincidence that it broke during the campaigns for 
the parliamentary elections in Uganda. The reasoning behind this is rather plau-
sible to the warriors:  
“See, for the elections, it is good to do a raid during this time, because the politicians want to 
have their vote, they will have it their way.” (Lorepai, raid organiser)  
Apparently, warriors assumed that each of the two competitors would not dare 
to criticise them of breaking the peace, because they were too afraid of losing a 
rather substantial part of their votes.
22
 
Peacemaking in Pokotland 
Contrary to what is repeatedly been taken for granted by NGOs and academics, 
pastoralist conflict, at least in the research area, has little to do with resource 
scarcity. Peace brings many economic benefits such as common grazing grounds 
and water resources. For the Pokot, this is especially important in the dry season 
because during this time they need to have access to grazing grounds in Karimo-
jong territory (see Masinde et al. 2004). The consequence of this is that the wet 
season is seen as a time of ‘weaker peace’ and not surprisingly, many respon-
dents told me that the raids happen during wet seasons. Scarce resources thus 
lead to cooperation instead of conflict (Eaton 2006; Adano & Witsenburg 2004). 
Therefore, when talking about peace agreements, one should keep in mind that 
                                                 
21
  I am using the male form for MP, as there is a separate position for ‘Women MP’. This posi-
tion was not regarded as equally powerful.  
22
  During the elections, none of the competitors spoke openly about the raids, while after the 
challenger had won; each supporting group accused the other competitor of inciting the raids 
with the intent of harming the opponent. 
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traditionally peace is usually not considered to last forever but rather reflects stra-
tegic considerations of the pastoralist groups. 
For the pastoralists, the matter of peacemaking – like that of politics – puts 
emphasis on the difference between the town people and the traditional people. 
Sentiments that often came up during talks with the traditional Pokot were anger 
and distrust towards the town people, mainly because they did not feel that they 
had been asked in matters of peace. Consequently, the pastoralists affirmed that 
they could not believe in peace initiated by the town people:  
“See, these things come from the side of the government and through the people of the town. 
We, as pastoralists, we are not there. We don’t believe in their peace, because only from pas-
toralist to pastoralist, only that one we believe.” (Longon, older warrior) 
Furthermore, traditional community members had a strong feeling that they 
wanted to deal with their conflict in a way they were used to, and outside inter-
ference was not desired.  
“There was a time when the Karimojong came and took many cattle and one of the believers 
came and wanted to pray that the cattle would get back here. Even without the boys going af-
ter them. People got really angry!” (Lodukwi, young warrior) 
The town people generally thought of the traditional pastoralists as stubborn, 
inconsiderate and inward looking. Such ideas reinforce negative opinions held by 
both groups and provoke an almost rebellious attitude from the ones involved in 
conflict, namely the warriors: “The old men, together with those of the towns, 
who are they talking to?” (Lopeke, warrior). 
 
NGO dilemmas 
Generally, peace organisations have tried to imitate traditional peace meetings, 
i.e. to call together elders of different groups and try to stimulate peace agree-
ments between them. However, with time (and after unsuccessful attempts) the 
use of other methods and media has increased and target groups became more 
specific. NGO peace meetings are normally organised in the form of a ‘tour’ in 
order to reach many communities, sometimes using video screens, microphones, 
or recorded material. There have been meetings for warriors only, for warriors 
and elders, mixed meetings, and women’s alokitas (peace crusades). Most of 
these meetings take place in workshop form, and they are often the only time that 
NGOs are physically in contact with pastoralists. This is one of the reasons why 
most NGOs find it difficult to monitor and evaluate their work.  
Many organisations establish ‘peace committees’ on village or district level as 
a way to stay in contact with the communities. These committees consist of 
community members who function as contact persons and who are supposed to 
report from their location. However, NGOs are faced with an organisational 
problem: Ideally the contact persons should be able to communicate in English, 
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but those are almost exclusively members of the ‘town’ community, as very few 
pastoralists are educated. NGOs do not even mention this difficulty publicly,  
either because they do not understand the crucial difference between the two 
communities – if they are aware of it – or because they fear to be regarded as less 
competent when presenting this issue to international NGOs. Furthermore, these 
committee members often get confused because several NGOs in the research 
area each operate with their own committees. Yet for the rest of the community 
the work or even existence of these committees was practically invisible. In 
Kenan, for example, none of my respondents knew that a woman of their com-
munity was a member of the West Pokot District Peace Committee. 
The peace organisations are not situated in the villages but almost exclusively 
in the two regional centres, in Kapenguria for the Kenyan side, and in Moroto, 
the capital of the Karamoja region, for the Ugandan side. In these two towns the 
sheer number of peace organisations, peace committees, or even white land rov-
ers with the respective NGO logos easily give the impression of a thriving ‘peace 
industry’. The fact that NGOs are virtually not present in areas where conflict 
takes place only provokes sceptic opinions of the pastoralists. Most respondents 
claimed that if the NGOs were serious about peacemaking, they should come to 
the places where conflict takes place, instead of calling individuals to meetings 
far away. Moreover, NGOs usually call back employees who are in the field once 
there is news of an evolving conflict. This creates a ‘cowardly’ image of the 
NGOs and their employees, something many Pokot keep joking about.
23
 
Not surprisingly thus, the relationship between NGOs and their ‘target popula-
tion’, the traditional people, is not one of mutual trust and understanding. Many 
informants of this study were grouping NGOs in the ‘government category’, 
meaning that they are not present in the area, that little could be expected from 
them, and that many of them were only interested in their own benefits. One man 
answered to the question why he thinks a certain NGO has stopped working:  
“That is because the leaders, who are controlling the NGO, they probably got their money 
and it was enough. And later, they failed to go on.” (Kokoroi, middle-aged man) 
Such a lack of trust is easily reinforced by unresponsive or uncompleted NGO 
projects. A local NGO in the research area experienced a major setback when 
they could not finish a peace project due to funding problems. With the funding 
of an international NGO, they had organised a meeting with Pokot prophets to 
                                                 
23
  FBOs (faith-based organisations) are an important exception here. As members of FBOs are 
often pastors or other persons working in the local churches, they are easier approachable, 
and they stay in the area when conflicts break out. Nevertheless, community members knew 
very little of the work of churches in this context.  
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talk about their role in the conflicts.
24
 They were to ask the prophets to cooperate 
with them and refrain from telling the warriors to raid. In return, the prophets 
asked the local NGO to organise a peace meeting with elders from other ethnic 
groups. Thereafter, the local NGO went back to the international NGO in order to 
ask for a second funding, which was denied with the explanation that the budget 
for peacemaking was used up already. Other donor NGOs responded similarly. 
The prophets still continue to heavily criticise the NGO for making false prom-
ises. 
Unfortunately, this is a very typical situation and it is a good example of the 
dilemmas local organisations are faced with. They often have to adjust to the 
agenda of international NGOs, which in turn promote their own, donor-oriented 
programs. Hence, local peacemaking will only be supported if it fits the para-
digm of international – Western – development aid. Wabwire (1993), who evalu-
ated the work of NGOs in Karamoja, argues that local CBOs or NGOs are 
“subject to almost total dependence on foreign support which often inhibits cer-
tain actions and types of project as these must be compatible, to some extent at 
least, with the donor agencies’ objectives and policies” (Wabwire 1993: 75).25  
Another dilemma faced by NGOs is that peace initiated or facilitated ‘from the 
outside’ is regarded less respectable than traditional peace. It seems clear that, for 
the pastoralists, a certain ‘ownership’ of the peace process must be felt; otherwise 
it will not be respected:  
“See, when these two groups meet they will make peace. But when it comes from NGOs or 
the government, they will not hear. The peace will run for a short time and then it will break. 
We tried to do that but it would not last, not even a year.” (Margie, middle-aged woman)26 
If NGOs fail to consider this attitude, their projects are doomed to fail. A for-
mer local employee of an international NGO told me that exactly this disrespect 
forced them to stop organising peace meetings. Their approach was to take a 
group of warriors with them in order to meet and talk with warriors from another 
ethnic group. While the warriors seemed very cooperative during the workshops, 
the NGO soon realised that they were actually using the meetings to scout the 
area. Eventually, about two weeks after each peace meeting, the community 
where it took place was attacked and raided. This illustrates that even if the war-
                                                 
24
  It can be assumed that none of the NGOs have been in contact with a ‘real’ Pokot prophet 
(werkovon). Generally, a werkovon has several messengers who normally interact with the 
public. That said, it is still questionable that NGOs would even get hold of these messen-
gersSome communities have purposely sent someone else as a ‘prophet’. 
25
  Unfortunately, the data of this study demonstrates that this has not changed over the past 
decade, and what is more, the attitude of donor NGOs seems to have become less tolerant 
with time. 
26
  For the Pokot, one year actually means one season; i.e. a half year of the Gregorian calendar. 
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riors acknowledge the purpose of the meetings, they are not seriously thinking 
about stopping their current activities. Finally, the lack of respect on the part of 
the pastoralists is increasingly communicated by not attending NGO peace meet-
ings at all. A recent report documented that a peace meeting facilitated by two 
international NGOs was ignored by both Pokot and Karimojong, two of the three 
groups invited (Practical Action 2003).  
 
Difficulties of traditional peacemaking 
While it becomes clear that current NGO peacemaking has little effect, the lack 
of traditional peace agreements still needs to be scrutinised. What is it then that 
makes peace so difficult in the area? Are those difficulties experienced and 
communicated by both pastoralists and NGOs? In the following, I want to con-
centrate on five issues that came forth as the most problematic.  
First and most importantly, peace is an act of trust, and this trust is lacking in 
all communities in the area. If two groups, in this case the Karimojong and the 
Pokot, agree on peace, one group will have to initiate the peace process – and 
each group expects the other to take this step. Yet, when talking with the infor-
mants about these issues, and even more so during informal conversations, it be-
came clear that a peace deal offered by the Karimojong cannot be trusted:  
“The people keep saying, these Karimojong, they want us to come and graze near to them, 
and then they will raid us.” (Lomuria, old man) 
But has this trust been there before? Many respondents denied this and 
claimed that it has always been this way; they often told stories of peace attempts 
that turned out to be tricks by the Karimojong to raid cattle. However, they 
agreed that periods of peace were indeed longer in past times. This inconsistency 
might be explained by the fact that Pokot and Karimojong have only started to 
seriously raid each other in the 1950s, and a severe deterioration of the relation-
ship between the two groups only occurred after 1976 (Dietz 1987: 124-126). For 
the NGOs working on conflict resolution in the area, this lack of trust between 
the communities represents a critical problem. On the one hand, there are few 
obvious ‘methods’ to increase trust between the communities, such as exposure – 
an example would be the building of two villages close to each other. Projects 
like this often require more time and funds than most of the organisations in the 
area can afford. On the other hand, even such projects cannot ‘force’ the pastoral-
ists to trust each other, as this must come from within the groups.
27
  
Secondly, it is interesting to look at the role of the prophets. A majority of the 
NGOs argued that the prophets were actively trying to hinder peace processes. 
                                                 
27
  Respondents have identified intermarriages as the most important indicator of inter-group 
trust. Naturally, intermarriages only happen after a long period of peace between two groups. 
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To a certain extent, community members agree with this, because prophets often 
benefit from raids:  
“Even the prophet will disagree with the peace, because he will get his cattle of the raids 
himself. [The prophets] don’t want to be influenced by NGOs.” (Losute, warrior and raid or-
ganiser) 
This has caused many NGOs to tackle the ‘prophet’ issue directly, for example 
by trying to convince the prophets to stop initiating raids, as mentioned above. 
However, this is the wrong reasoning. As I was talking with my informants about 
NGO plans to get in contact with the prophets, many could not help laughing 
aloud. Of course, prophets call for raids, they answered, but they are not power-
ful enough to create peace.  
A third difficulty is of an economic nature and poses a significant obstacle to 
not only NGO peacemaking. Warriors normally argue that the raids are their only 
form of income and often expect NGOs to provide some sort of compensation. 
Most NGOs are not able to provide alternatives, partly because this would re-
quire an involvement over a long time span and considerable funds, but also be-
cause there are very few alternatives of earning a living for the pastoralists. They 
have tried to convince pastoralists to take up farming, but with little success. Al-
most all NGOs experience this dilemma and it shows that ‘real’ peacemaking can 
only be successful if the economic structure of the conflict is tackled.  
Fourthly, the influence of politicians on local peacemaking seems to be under-
estimated by both international NGOs and scholars. The most successful local 
peace building initiative in the research area was severely impeded by political 
interference and had to stop working after only three years. Most initial members 
of the organisation were highly respected community members; they took part in 
local meetings and ‘showed up’ during times of conflict, which contributed 
greatly to their credibility. Due to a political conflict between the current MP of 
the constituency and the initiator of the project, the latter was forced to leave the 
organisation. The work of the organisation was then reduced to organising peace 
conferences with (international) NGOs and churches. It is widely believed that 
the current MP felt threatened by the rising popularity of the initiator – a result of 
his success in peace making. The case highlights the important role of politicians 
in causing conflict as well as the power they are able to exercise. Several former 
members of the initiative mentioned above told me they wanted to revive the pro-
ject, which will probably depend on the success of the initiator in the next elec-
tion. The political dimension of peace and conflict represents a significant 
obstacle to peace initiatives that originate from within the communities, as they 
need to be ‘approved’ politically.  
It is difficul to reach all community members in order to make the peace effec-
tive. This is certainly a problem for peace organisations but it seems to constitute 
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a problem for traditional peacemaking as well. An effective peace agreement is 
one that all community members feel responsible for, because a broken peace 
needs only few actors. Cattle thefts are often done by only a small group of war-
riors. They even may have gotten the idea to steal animals while drunk. Simi-
larly, it only needs a few women that will cook the food for warriors. If a raid is 
planned, warriors tend to seek the blessings from a few or only one elder they 
consider supportive. Most of the respondents concluded, and some in a quite in-
different way, that this aspect needs to be accepted: 
“Remember, we know death can happen anytime to one of us, but we like the peace. … See, 
the raids will not stop. Let us assume we have peace right now, but there are always people 
that do wrong things. We live with wrongdoers. They will break the peace and we will fight 
again” (Lokiru, warrior). 
Obviously, ‘weak’ peace will not survive such an attitude and at the same time 
this cannot easily be countered by NGO efforts.  
Discussion and conclusion 
Whereas we may keep on arguing whether pastoralist conflict along the border of 
Kenya and Uganda has indeed intensified over the last decades, or if you want, 
after the introduction of automatic weapons, the pastoralists themselves are con-
cerned with other issues.
28
 As observed many times already, young men need to 
gain status within their community and they do so by proving themselves as war-
riors, fighters and successful raiders. Young women, aiming for a comfortable 
life and respect, wish to be married with warriors who are heroes, not least be-
cause those will be able to feed the family. These remain the driving motivations 
of the young pastoralist generation and cannot be repeated often enough when 
dealing with conflict in the region. 
What has indeed changed in the communities is caused by economic and so-
cial development. Most villages in the research area now consist of a town com-
munity and a community of traditional pastoralists; and the town communities 
are often the ones that receive more attention in development projects, not only 
because they are more receptive for change. For the pastoralists, of whom many 
refuse to ‘develop’ – i.e. to send their children to school, participate and invest in 
farming projects, or even to go to church, all part of a world that threatens them – 
there are very few alternatives other than simply continuing the life they are liv-
                                                 
28
  Knighton (2003) writes that the Karimojong and the Pokot have been involved in heavy 
fights throughout the last century. As early as 1910 tribal figthing between the Pokot and the 
Karimojong had been reported. The Pokot, Sebei, Karimojong and Turkana were encouraged 
by the British to hold a peace ceremony in 1920, however, hostilities resumed shortly after. 
Since that time Pokot have reportedly tried to expand into Karimojong territory (Knighton 
2003: 434). 
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ing. The changes cause worries among the traditional community, and the pastor-
alists have long begun to realise that they depend on help from the outside, be it 
food aid delivered by the government or boreholes drilled by a mission.
29
 This 
realisation is painful – not only in years of prolonged draught. 
Seen from this angle, the continuation of violence in the region seems quite 
logic for the pastoralists. It also pleads for a different view on the militarization 
of these groups. As mentioned earlier, the feeling of helplessness expressed by 
many pastoralist elders is rather rooted in this general feeling of dependency and 
incertitude than the militarization of the society, as argued, for example, by Mir-
zeler & Young (2000) and Simonse (2003) for the Karimojong. Weapons might 
enhance the status of young men in pastoralist societies, but it is only a small part 
of a structural change that these communities undergo.  
Quite interesting results come about when discussing state interventions from 
the Pokot viewpoint, first and foremost the disarmament operations. Not only are 
the operations regarded as a major security threat by the pastoralists; they also 
threaten economic security and cultural identity. Mkutu rightly pointed out that 
‘[d]isarmament initiatives have … failed to properly take into account the fact 
that they threaten livelihoods, however problematic these may be for peace and 
security in the border area’ (Mkutu 2003: 15). It is thus imperative to understand 
and disseminate the pastoralists’ ideas of ‘security’ and ‘securing livelihoods’, as 
this seems to be of little interest to the governments. Only in 2006, the minister 
of Internal Security in Kenya has ordered another forceful disarmament cam-
paign, with the Pokot as a main target (East African Standard, 02/05/2006). Tak-
ing the attitudes of the pastoralists into account should be a starting point for any 
activity planned by the governments, as recent interventions have been deferred 
with scant success.  
Another issue that I discussed earlier is the role of politicians in the region. I 
have argued that politicians are rather concerned with their own votes than in 
some way strengthening the position of the pastoralists. But this remains a moot 
point to discuss as the question that needs to be answered here is to which extent 
politicians can play a role in disseminating the pastoralists’ voice to the two gov-
ernments. While politicians have fiercely pleaded for other solutions than disar-
mament operations in the past, there was no way that they could have interfered 
with the government plans.  
Considering the attitude and perceptions of the pastoralists are equally signifi-
cant for NGOs that organise or fund peace work. It is too often taken for granted 
that the Pokot are suffering from the conflicts they are involved in and that they 
are in constant search for solutions. One of the greatest mistakes of NGOs active 
                                                 
29
  See Lind (2005) for an extensive elaboration on aid dependency in Northern Kenya. 
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in peacemaking is that they underestimate the pragmatic attitude of the pastoral-
ists, which is often expressed in their disbelieve in long lasting peace. All three 
groups portrayed earlier in this chapter show a certain tolerance of the conflicts 
and at the same time, none of the groups feel that they are supposed to or respon-
sible for changing the current situation. After all, the primary objective of the 
traditional Pokot is not to find peace, but to live with (and survive) raids and 
theft. As long as it seems that only certain a part of the communities is interested 
in stopping the conflicts, most of the Pokot will not even make an effort to estab-
lish peace.  
The disappointing effects of peace building activities have so far not been dis-
cussed – neither in academic literature, with the notable exception of Eaton 
(2008), nor have NGOs critically evaluated their own activities. Fact is that most 
information available about pastoralist conflict in the region stems from studies 
conducted or funded by NGOs and that this information is being used for the im-
plementation of new projects. As showed earlier, these studies have come to 
rather questionable conclusions if one takes a closer look ‘on the ground’.  
Eaton (2008) argues that peacemakers have to concentrate on retaliation prac-
tices, instead of tackling the popular ‘root causes’ so often mentioned in NGO 
literature. Only by helping pastoralists get their animals back after an enemy at-
tack are they able to regain the trust, and only from this starting point can peace 
work be successful. At this moment, this has not been effectively tackled by any 
NGO in the region, which is chiefly due to the fact that they are not in contact 
with traditional pastoralists, as I have showed earlier.  
Finally, NGOs do not seriously address the criticism they receive by the Pokot 
and other groups in the region of being cowardly. Omaar & de Waal (1994) dis-
cussing the hypocrisy that often accompanies peace work: “Most international 
organizations … put the physical security and well-being of their staff ahead of 
sharing suffering and risk with local people” (Omaar & de Waal 1994: 29).30 The 
comments made by my informants are quite the same. Although it is unrealistic 
to expect that NGOs will relocate their activities to villages in conflict areas in 
order to prove their commitment, it remains to be seen how the organisations will 
manage to improve communication with the pastoralists under those circum-
stances. Their staying would seriously increase their accountability and level of 
being trusted, which is in fact a requirement before any peace work can start. 
Clearly, there is an urgent need to closely monitor and evaluate NGO peace 
work in the region. NGOs involved should work together so as to minimise con-
fusion among the pastoralists and to focus on activities that are truly effective. 
                                                 
30
  The authors do make a distinction between NGOs and churches, wherein the latter share suf-
fering with the local community.  
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Again, as Eaton (2008) has demonstrated in his article, pastoralists are well 
aware of the fact that these days peace work needs to be ‘showy’ in order to sat-
isfy donor expectations. Especially international NGOs that often fund local 
NGOs – and therewith impose their agendas on activities in the region – should 
reconsider their approaches.  
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meaning of livestock raiding  
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This chapter examines the meaning of the raiding conflict for the Western Pokot, 
an agro-pastoral community living in the border regions of Kenya and Uganda. To 
this end, 119 interviews were held during seven months of fieldwork in 2005 and 
2007. From a constructivist perspective, making use of the theory on integration 
and conflict proposed by Schlee, identity strategies among the Pokot are assessed 
for two different periods. The first part deals with the latter half of the 19
th
 century, 
when the Pokot adopted cultural characteristics (including the sapana age organi-
sation) from the Karimojong, a neighbouring rival group, whom they admired for 
wealth in livestock. The second part concerns the period from the late 1970s on-
wards, when pastoralism was severely undermined by a series of natural crises and 
insecurity situation resulting from raids and state repression. In this context, an in-
flux of external development activities fostering sedentary ‘modern’ lifestyles as 
well as heated ethnic politics feeding on a discourse of marginalisation, have made 
many Pokot to emphasise different features of their identity. Especially the more 
sedentarised Pokot started not only to disassociate from the Karimojong and their 
cultural characteristics, but also showed ambivalence towards ethnic traditions 
such as raiding. The chapter shows that the decisions underlying these identity 
strategies are inspired by the raiding conflict, whereby choices are instrumental, 
but also bounded by specific cultural givens. While widening their scope of identi-
fication allowed the Pokot to expand territorially and become more pastoral in the 
19
th
 century, narrowing it in more recent times allows them again to acquire new 
resources in times when pastoralism and associated traditions are less viable then 
before.  
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Introduction1 
“Dark, towering and wearing a no-nonsense look, the Pokot are an ethnic phenomenon for-
ever firing from all flanks.” (East African Standard, February 5, 2005) 
In the minds of other Kenyans, the Pokot clearly invoke the image of stubborn 
and fierce people endlessly enrolled in livestock raiding. Newspapers often por-
tray the most northerly Kalenjin group as a violent community associated with 
raids, weapons and inflammatory statements of politicians. And indeed, despite 
projects aiming at conflict management and peace building ranging from disar-
mament to sensitisation meetings, raiding is still persistent and perhaps even 
more than in the past. Raiding is often associated with savagery or primitivism. 
The use of automatic weapons in the conflict has made Pokot territory, especially 
the pastoral lowland areas, for many a dangerous place to be.  
From an outside perspective, raiding is thus seen as a negative and innate ele-
ment of the Pokot ethnic identity, but one may ask how the Pokot themselves re-
late to the practice. To examine this, I have analysed the meaning of raiding for 
the Western Pokot, an agro-pastoral community living in the border regions of 
Kenya and Uganda. From an historical perspective, Pokot identity strategies re-
lated to raiding are assessed for two different periods of time that are character-
ised by great changes for the Pokot society, whereby both inter-ethnic as well as 
intra-ethnic relations are taken into account. My hope is that this analysis con-
tributes to a better understanding of the practice as well as the ways the Pokot 
have responded to changes in their society.  
I make use of the theory of integration and conflict proposed by Günther 
Schlee (2001, 2003, 2004, 2008). According to him, identity consists of certain 
markers or features, such as descent, language, social organisation, religion etc, 
whereby strategies of inclusion and exclusion can be negotiated upon through 
changing the importance of these markers. The aim of defining either wider or 
narrower identities is to control of resources, varying from natural/physical to po-
litical and socio-economical to emotional (or social) capital. Schlee combines in-
strumental and primordial aspects of ethnic identity in his theory, whereby he 
                                                 
1
  I am especially grateful for the stimulating efforts of my research assistants ‘in the field’, 
Rachel Andiema, Simon Lopeyok Lokomolian, Albino Kotomei, Moses Kamomai and Jacob 
Kalalyo Aitaruk. Moreover, I thank Dr Karen Witsenburg and Prof. Joshua Akong’a for the 
possibility to publish parts of my Master’s thesis in this book. Through the book conference 
that was held in Kenya, they also enabled me to visit the Pokot again to discuss some of the 
data I had collected during my first fieldwork period in 2005. Lastly, I am very much in-
debted to Prof. Ton Dietz, the supervisor of my thesis, and Friederike Mieth and Dave Eaton, 
who both studied the raiding conflict in Pokot thoroughly during the same period as I did my 
research. All three contributed in a fundamental way to my understanding of the matters de-
scribed here. Needles to say, responsibility for the views expressed, as for any errors and 
omissions, is mine alone.  
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stresses that identities can be chosen but not ‘invented’ outside a context of cer-
tain ‘givens’. The narrative approach is used to explore how identity strategies 
are ‘storied’. In order to become aware of how people ‘make sense’ of identity 
strategies, it is essential to examine which aspects of identity are emphasised and 
remembered, and which are forgotten or repressed. 
The first part of the chapter deals with the latter half of the 19
th
 century, when 
the Pokot became more pastoral and expanded their territory westwards. In this 
process the Pokot chose to adopt certain cultural characteristics (including the 
sapana age organisation) from the Karimojong,
2
 a neighbouring rival group, 
whom they admired for their wealth in livestock. Until now these Karimojong 
elements are integrated in the Pokot culture, although they are more important to 
the pastoral Pokot of the lowlands than to the more agricultural Pokot of the 
highlands. The first part of this chapter is therefore dedicated to the question why 
the Pokot chose to identify with cultural elements of a rival group with whom 
they have a long history of mistrust and why ethnic unity has been preserved.  
The second part of the chapter shifts our attention to more recent times, and 
concerns the period from the late 1970s onwards. Since then, the Pokot commu-
nity has faced great changes. First of all, pastoralism was severely undermined 
by a series of natural crises and insecurity resulting from raids and state repres-
sion (mainly disarmament operations). In this process, raiding itself was modi-
fied most obviously by the influence of automatic weapons that have become 
widely available in the area since the late 1970s. Furthermore, the area saw both 
an influx of external development activities fostering sedentary ‘modern’ life-
styles and heated ethnic politics feeding on a discourse of marginalisation. These 
changes have made many Pokot to narrow their identification, by disassociating 
from not only the Karimojong and their cultural characteristics, but also by show-
ing ambivalence towards other ethnic traditions such as raiding. Again, we see a 
variation in the extent to which the identity strategies have changed, as they are 
more important to the sedentary (more agricultural) Pokot than to the semi-
nomadic pastoral Pokot. By exploring the meaning of these changes for the 
Pokot, we can study how the conflict has changed their ethnic identity and 
whether this spatial variation in changes has influenced ethnic unity.  
                                                 
2
  The Karimojong consist of several subgroups, such as the Matheniko, Pian and Bokora. The 
territorial identities of these sections have become increasingly prominent over the last dec-
ades, meaning conflict relations are negotiated at the sectional rather than the ethnic level 
(see also Eaton, this volume). I acknowledge the point made by Ocan (1994) who argues that 
the Karimojong should therefore not be seen as one single political entity. However, in this 
chapter I do speak of the Karimojong as a whole since I am mainly concerned with cultural 
characteristics, which do not significantly differ per subgroup.  
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The research area 
The study area comprises of the western part of the (former)
3
 West-Pokot Dis-
trict, and is predominantly inhabited by Pokot (sing. ‘Pochon’, under colonial 
administration referred to as Suk). The Pokot are classified as a subgroup of the 
Kalenjin cluster of the Southern Nilotes (formerly known as Nilo-Hamites). They 
are found on both sides of the international border. In Uganda, they live in Pokot 
County (formerly known as Upe County, the Ugandan Pokot are also known as 
Upe Pokot) of Nakapiripirit District in the Karimojong Region.  
Upe and the western area of Kenya’s West-Pokot District form one economic 
region because of a shared economic history and herd mobility during droughts 
(Dietz 1987). The Pokot are able to cross the border easily for grazing or security 
purposes, since the area is expansive and hardly controlled by security forces. 
Therefore, the Western Pokot from Kenya have strong links with – and in fact 
often are – the Pokot from Uganda, as many Pokot are said to be in possession of 
both a Kenyan and a Ugandan identity card. Furthermore, many Pokot who once 
lived in Uganda have migrated since the 1970s to the Kenyan side as a result of 
Amin’s brutal regime and continuing conflict with the Karimojong. 
The Pokot border the predominantly pastoral communities of the Karimojong 
to the west and the Turkana to the east, who both belong to the Ateker grouping 
of the Eastern Nilotes. In between the Pokot and the Karimojong, the Tepeth, 
with whom the Pokot have an historical friendly relation, are found on Mount 
Kadam and Mount Moroto. Furthermore, the Pokot border separates them from 
Kalenjin groups who focus more on agriculture. These are the Sebei to the 
southwest on the slopes of Mount Elgon in Uganda, the Marakwet to the south-
east in the northern Kerio escarpment, and the Sengwer – often portrayed as a 
section of the Marakwet, but actually a distinct ethnic grouping – in the Cheran-
gani hills. Lastly, the area of Trans-Nzoia to the south has a mixed ethnic popula-
tion, consisting of Luhya, Kikuyu (Bantus) and other ethnic groups who came to 
farm there after the colonial settlers had left.  
The Pokot community can traditionally be divided into two sections. The east-
ern part of the research area, comprising of the high mountainous and remote ar-
eas of Chemerongit and Sekerr, are inhabited by agricultural or Hill Pokot 
(‘Pipöpagh’, ‘people of the grain’). They practice extensive agricultural produc-
tion and keep some livestock. The western lowlands stretching into Uganda are  
 
                                                 
3
  Since the beginning of 2007, a new district was installed in the research area, namely North-
Pokot District. The new district is carved out of the former West-Pokot District and covers 
the area west of the Suam River. Most of the sources used in this chapter however still refer 
to the former West-Pokot District. 
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Map 5.1 West-Pokot District (based on Dietz 1987: 24, 80) 
 
 
 
 
mainly used as grazing lands by the pastoral or Plain Pokot (‘Pipötich’, ‘people 
of the cattle’). Although agriculture is practiced by them to some extent, espe-
cially alongside the rivers (Suam, Konyao and Kanyangareng) and mountains, 
life centres predominantly on the herding of cattle, sheep, goats, and in smaller 
numbers donkeys and camels. Whereas the hill Pokot live more sedentary life-
styles, the lowland Pokot are highly mobile as they travel long distances with 
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their livestock moving between dry and wet season grazing areas. A third area 
which can be identified are the ‘urban’ towns of Makutano, Kapenguria and 
Chepareria, where political and commercial life is centred, and the Southern 
Mnagei lands bordering Trans Nzoia, where people practice mixed-farming. In 
the lowlands, agriculture has become more important for pastoral people and 
many (have been forced to) practice more sedentary herding strategies.  
Part I:  Expanding from the core 
Establishing contact with the Karimojong 
The area west of the Suam River is believed to have become Pokot territory only 
after the period of rinderpest epidemics and droughts between 1886 and 1896, 
which seriously affected all East African pastoralists (Dietz 1987). Before that 
time, the Karimojong controlled this land as they had been using the areas around 
the Kanyangareng and Suam Rivers for dry season grazing (Turpin 1948; Bras-
nett 1958).
4
 Several places in the western plains of the study area still bear Kari-
mojong names. During the 1880s-1990s, the Western Pokot had been mainly 
confined to the mountainous areas of Chemerongit, Sook and Sekerr, and were 
therefore presumably less affected than the Karimojong, who lost most of their 
stock and had to survive by hunting and gathering (Turpin 1948).  
This advantage of isolation in the mountains coupled with territorial pressures 
during the 1910s-1920s from the Turkana in the northeast and colonial settlers in 
Trans Nzoia in the south, made the Pokot rapidly expand westwards, supported 
in their movement by the colonial administrations (Cox 1972; Barber 1968). 
Barber (1968) states that in the early 20
th
 century, “the Suk were ‘the strong’ and 
so they adopted a militant, aggressive, expansionist policy, while the Karamo-
jong were ‘the weak’ (...), yielding ground as slowly as possible, counter-
attacking when they could, but gradually, inexorably falling back”. The Pokot 
expansion got as far as the present day Pokot county in Uganda, of which they 
got in full control during the 1930s (Brasnett 1958).  
It is often thought that prior to the 1880s-90s, the Western Pokot were “still 
essentially a hill tribe” (Brasnett 1958: 115; see also Turpin 1948) and thus found 
                                                 
4
  Before the Karimojong got in control of the area west of the Suam River, it was inhabited by 
the Oropom people who have now been assimilated into other ethnic groups, among them 
the Pokot and Karimojong (Clark 1950; Novelli 1999; de Vries 2007). The Oropom had been 
forced to live on the banks of the Suam River over the years because they had been attacked 
by various groups, among them the Turkana, Karimojong and Pokot. The Karimojong got in 
control after the final defeat of the Oropom around 1830 near Kacheliba (Turpin 1948; Wil-
son 1970). 
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on the mountains in the east of our research area. This idea is derived firstly from 
the fact that the core group of Pokot was historically founded in the mountains of 
Sekerr and the northern Cherangani where they practised mainly agriculture, pos-
sibly with a small number of livestock, and were hunting and gathering as well 
(e.g. Beech 1911; Barton 1921; Huntingford 1953; Peristiany 1951a; Porter 
1988; Bollig 1990a). Furthermore, the suggestion of Pokot moving into the west-
ern lowlands only after the 1880s-1990s was probably strengthened because the 
first accounts on Pokot territory were made during and soon after these years of 
rinderpest and drought, which left the plains west of Suam almost entirely empty. 
Early explorers such as Teleki and Von Höhnel travelling in the area in 1888, 
still recognised the western plains as Karimojong territory (von Höhnel 1894).  
Nonetheless, even though the western plains may have still been controlled by 
the Karimojong until the 1880s-1990s, the Pokot must have grazed there before 
this time since a process of cultural fusion had already taken place (Bollig 
1990a). 
Cultural fusion 
In the process of expanding westwards, the Pokot thus encountered the Karimo-
jong, an ethnic group that although considered a rival, was admired because of 
being more affluent in terms of livestock. According to Bollig (1990a), the Pokot 
then grazed in the Karimojong territory, where they noticed that even though 
they had been circumcised, the Karimojong did not regard them as men, because 
they had not undergone the initiation rite of sapana. He argues that “(t)hough 
they were generally welcomed by their hosts out of ritual obligations they could 
not be given the best pieces of meat” (Ibid.: 82). In order to gain social standing 
among the Karimojong, which ensured them grazing rights and stock friends,
5
 
the Pokot thus began to adopt certain cultural characteristics.  
The most prominent feature the Pokot adopted is the Karimojong age-system 
based on the initiation rite sapana for males.
6
 The rite involves the spearing of an 
ox by a young man, averagely of about 20 years, after which he is rubbed with 
the contents of the ox’s stomach. Sapana defines the time of entering manhood; 
the ritual grants the young man rights to marriage and access to ceremonies that 
involve the kerket, a semi-circle of men who are seated according to seniority. 
Prior to the adoption of sapana, the initiation rite of circumcision provided the 
single means of age-organisation among the Pokot. The practice of circumcision 
                                                 
5
  Stock friendships involve the exchange of livestock between friends out of mutual solidarity 
(e.g. Bollig 2006 and Schneider 1957). In this way herds are dispersed, something which acts 
as a form of social insurance (Dietz 1991).  
6
  For detailed information about the sapana age-organisation, see Peristiany (1951a). 
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is clearly recognised as more ancient (Sutton 1976). Circumcision is performed 
during a boy’s adolescence and is followed by a period of seclusion of about 
three months during which the boy and his age-mates who have been circum-
cised in the same ceremony receive instructions on how to behave responsibly in 
family and security matters. Strong bonds are formed between members of the 
same sets.  
As part of marking adulthood through sapana, the Pokot adopted a certain 
style of head dressing, a practice that is almost nowadays. Initiated Pokot tradi-
tionally wore the siolip headdress whereby the hair is plastered with mud, col-
oured with clay and often decorated with feathers. Another headdress that was 
traditionally worn by initiated men is the atoro, a beaded head adornment that 
was mostly worn on specific occasions such as dancing sessions. The most im-
portant Karimojong dances that have been adopted are the amumur and adongo, 
and many of the songs are still most often sang in Karimojong language. In addi-
tion, other material cultural features were adopted by the Pokot that were, found 
among the Karimojong and Turkana, but not among other Kalenjin groups. These 
included the long and narrow shaped shields, wrist and finger knives, skin capes, 
lip plugs and nose discs and headrest-stools (Huntingford 1953). 
Important for our argument, and specific to the Pokot, the adoption of sapana 
has also spread among them from the western plains in Uganda to the eastern 
plains in Baringo. This is noteworthy since it is circumcision only that is the pri-
mary identity marker concerning age-organisation for all other Kalenjin groups 
(Daniels 1982). 
Merkol as a hero  
The story about adoption of sapana is related to a fundamental aspect of the 
Pokot ethnic identity, namely the strategy of adopting cultural characteristics of 
neighbouring (enemy) groups for security purposes. The adoption of sapana is 
believed to have been instigated by a Pochon named Merkol, who came to live 
among the Kasauria section of the Pokot in the present day Alale division, after 
Pokot elsewhere expelled him because of small theft. In these northern parts, the 
Pokot lived with the Karimojong and so Merkol learned about their customs. 
Merkol, who was in close contact with a Pokot prophet,
7
 told the Pokot to copy 
the Karimojong culture in order to be superior to them. One element of this strat-
egy is that Merkol was instructed by the prophet to advise the Pokot to adopt sa-
pana and leave circumcision in order to be less easily identifiable as a Pokot by 
                                                 
7
  Prophets (in Pokot known as werkoy) are highly respected. They are able to predict the fu-
ture through their dreams and they advise the community according to which upcoming dan-
gers and opportunities they foresee. Prophets inherit their position through the sub-clan line. 
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their ethnic neighbours, who do not circumcise. Because the Karimojong trusted 
Merkol (because he had assimilated by doing sapana), he was able to scout their 
territory. Merkol is still remembered as a hero among the Pokot, because he was 
able to deceive the Karimojong by informing the Pokot about their position and 
mobilizing large groups of warriors to raid them. 
Considering Merkol and his interests, Peristiany (1951a: 190) also believes 
that the adoption of sapana and the headdress were strategically instigated by 
Merkol “to become invincible in battle”. Furthermore, Schneider (1967), who 
gathered folktales among the Pokot, recorded a story about a hero named Merkol, 
who was known for deceiving the Karimojong. Concerning the deceiving atti-
tude, it might be illustrating to quote Andiema et al. (2003: 199), who rightly 
postulate that, for the Pokot “[i]n the traditional ‘scale of tribal values’, the high-
est one is the ability to increase one’s herd through intelligence, force and even 
cunning”. 
The story of Merkol is indicative for a general survival strategy among the 
Pokot, whereby adopting cultural characteristics of a neighbouring rival group, 
and thereby hiding one’s original identity, is considered essential in order to noy 
only cooperate but also to take advantage. At the time of adopting sapana, the 
Pokot had probably lived together with the Karimojong in relative concord, with 
fairly stable territorial boundaries between the ethnic groups.
8
 The Pokot who did 
move to the plains came to live in Karimojong territory, whereby they adopted 
their form of age organisation to be equally respected by their neighbours – 
whom they admired for their pastoral lifestyle – and with the strategic aim of 
sharing resources.
9
 For the Karimojong it might have been acceptable that the 
Pokot lived among them and adopted their practices, as they felt respected or at 
least it made social gatherings easier as seniority could be defined for all. For 
both ethnic groups the adoption can believed to have widened their circle of ex-
change through the exchange of livestock, wives, services and food.  
The story points to the believe that the Pokot used the trust they acquired out 
of the assimilation to overpower the Karimojong, thereby illustrating a change in 
the balance of power between the two groups during the early decades of the 20
th
 
century. Consequently, the adoption of sapana and related Karimojong cultural 
characteristics by the Pokot can be seen as an identity strategy; by defining a 
                                                 
8
  I use the expression ‘relative concord’, because before the 1880-90s the more powerful Kari-
mojong (in both population and livestock numbers), might have been too strong for the 
Pokot to attack on a regular and large-scale basis.  
9
  The admiration for the Karimojong (and Turkana) is also expressed through the fact that the 
pastoral Pokot like to marry their women, as they are considered tough. It was said that such 
mixed marriages would produce strong offspring (especially strong warriors).  
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wider identity, survival of the Pokot ethnic group was assured through securing a 
more stable resource base.  
Adopting cultural characteristics of neighbouring rival groups for security 
purposes is still common among the western Pokot. In order not to be detected 
when scouting the enemy territory, many Pokot along the borders of their terri-
tory are fluent in both the Karimojong and Turkana languages. Furthermore, 
most men refrain from circumcision in the northern parts of Pokot territory. This 
is done, not only to identity with the Karimojong, but also because the home-
steads might be attacked if groups of warriors would be in seclusion for a period 
of several months.
10
  
Considering the adoption of cultural elements of the enemy, it invokes feelings 
of superiority as one respondent explained:  
“For the Pokot its means pride to have copied this. We feel advanced and are generally 
known to be very good at adopting, not only names, but also language and dances. We con-
sider it as additional knowledge. Also, it is necessary for survival to know about the other’s 
culture. In order not to be identified when spying, it is very useful that the Pokot are able to 
speak the Karimojong and Turkana languages. Something that is almost impossible vice 
versa. The Turkana and Karimojong find it very hard to speak the Pokot language”.11  
The pastoral tradition of raiding  
For the Pokot raiding livestock from enemies has been an integral aspect of their 
culture, and they claim the practice has existed from time immemorial. For as far 
as can be traced back in the national archives, the Pokot and surrounding 
neighbours, most notably the Karimojong and Turkana, have been raiding each 
other on a regular basis, at least since the end of the 19
th
 century.
12
 The Pokot 
therefore generally refer to themselves as an isolated group that is surrounded by 
enemies (e.g. Bollig 2006). Historically, this led to the ideological belief that in 
order for them to survive they have to conceal their identity through adopting 
cultural characteristics of their neighbours.  
Bollig (1990a) has linked the raiding tradition among the Western Pokot to the 
adoption of the sapana age organisation. However, I believe it was not necessar-
ily the new age organisation that enabled large-scale military mobilisation. A 
                                                 
10
  In case of the Eastern Pokot, Muir (1985) also found that men had refrained from circumci-
sion for the same reasons in Nginyang for approximately 25 years because of intensive con-
flict with the Turkana. 
11
  From interview KONYAO # 2 (6-6-2005).  
12
  The suspicious attitude of the Pokot towards the Karimojong and the Turkana can also be 
shown by the way they refer to them as strangers/enemies (‘ghomin’ or ‘gham’) There is tra-
ditional hostility and mutual distrust between the groups as one respondent noted: “Even 
when we graze together, we know the peace can always break”. From interview KAPEN-
GURIA # 14 (7-6-2007). 
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very well organised and effective military organisation was also found among 
other Kalenjin groups, most importantly the Nandi, who base their age-organi-
sation on circumcision.
13
 In the case of Pokot, military organisation is not that 
strictly defined to certain age-ranks anyhow (e.g. Schneider 1959). Peristiany 
(1951b: 282) correctly states that “(1) although entry into manhood is regulated 
by the age-system no obstacles are put in the way of the would-be warriors (2) 
the age-system does not provide for enforced retirement, and (3) the offensive 
and defensive organization is based on the principle of the nation armeé so that 
all able-bodied men carry and use arms as long as they are in a position to do so”. 
Bollig (1990b: 88) also notes that among the Pokot the rhetoric of age-sets may 
be used to motivate men for warfare, however “[a]ge-sets are not organized as a 
military organization. They lack internal leadership and formal group organiza-
tion”. According to Pokot tradition, all able-bodied men are considered warriors 
who have the duty to defend the Pokot community, which includes its territory 
and livestock.  
Instead of explaining the origins of raiding through age-organisation, we 
might rather see the promotion of militarization among the Pokot, as a means to 
occupy the western plains ans as a consequence of the increasing focus on pas-
toralism during the 19
th
 century. In his assessment of the eastern expansion of the 
Pokot, Bollig (1990a) confirms this point. The highland Pokot, initially poorer in 
terms of livestock, may prefer to live a pastoral lifestyle, which is traditionally 
considered superior to an agriculturalist lifestyle, and raiding is a means to attain 
this. Although livestock is highly valued by both the agricultural and the pastoral 
Pokot (e.g. Edgerton 1971; Meyerhoff 1981), logically the latter are more de-
pendent on it not only for food needs but also in terms of dowry, stock friend-
ships and ritual ceremonies. This makes raiding more important for the pas-
toralists of the lowlands than for the agriculturalists of the highlands. The 
pastoral Pokot are respected for their raiding skills and therefore the defence of 
the community. People from the highlands could speak about them in heroic 
terms: “They are the real Pokot. They live out there on the plains and protect 
us”.14 
For all Pokot life rotates around livestock and defending this key resource en-
sures the survival of the community. By tradition, it is better for a Pokot to die 
when protecting the community and its livestock during raids, than to die of any 
other cause (e.g. Lipale 2005). Raiding parties are principally defined by ethnic-
                                                 
13
  During the 19
th
 century the Pokot were under heavy attack by the Nandi, who were notorious 
for their skilled military organisation. In addition, the Nandi warriors, led by their prophets, 
were able to strongly resist the establishment of colonial rule (e.g. Matson 1972). 
14
  From interview MAKUTANO # 3 (17-5-2005). 
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ity, and warriors act on the basis of primordial attachments.
15
 The high risks 
taken during raids are explained by a central motivation behind raiding, namely 
the desire of warriors to prove themselves, to establish a reputation. Warriorhood 
is associated with aggressive and violent behaviour; raiding and killing enemies 
adds to the social prestige of men (e.g. Bollig 2006). The symbolic value is un-
derlined through the fact that the names of warriors may be changed after they 
have killed an enemy and body marks may be placed as to show their courageous 
achievements.
16
 The heroism associated with raiding is also publicly promoted, 
for example in traditional dances and songs that incite men to fight.  
A desired situation of independence and prosperity of the Pokot household is 
fostered through raiding. Hence, a successful and thus respected warrior is some-
one who is self-sufficient and has a homestead with more than one wife, children 
as well as a large herd of livestock. Only married individuals are considered full 
members of the community. The younger warriors carried out raids because they 
are eager to marry and they needed to accumulate livestock for dowry payments. 
Also for the somewhat older warriors, raiding is still a prestigious act, because 
when successful, it increases the herd through gifts from the raiders and thus in-
dependence and prosperity of the household. It opens possibilities for further 
marriages.  
Ethnic unity despite internal differentiation  
Even though both forms of age organisation (circumcision and Sapana) are found 
among the Pokot, their importance varies considerably in Pokot territory. For the 
pastoral Pokot of the eastern and western plains the ritual of sapana is most im-
portant in defining adulthood, for the agricultural Pokot of the highlands circum-
cision is imperative and sapana is considered by them merely as an additional 
and last step in process attaining maturity. That the more ancient custom of cir-
cumcision is most important in the highlands can be explained because the ethnic 
core area of the Pokot is situated here.
17
 A respondent that portrayed the variation 
stated:  
                                                 
15
  Because familial ties may cross ethnic boundaries as inter-ethnic clan networks exist, it is 
possible for warriors to kill relatives during raids.  
16
  In order to signify that a warrior has killed either a male or a female enemy in a fight, respec-
tively the suffixes – tum and – le or – moi, may be added to his name (e.g. Lipale 2005). Fur-
thermore, the shoulders of Pokot warriors are traditionally scarred after killing enemies, 
whereas in addition, sisters of warriors may put scarring marks on their bodies as to praise 
the strength and courage of their brothers.  
17
  This different perspective on ethnic traditions is also shown by the fact that female circumci-
sion is more important for the highland Pokot than for the lowland Pokot. 
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“The functions of the circumcised men are still very much clear in the (highland) areas of 
Sekerr, Sook, Chepareria, Ortum, Marich, Sigor and Lelan. Here uncircumcised men are re-
garded as children, which means that they cannot bless, do parpara (ritual cleansing), or talk 
with authority. Among the pastoralists of the lowlands, it is not such a big deal when you are 
not circumcised; here it is sapana that counts”.18  
According to Peristiany (1951a: 204-205) the existence of a dual age-system 
among the Pokot has the following implications for people from the highlands: 
“[T]o marry without having made sapana only results in a loss of prestige. There 
is no uncleanness from which to purify oneself, no danger of contagion for one’s 
sexual partner, kinsmen, or neighbours. Kerket feasts are not as frequent in the 
hills as in the lowlands but when they do take place the man who has not made 
sapana will not enter the kerket but will stay outside it”.19  
Even though there might be some disapproving remarks about the difference 
in defining manhood between the people of the lowlands and highlands (i.e. they 
might refer to each other as children or women), the dual age-system has not led 
to internal disarray or even disaffiliation among the Pokot. I believe that this eth-
nic unity can be explained because the Pokot understand that the adoption of sa-
pana was essential to the survival and expansion of the Pokot community as a 
whole. In addition, and perhaps more important, sapana and related Karimojong 
characteristics are associated with the highly valued pastoral lifestyle.  
“Having livestock is essential for a Pokot, because it is needed for food and dowry. A Po-
chon would, provided that there is enough livestock, always prefer to live fully of the live-
stock”.20  
Livestock and cattle in particular, is what makes life meaningful to the Pokot; 
it provides food and it structures life as relationships, such as marriage and stock 
friendships, are mediated through the exchanges of it. Already in the early 20
th
 
century, Beech (1911: 9) noted: “The Suk lives for his cattle, and everything is 
done to make them an object of reverence.” Among the Pokot, livestock is very 
much esteemed for its beauty and is associated with most of the rituals – it is the 
resource that is valued most. This resulted in the general term ‘mey’ among the 
Pokot, which refers to poor people within the community, especially to those 
                                                 
18
  From interview KONYAO # 3 (7-6-2005). 
19
  Besides the adoption of sapana, it was found that among the pastoral Pokot on the western 
plains more cultural Karimojong characteristics were adopted. Firstly, some clans originated 
from Karimojong and certain clan praises and burn marks for the livestock were taken over 
from Karimojong clans that shared the same totem. These practices were said not to be in use 
among the highland Pokot. Secondly, the Pokot have adopted Karimojong names (for both 
persons and livestock) and learned their language. The latter also resulted in a dialect on the 
western plains that differs from the Pokot dialect that is spoken in the highlands. 
20
  From interview KACHELIBA # 14 (28-4-2005). 
 Identity strategies of the Western Pokot 101 
 
without stock.
21
 Schneider (1957: 281) mentions that “cattle wealth is undeniably 
a source of prestige and some status”. Especially the people from the lowlands 
expressed this rather strongly:  
“If you don’t have livestock, you are considered a dead man. You cannot speak in front of a 
public; you will not have an audience. You will not be given the best meat”.22  
Kotomei (1997: 18) emphasises once more: “A Pochon who has no livestock 
is as good as a dead one. Pokot take livestock as their life line, that is no live-
stock no life”.  
Despite the fact that livestock herding is traditionally perceived as the ideal 
way of life, there is also great respect for the agricultural Pokot of the highlands. 
People from the lowlands put it this way:  
“The relation with the hills is always there”,23 and “The Pokot honour the highlands, because 
it is their ancestral land and there is food in times of hardship on the plains.”24  
The clan land in the highlands forms a base where clan relatives from the 
plains can ideally fall back on. Furthermore, the ethnic core area in the highlands 
was considered as a safe haven where moral standards were strict and pure Pokot 
culture was preserved. Peristiany (1951a: 189) clearly summarises the relation 
between the people from the plains and hills in his description of the sapana age-
system of the pastoral Pokot: “[I]f, from utilitarian motives, they fell in with the 
ways of the Karamojong, the pastoral Pokot never failed to display the greatest 
respect for everything connected with the ritual of the hill people. The pastoral 
lowlands may be a provisional Eldorado, the hills are the ancestral home and its 
inhabitants the living repository of ancestral values”.25 
Part II:  Settling down 
Conflict in the context of ‘depastoralisation’  
The second part of this chapter discusses how the Pokot regard the pastoral life-
style and the tradition of raiding in more recent times. Both were believed to 
                                                 
21
  The Pokot also distance themselves from the more agricultural Marakwet by terming them 
Chepleng, meaning ‘poor people’ or ‘those without stock’. 
22
  From interview KACHELIBA # 20. (5-5-2005). 
23
  From interview KACHELIBA # 20 (5-5-2005). 
24
  From interview KACHELIBA # 21 (3-6-2005).  
25
  Respect for the highlands is furthermore asserted through the worship of Mount Mtelo, the 
central and highest mountain in the Pokot territory, which is situated in the ethnic core area 
at the eastern part of Sekerr Mountains. Mount Mtelo is considered as a sacred place by all 
Pokot, something that is expressed during ceremonies whereby the kerket is formed and the 
circle of men is facing the mountain.  
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have been seriously affected since the late 1970s, whereby the time of major 
change was often traced back to the year 1979. This year coincides with the start 
of a three-year period known as the ‘Dark Age’ among the Pokot, throughout 
which the community was hit by several calamities (Andiema et al. 2003). Espe-
cially the pastoral lowlands were affected, according to Dietz (1987: 241) by 
“probably the severest crises of the century”. During these years, there was an 
escalation of insecurity problems, rinderpest, drought, epidemic diseases and 
famine.  
Insecurity increased firstly because the raiding conflict flared up after 1979. 
This was the year when Idi Amin’s regime collapsed, which made Ugandan sol-
diers in Upe open up the Moroto Barracks that were fully stored with AK47 
arms, in the hope of receiving support of the local people. The Matheniko section 
of the Karimojong as well as Tepeth grabbed the chance to arm themselves and 
raid their neighbours. As a result the region quickly armed, and whereas the raid-
ing situation had been relatively peaceful before, because the Karimojong feared 
reprisals from Amin, from 1979 onwards large scale conflict arose between 
Pokot, Karimojong and Turkana (Dietz 1987).  
The situation worsened because a prolonged 2-year drought had made grazing 
poor and harvests fail. Furthermore, outbreaks of goat disease and rinderpest 
caused animal loss during these years. Even though some relief food was distrib-
uted, people were left desperate for food. It was said that people had to eat the 
carcasses, something that led to a severe cholera outbreak claiming many lives.  
Just as the Pokot had began their restocking and raiding between the Pokot 
and Karimojong had died down, in 1984 disaster struck again. After some Pokot 
had raided Sebei and large landowners in Trans Nzoia, the government decided 
to carry out a major disarmament operation. This operation was targeted on the 
Pokot alone, leaving them vulnerable to the attacks of their non-disarmed 
neighbours. In order to force people to surrender their guns, cattle was confis-
cated in large numbers. During the operation many people lost all their cattle, as 
only a very small portion of it was returned and most of it had died while being 
crammed in the army camps. As a result, dowry payments had to be postponed. 
The situation aggravated since the operation was carried out in another period of 
drought and famine, and relief food was hardly distributed.  
Osamba (2000: 22) argues that the disarmament operation of 1984 could be 
seen as “evidence of attempted depastoralisation of the Pokot”. Although already 
in 1979, “the point had been reached where less than one-third of human food 
requirements could be secured from subsistence livestock production”, since 
then, “the gradual process of undermining pastoralism suddenly accelerated” 
 Identity strategies of the Western Pokot 103 
 
(Dietz 1993: 86-87).
26
 By the mid-1980s, many Pokot had become in Dietz’ 
(1987) words, ‘pastoralists in dire straits’.  
The calamities since 1979 plus the operation of 1984 have made many Pokot 
to look for other than pastoral means of survival. The insecurity led to “an exo-
dus towards the south” as someone who had also fled articulated.27 Many north-
ern Pokot residents of Alale and Kasei divisions (in addition to many Upe Pokot) 
settled around Kacheliba, a relatively safe area compared to where they had lived 
before. Many tried to survive with the little livestock that was left, others started 
farming, or opened shops. A portion of the new refugees together with some of 
the original residents from Kacheliba proceeded and migrated to the mountainous 
areas of Kapenguria, Lelan, and Chepareria and even further to Trans Nzoia to 
look for jobs as casual labourer. Later on these changes were also brought back 
to north Pokot, where people also began to invest in livestock trade. Furthermore, 
gold and ruby mining, as well as the selling of miraa
28
 have brought some new 
opportunities, which also stimulated the cash economy. Insecurity also increased 
school enrolment because many parents send their children to school for food 
and protection. 
The raiding conflict continued after 1984, and coupled with famines and out-
breaks of diseases, this meant that it has been hard for the Pokot to recover from 
what had happened to them in the period of 1979-1984. Although there have 
been times of peace, the effects of the conflict are disturbing. To give an indica-
tion, it was estimated by Adan & Pkalya (2005) that in the whole of West-Pokot 
district during the years 1994-2004, more than 50,000 livestock was stolen, 349 
lives had been claimed, and 94 people had been injured livestock raids.
29
 Because 
of decreasing herd sizes,
30
 livestock raiding has increasingly become regarded as 
                                                 
26
  Dietz (1993: 86) explains that the decline of pastoralism was already underway before 1979, 
because of strong population increase attributable to improved medical conditions over the 
years. All this, “despite the fact that the number of animals had probably increased by more 
than 60 percent since the 1920s”.  
27
  From interview KACHELIBA # 8 (19-4-2005).  
28
  Related to the khat family of stimulants. 
29
  The authors do not make clear on which sources their estimation is based. Most probably, 
they have looked into files of the police and local administration. Therefore, the actual num-
ber of stolen livestock, deaths and injured persons may be considered much higher as figured 
here, because by far not all raids are reported in the official records.  
30
  Zaal & Dietz (1999) have shown that the number of Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) per cap-
ita has decreased strongly during the last century. (1 TLU = 1.42 head of cattle, ten hair 
sheep or goats, one camel; whereby a absolute minimum of 3 TLU is required for strict pas-
toral survival in terms of food needs, not taking into account livestock requirements needed 
to support a local network.) The figure for the whole of West-Pokot district stood between 4-
7 TLU/cap in 1926, and dropped to between 3 and 4 TLU/cap from the 1920s until the 
1950s. In 1983, the figure had dramatically fallen to 0.5 TLU/cap, and the year 1987 gave 
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‘excessive’. People mentioned that since they already had less livestock to de-
pend on, it was more difficult to rebuild herds after raids. Additionally insecurity 
has negatively affected development activities as many developmental workers 
feel safe enough to work ‘in the field’. Moreover, the insecurity has led to mas-
sive displacement (Pkalya et al. 2003), whereby people retreat to safe areas 
around the towns, which also causes for overgrazing and soil erosion.  
Gun culture and ineffective security 
The most obvious change in raiding since 1979 is due to the prevalence of auto-
matic weapons. Guns, especially AK47’s, are very popular among the pastoral 
Pokot and the opening up of the Moroto barracks in Uganda made them available 
on a large scale. While it is difficult to estimate how many guns are owned by the 
people, most people are accustomed to living with guns. As a mission report 
notes: “In West Pokot, carrying small arms is only strange to a stranger in the 
community” (NCA 2006: 5).  
Besides the recruitment of home guards,
31
 disarmament operations have 
proven to be the most consequential attempts by the Kenyan government to ad-
dress the raiding problem. Since the late 1970s, the Pokot have been disarmed 
every few years (Mkutu 2003). Both the Kenyan and the Ugandan governments 
have generally taken the stance that insecurity in the region follows primarily 
from the proliferation of small arms. For example in 2001, when president Moi 
ordered the people to surrender their guns, he preposterously tried to make his 
point by stating that, “[t]raditionally (in a situation without guns), cattle rustling 
does not involve killing people” (Daily Nation, April 18, 2001).  
During my fieldwork in May 2005, the Kenyan government had just started a 
new disarmament operation. This reminded my respondents of the 1984-ope-
ration described above, especially when they saw helicopters flying to the army 
camp in Kacheliba.
32
 One week before the operation, notably a former Pokot 
Administrative Police officer described the deteriorated relation between the 
Pokot and the state as follows:  
                                                 
only a slightly better figure of between 0.6 and 0.7 TLU/cap. At the time of writing (1999), 
they estimated that the western lowlands still only had 1.3 TLU/cap. 
31
  In Kenya these are KPRs (Kenya Police Reservists) and in Uganda LDUs (Local Defence 
Units). However, there are strong doubts about the success of these forces. Home guards 
may either lack support of the government to work effectively, or use the guns they are pro-
vided with to participate in raids (e.g. Mkutu 2003; Adan & Pkalya 2005; NCA 2006; Mieth, 
this volume).  
32
  The operation of 1984 is also known by Pokot as Lotiriri, which refers to the noise of the 
helicopters that were used (Dietz 1987).  
 Identity strategies of the Western Pokot 105 
 
“The Kenyan government is ever picking on the Pokot, especially now when there is a new 
threat of operation. The government does not act like a father, who is interested in his kids 
and provides security, as it should be doing, but instead it treats the Pokot as mad dogs, hav-
ing rabies, by which the only means to end it, is to kill it. … I blame the government for 
never doing real research on the causes of violence. Since 1984 there have been no sustain-
able improvements, nothing has been done. The Pokot feel they have been left on their own. 
… The images of the operation of 1984 are still very much alive. They were reminded once 
more in 1997 when tanks and helicopters stood ready again and 60 Pokots were killed when 
fleeing to Uganda. Every government has so far done an operation among the Pokot, it is 
kind of like a tradition.”33  
The continuing disarmament operations have made many Pokot regard the 
government as an enemy, whom they treat with great suspicion.
34
 Guns are 
needed for protection, so the majority of the pastoral Pokot argue, and because 
the government is not providing this, they need to take matters in their own 
hands. Instead of ‘targeting’ the Pokot through disarmament, people felt the gov-
ernment should rather provide security through stronger enforcement of law. Yet, 
police forces are barely present in the isolated areas and people are prone to at-
tacks from enemies. Furthermore, although the army camp in Kacheliba assisted 
the community for example through the distribution of relief food, they hardly 
reached out to the public to provide security from raids.  
Apart from the more general complaint that the Pokot were marginalised, there 
is a strong underlying belief that actually the Pokot warriors are actually feared 
by the government security forces. The Pokot depict their warriors, especially 
those of the lowlands, as highly skilled, they consider them tough men who are 
familiar with the rough terrain they live in. They are known to strike and are eas-
ily able to hide themselves from security forces. Some respondents argued that 
disarmament operations were carried out with most force in the highlands where 
there are fewer weapons but where they can be found more easily. The search in 
the more remote parts of the lowlands was less intense as the pastoral Pokot were 
more cunning by tradition. The Pokot from the lowlands only handed in some of 
their older or defunct weapons, sometimes even with the assent of the army.  
                                                 
33
  From interview KACHELIBA # 10 (26-4-2005). Because of fear for the operation, it was 
estimated that around 26,000 people had fled the research area into Uganda (Daily Nation, 
May 11, 2005). The disarmament operation proved unsuccessful, as many others that pre-
ceded it. After three months, only 2100 out of the targeted 50,000 arms in the North Rift dis-
tricts had been surrendered. However, incidents of cattle raids had gone up by 30 per cent 
over the same period (East African Standard, August 6, 2005).  
34
  It must be said that the disarmament operations place the chiefs and sub-chiefs in a difficult 
position, since it questions their loyalty to their community vis-à-vis the government. 
Kamenju et al. (2003), describe the same dilemma for Marakwet chiefs, who themselves be-
came “victims of insecurity”. 
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Ethnic politics and the discourse of marginalisation  
As said, the Pokot do not respect the government security forces, even though at 
times they may be feared. In this regard, the colonial administration was rather 
commended. They were said to be present in the area in greater numbers and per-
form with more strength. Greater legitimacy was attributed also because they 
were seen as non-aligned. Since independence, Kenyan politics has become de-
fined by ethnicity. This has made the Pokot reason that the lack of development 
and security in their area is a deliberate act of marginalisation by the government 
because they do not share the ethnic identity of the president and the ruling party. 
People mentioned they experienced this not only under the Kikuyu presidents 
Kenyatta and Kibaki, but also under president Moi, a Tugen and thus fellow 
Kalenjin. The devastating operation of 1984 was carried out when the latter was 
in power and the Pokot felt that they were intentionally marginalised, compared 
to other Kalenjin communities.  
An important new catalyst of conflict since roughly the 1980s has been the in-
fluence of politicians, who are concerned with ethnic politics. By representing 
the most numerous ethnic group in their constituency, politicians may strategi-
cally choose to inflame or stay silent about conflict against other communities, as 
they position themselves for the next elections.
35
  
For example, former Environment and Natural Resources Minister Francis 
Lotodo, also referred to as the ‘King of Pokot’, became known in the media for 
making inflammatory statements. According to the Sunday Nation (September 
13, 1998): “Each time he issued an ultimatum to one or the other ethnic group to 
return stolen cattle or face the wrath of the Pokots, a murderous raid would en-
sue”. A report of Human Right Watch notes: “The use of inflammatory rhetoric 
in the North Rift did not end with Lotodo’s death (in 2000); to the contrary, in-
citement by Pokot leaders reportedly increased in 2001” (HRW 2002: 66-67 re-
ferring to KHRC 2001: 48-52).
36
 Besides disarmament, major concerns have 
been the historical land losses in Trans-Nzoia, and the construction of the Turk-
                                                 
35
  The fact that the Pokot are found on both sides of the international border, has made it inter-
esting for MPs and councillors to campaign in both countries, since many Pokot are said to 
be in possession of both Ugandan and Kenyan identity cards (e.g. Singo & Wairagu 2001; 
East African Standard, October 25, 2007).  
36
  Kapenguria MP Samuel Moroto, who succeeded Lotodo, warned in 2001 that the Pokot 
would use force to reclaim land in Turkana and Trans Nzoia Districts; “if they (the non-
Pokot) are not ready to surrender the land peacefully my kinsmen should not worry because 
I’m going to protect their interests” (Sunday Nation, March 25, 2001). Just three months be-
fore I arrived in the research area, Moroto had been “spending the Christmas holiday in jail 
over incitement claims”, as together with the mayor of Kapenguria and two councillors he 
had “allegedly urged the members of the community not to vacate land in West Pokot Dis-
trict belonging to non-Pokots” (East African Standard, January 3, 2005). 
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well Gorge Dam, for which it is strongly felt the Pokot were not fairly compen-
sated.
37
  
The MPs discourse of marginalisation strongly appeals to the Pokot, who feel 
they are ‘left alone’ or mistreated by their governments. To illustrate this, during 
the process of the National constitution-writing the MP of Kacheliba constitu-
ency stated: “Getting Kacheliba put on the record as an area deserving special 
affirmative action and having the Pokot included among those who suffered his-
torical injustices are what this new Constitution is all about for me” (Daily Na-
tion, August 15, 2003). 
Through the influence of national politics, the Pokot have articulated their eth-
nic identity stronger. Overall, issues of control and access to land have become of 
vital importance to defining the Pokot identity. Whereas from tradition Pokot 
have a strong moral to live peacefully with other ethnic communities in their own 
territory, in the last few decades this open outlook has been questioned. For ex-
ample, when there were threats of a coup against president Moi in 1982 and 
again in advance of multi-party elections in 1992, non-Pokot immigrants where 
chased away from the towns in Pokot District.  
Modern values and generational conflict 
The decision-making authority of the elders concerning raids had lessened, as in-
creasingly the younger warriors are no longer following their advice. Compared 
to the warrior groups that were active in raiding in the years before 1979, the 
more recent warrior groups tended to behave differently. One concerned elder 
summed up some characteristics:  
“The Ngopotom and Ngisigira, [warrior groups that raided during the 1970s] are known for 
being organized, they organize themselves even when they were eating. They listened to the 
elders when they were going for raids, they don’t make a lot of noise (quarrel). These people 
did not have the Kalashnikovs yet, only a few homemade guns that came from the Turkana. 
The appreciation of traditional culture among this group is still very strong. Besides, they 
don’t drink so much. … The younger warrior groups are those such as the Ngidinkai (ac-
tively raiding since the late 1980s and 1990s). These guys don’t listen to any advice. They 
are very aggressive. They are stubborn and they drink a lot. However, the Ngimunyongkwo 
(also known as Rumokorogh, who raided since 2000) is the worst group of all. They grew up 
with guns; they don’t know about traditional weapons, each boy should have a gun. Just like 
the Ngidinkai, they do many evil things. They don’t follow the clan marriage rules, even the 
                                                 
37
  These matters have also brought forward by political activists appealing for the Pokot case. 
One of them stated that the Pokot armed themselves because they were “simply seeking 
remedies for the historical injustices that saw us lose large tracts of arable land over the 
years” (East African Standard, December 16, 2002)  
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girls (of that age). The respect is gone. They can even shoot their fathers, if these don’t agree 
with the sons’ plans to marry. They are very dangerous because of the guns.”38 
This quote points to the belief that declining respect for the elders and for tra-
ditional Pokot culture is accompanied by the prevalence of guns. It is nothing 
new that warriors feel attached to their weapons – this has been the case with tra-
ditional weapons too. However, the authority of the elders was no longer effec-
tive in managing the conflict. The young generation was said to behave in more 
autonomous ways, for example by marrying or raiding without the advice or 
blessing of the elders. The complaint is especially strong because in traditional 
Pokot culture, expressing respect to elders is considered as one of the most im-
portant values and bypassing this is thus deemed as an offensive act. How then 
do we explain the rejection of traditional moral standards by the younger genera-
tion and, perhaps more important, why is the older generation not able to restore 
their authority? Instead of attributing this generational conflict to the introduction 
of guns, I believe we must investigate it in the light of a wider context.  
To start with, the position of the elders is at stake because they are confronted 
with modern civilisation and development thinking, something that has brought 
new values to the area. These new values were attributed to the influence of 
Christianity and education. The majority of schools in the area are founded and 
sponsored by missions. Most of the missions are foreign funded and thus in a 
relatively good financial position compared to the government. Especially during 
the 1979-1984 period, they were able to take a prominent position as relief agen-
cies, and many parents decided to send their children to school for food and pro-
tection.  
The missions take an uncomfortable stance toward many of the Pokot tradi-
tions, although the approach varies per denomination, as the Protestants are 
stricter compared to the Catholics. In general, the missions express disapproval 
of livestock raiding, traditional initiation rites, requesting advice and blessings 
from traditional specialists (such as prophets, intestine interpreters and shoe toss-
ers), worshipping of ancestors and the sacrificing of animals that is related to 
this. The Protestants generally require more changes as they may not approve the 
wearing of the traditional Pokot adornment, and order for the complete abolish-
ment of alcohol. Besides, they are stricter on the point of monogamy.  
Elders who are educated and Christianised are placed in a difficult position as 
they hinge between traditional and modern forms of identity. On the one hand, 
they see the benefits of development in the area and know that integrating in the 
                                                 
38
  From interview AMAKURIAT # 4 (17-6-2005). The names of these warrior groups are 
mostly identified in North Pokot, Alale Division; as such, they may not be recognised in 
other parts of the research area. However, the problems associated with the younger warriors 
are commonly acknowledged. 
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modern system is needed to acquire positions of political authority. Many of the 
individuals that have undergone these changes are the ones who are currently tak-
ing leadership positions (e.g. chiefs, teachers, religious leaders) in the commu-
nity. They often regarded themselves as role models, who are to convert ‘the 
traditional people’ to the ideology of the nation state, so that the Pokot commu-
nity comes out of marginalisation. On the other hand elders may fear the ‘erosion 
of culture’ as it was frequently described, probably even more so because their 
position of authority is affected. One elder who went to school in the late 1960s 
where he was also Christianised explained: 
“Elder people are not so tough on traditions anymore. They have benefited from education 
and religion. The older generation is gone now. Although the elders have left traditions 
themselves, they still find it unpleasant to adapt to the new situation.”39 
Related to the declining authority of elders is the depreciation of the traditional 
age-systems in the area. People who are influenced by modern values may regard 
the methods as outdated and uncivilised. Although most missions regard male 
circumcision as a good thing as they say that this is also preached in the bible, 
they prefer that the operation be carried out in medical clinics, for hygienic rea-
sons but moreover because the traditional education taking place during the se-
clusion period of traditional circumcision, was considered improper. This means 
that a large part of the new generation grows up without the traditional education 
– which places emphasis on the respect for senior age-sets – and without the so-
cial bonding between age-mates that is related to traditional circumcision. Fur-
thermore, elders complained that the proper naming and time-sequencing of age-
sets was affected because of this. 
A similar decline of the sapana initiation rite is recognised among people who 
are educated and Christianised. In addition, some people cannot afford to offer an 
the animal for the ceremony because of scarcity in livestock. A worried elder set 
out the implications:  
“Less people do sapana. This causes a generation conflict. The ones that have done sapana 
are proud and feel complete. They view the ones who did not do sapana as children – they 
are not allowed to sit in the kïrket, and they cannot eat specific parts of the meat. They may 
not speak inside the arena before the elders or officially open the girls who come out of cir-
cumcision. Their sons can never undergo sapana, it stops the chain. The ones that don’t do 
sapana are mainly the Protestants, because they see the practice as something pagan.”40 
Whereas the traditional age-systems may be lost because of modern values, 
the idea that education will put an end to raiding proves unrealistic. Instead, it 
was put forward that many of the younger warriors were in fact ‘dropouts’, who 
had left school for various reasons such as feelings of indifference or difficulties 
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  From interview KACHELIBA # 5 (14-4-2005). 
40
  From interview KONYAO # 2 (6-6-2005).  
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paying fees. This leaves these boys without the feeling of being rooted in tradi-
tional culture, and often without employment opportunities. A teacher noted:  
“There is a hanging group of youth, who go for rustling and robberies in order to gain eco-
nomically. Many parents have left their children at school, without giving them direction. 
They think they are in the right place, but the young children go to town and chew miraa, 
drink bear, smoke cigarettes, while they claim to have gone for study”.41  
Besides the fact that modern values have altered the perception towards tradi-
tional Pokot culture, another incentive towards this is the commercialisation of 
the livestock economy. Especially since the 1990s, this has opened up opportuni-
ties for commercially inspired raiding. Large traders have come up, who trans-
port the livestock to other parts of Kenya.
42
 It was believed that these affluent 
individuals were facilitating raids, not because they organise raiding parties as is 
assumed by some authors (e.g. Mkutu 2003), but because they buy and export 
raided livestock. Raided livestock can be sold without difficulty, as there are no 
security forces that inspect markets in the area. Zaal et al. (2006) have estimated 
that approximately 10,000 heads of cattle leave West-Pokot District each year for 
the Western highlands and Nairobi, although they suppose this number is proba-
bly underestimated since much trade occurs outside of official routes. They as-
sume a lot of the raided cattle end up in the market (Ibid.: 162).  
Selling raided livestock also destabilised the social organisation of the com-
munity because thieves traditionally do not steal from fellow Pokot. This is con-
sidered a serious crime. The thieves may even be involved in a trading network 
that crosses ethnic boundaries. In Amakuriat, a victim of cattle theft by a fellow 
Pokot mentioned:  
“Now that there is peace with the Karimojong, the thieves sell the livestock in Karamoja. 
This makes it more difficult to trace stolen cattle. Cattle-thieves amongst the Karimojong 
and Pokot are friends. They help each other to find markets on the other side to sell the sto-
len cattle.”43  
Because stolen livestock is increasingly being sold, raiding is now increas-
ingly perceived as excessive, since it can be carried out independent of the avail-
ability of land or labour for livestock management and moreover because it 
“excludes reciprocity as marketed cattle cannot be raided back” (Krätli & Swift 
2001: 9).  
                                                 
41
  Interview: CHEPARERIA # 14 (31-8-2005). 
42
  Zaal & Dietz (1999) show that the ‘caloric terms of trade’ have become more positive for 
pastoralists in the research area during the 20th century, thus making it increasingly favour-
able for them to sell their animals in return for grains, especially when they trade for maize 
(compared to millet). However, they note that the market-based form of food security is af-
fected because cereals are increasingly sold to the urban markets, instead of the pastoral low-
lands, and liberalisation since 1990 has cause for sharp price fluctuations.  
43
  From interview AMAKURIAT # 4 (17-6-2005). 
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People from the bush  
The extent of development activities and infiltration of modern values is spatially 
defined in the area. Places where people live a primarily sedentarised lifestyle are 
more involved in cultural change. Therefore, during the interviews that focused 
on the perceptions towards traditional Pokot culture, often distinctions were 
made between people from ‘town’ and people from the ‘bush’ or ‘village’, ‘re-
serve’ or ‘interior’.  
The pastoral community still desires a lifestyle in which livestock features 
prominently. Even though many people have to rely more on cereals these days, 
“as a way of life, subsistence pastoralism is clearly preferred”, like Dietz (1987: 
287) also found in the 1980s when the pastoral community had been tested to the 
extreme. For the pastoralists farming has become integrated in their lives, even 
though “in the past herders looked down upon the farmers. They were considered 
poor people. Nowadays people have actually learned that you could eat rubbish” 
referring to the consumption of grains without milk, as one pastoralist noted.
44
  
Still, pastoralists are sceptic about some cultural changes that modern devel-
opment has brought along. For example, for them to put an end to raiding or to 
be monogamous is contrary to their ideals. Therefore, churches are hardly visited 
by the pastoralists (especially the men) as their cultural perspectives differ. The 
changes of modernity are often met with ambiguity. While some of the pastoral-
ists might send a few of their children to school (probably in the long run to pro-
vide for other income opportunities) and see the advantages of development 
activities such as medical clinics, boreholes or relief food, the cultural changes 
that come along with it are not so beneficial to them.  
In contrast to the pastoralists perspective, the town community has internalised 
a discourse of modernisation. They often refer to the pastoralists not only as tra-
ditional but even as uncivilised or backward. For some former warriors, also 
called ‘reformed warriors’, this has meant that they ended raiding and began to 
invest in livestock trade or other small businesses, often inspired by Christian 
values. The ideology of modernisation as opposed to pastoralism, actually origi-
nates from the early colonial times, when “progress was to come from the Hill 
Suk” (Visser 1989: 34). The colonialists put emphasis on agriculture, and found 
it hard to convince the Pokot to change their pastoral lifestyle. The Pokot were 
therefore often thought to be ‘conservative people’, who were ‘resistant to 
change’ (Schneider 1959; Patterson 1969).  
We could portray the attitude of the town community towards the pastoralists 
and the raiding tradition as ambivalent. On the one hand, many of the town peo-
                                                 
44
  From interview KONYAO # 5 (7-6-2005). 
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ple, often consisting of former pastoralists who were forced to adopt a sedenta-
rised lifestyle, still remember their live as pastoralists, which despite its hazards, 
seemed less complex to them. Moreover, many of them still own livestock that is 
often herded by their relatives who are continue living a pastoral lifestyle. The 
settled people still value livestock, as one of them illustrates: “As a Pokot, you 
should always have at least a few livestock, only then you can be respected”.45 
In addition to this, the heroic qualities attributed to pastoralists do not fade 
away. Pastoralists are still admired for their tough spirit and means to protect the 
Pokot community, even in the modern context. A teacher remarkably told that:  
“The pastoralists are generally believed to be sharper and wiser than the farmers. Even to-
day, they (the children from the pastoralists) lead in class. The pastoralists are able to protect 
the community. When they campaign for parliamentary seats, the farmer has a hard time 
proving that he is capable of leading. In times of war the pastoralists are leading.”46 
On the other hand, new identity strategies are emerging. Town people argued 
that because the pastoralists were not giving up their old lifestyles, especially in 
regard to raiding, the Pokot became known as a violent and backward commu-
nity. The media reinforce this suggestion through biasing their news coverage 
about the Pokot mostly to raids and the prevalence of arms.
47
 A modern perspec-
tive on human rights condemns the violent practice of raiding. Also, being seen 
as a violent community living in an insecure place is not favourable for town 
people. They might see their trade or development diminish as people are afraid 
to visit or work in the place.  
A grains salesman from Chepareria explained the complicated position of 
town people towards the pastoralists: 
“For example in the war with the Marakwet, the pastoralists from the lowland came to rescue 
the farmers from the highland. The pastoralists were camping in the highland, spying and 
fighting from there. They were the militia with skilled war techniques. … We tell them that 
they should stop raiding, because is gives the Pokot a bad name, it presents a poor picture. 
People elsewhere are afraid of the Pokot.”48  
The different response to the raiding conflict between pastoralists and the 
town people is also altering the scope of identification with the adopted culture of 
the Karimojong. Unlike in the past, when adoption was stimulated so the pastoral 
                                                 
45
  From interview MAKUTANO # 12 (1-10-2005). 
46
  From interview CHEPARERIA # 17 (6-9-2005). 
47
  To highlight one, the Daily Nation (2003, August 4) heads: “For the Pokot firearms are a 
way of life” and continues by stating that the Pokot are “a people who have changed little 
with time. … a people who, from time immemorial, have regarded cattle rustling as a virtue 
and insecurity as a normal hazard to be endured. … It is not uncommon in the Pokot coun-
tryside to come across shuka-clad lads casually wielding guns in the bush where they could 
be anything from homeguards to herdsmen and bandits”. 
48
  From interview CHEPARERIA # 9 (30-8-2005) 
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Pokot could gain social standing in the Karimojong community to ensure grazing 
rights and stock friends, nowadays people who have other than pastoral means of 
survival ask themselves:  
“The new generation is giving their children Pokot names, instead of Karimojong names. 
This happens especially among the educated ones, who are proud to use the Pokot names and 
saying: Why should we borrow the culture of an enemy tribe?”49 
A larger sense of ‘Pokotness’ which has been reinforced through the ethnic 
politics, has furthermore led to increased importance of the practice of circumci-
sion. This was already forecasted by Peristiany (1951a: 205), who believed that: 
“... circumcision will be attended by a larger number. This is due to the ‘increas-
ing pride of race’, of Pokot who, having now spread over a much greater area 
than they occupied before, feel that their increase of cattle and land entitles them 
to treat their pastoral neighbours on an equal footing”. Although sapana is still 
important for the pastoral Pokot, and most of their men along the borders still re-
frain from circumcision because of security reasons, an increased number of pas-
toralists choose to be circumcised as well. When asking why, someone replied: 
“Because when you are among those other Pokot, you’re the same” referring to 
the need to be equally respected by other circumcised Pokot.50 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have examined the meaning of the raiding conflict for the ethnic 
identity of the Pokot for two different periods from a constructivistic perspective. 
This was done by taking Günther Schlee’s preliminary theory of integration and 
conflict in account, in order to examine how different conditions may opt for 
changes in the scope of identification.  
By tradition livestock is the resource that Pokot value most, also by the more 
agricultural Pokot in the highlands. The raiding tradition was introduced as the 
Pokot gradually expanded from their mountainous core area to the surrounding 
lowlands. Therefore raiding is mostly associated with the pastoral section of the 
community, although it also offers opportunities for the more agricultural Pokot. 
And even though raiding may be regarded by outsiders as a practice which af-
fects human rights, it is considered as a legitimate means for Pokot warriors to 
establish themselves in the community. It enlarges access to a key resource and 
hence increases the degree of personal independence. Furthermore, the act of 
raiding, which is accompanied by the killing of enemies, forms one of the ideals 
of warriorhood, as men involved are admired for showing courage. For the pas-
                                                 
49
  From interview KONYAO # 2 (6-6-2005). 
50
  From interview KONYAO # 2 (6-6-2005). 
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toralists, a certain degree of conflict and insecurity are accepted as part of their 
lives.  
During the latter half of the 19
th
 century, the Pokot got in control of the west-
ern lowlands, an area formerly inhabited by the Karimojong. This rival group 
was admired by the Pokot for being more affluent in terms livestock and for con-
trolling the land to graze on. In the process of expansion the Pokot adopted cul-
tural characteristics from the Karimojong, most notably the sapana age organi-
sation. By doing so, the Pokot peacefully gained access to land and livestock as 
they were identified as equals by the Karimojong. As the Pokot prospered, espe-
cially after the Karimojong had been severely hit by droughts, diseases and fam-
ine in the years 1880s-1990s, they were able to shift the balance of power to their 
advantage. The story of Merkol, who instructed the Pokot to adopt sapana, points 
to the indicates that the Pokot saw it as a strategy to hide their original identity in 
order to eventually overpower their enemy. We can thus agree with Simonse & 
Kurimoto (1998: 4) who explain that age-systems as inter-societal phenomena 
“are instrumental not only in binding different kinship groups, village communi-
ties and territorial sections of a region, but also in bringing together different eth-
nic groups as meaningful units of interaction both antagonistic and peaceful”. 
That the Pokot chose to integrate the sapana age organisation is especially re-
markable because they traditionally place more emphasis on the circumcision age 
organisation, something they share which other Kalenjin groups. Until today the 
Pokot practice a dual form of age organisation, whereby sapana is more impor-
tant to the pastoralists of the lowlands and circumcision is more important for the 
more agricultural Pokot in the highlands. In this sense ethnic identity of the 
Pokot can best be described as a matter of spatial graduation, something which 
Dahl (1996) also found in case of the Boran. This has not led to internal disarray 
because there continues to be a need for a secure a stable resource base. While 
the pastoralists from the lowlands are admired for living a pastoral lifestyle and 
their protection of the larger Pokot community, the agriculturalists from the high-
lands are admired for living in the ancestral homeland (i.e. preserving pure Pokot 
culture) and because their land forms a refuge area for people of the plains to fall 
back on in times of hardship.  
I also discussed identity strategies in more recent times; the period from the 
late 1970s onwards, when pastoralism was seriously undermined. The region was 
hit by several calamities including drought, famine, livestock diseases, and in-
creased insecurity because of more frequent raids and harsh disarmament opera-
tions by the Kenyan government. This spurred intensified hatred not only to-
wards the neighbouring ethnic groups, whose raids were seen as excessive in 
times of livestock scarcity, but also towards the Kenyan government, which was 
felt to deliberately marginalise the Pokot.  
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By voicing this sentiment, which I described as a ‘discourse of marginalisa-
tion’, politicians framed Pokot identity in the national context, something which 
may also explain why the Pokot are so much associated with raiding by other 
Kenyans. There is an imminent danger in addressing the community through this 
discourse. Kenya’s typical political-administrative system is still very much spa-
tially defined by ethnicity, which means that MPs may often speak in the name of 
the dominant ethnic community in their constituency. This may amplify inter-
ethnic mistrust and hatred and incite people to violate often innocent ‘others’ on 
the basis of primordial attachments.  
Faced by declining opportunities to live a pastoral lifestyle, and development 
activities that brought new services to the towns, many Pokot chose or were 
forced to sedentarise and opt for other livelihoods. This has caused for an ideo-
logical separation within the Pokot community, whereby people in towns have 
taken on a modernising discourse and have started to disassociate themselves 
from the pastoralists and their traditions (including the sapana age organisation). 
However, the attitude of the town people may be termed as ambivalent. On the 
one hand, they still value livestock and the warriors’ courage and ability to pro-
tect the community. On the other hand, they adopt new identity strategies and 
livelihoods, whereby raiding is not beneficial to them in terms of development 
and trade.  
The elder generation is in between these positions and they hinge between 
modern and traditional identities. While some of them benefitted from newly ac-
quired positions, they also criticise the youth’s disregard of Pokot traditions. 
Concerning raiding, elders complained that young warriors were no longer re-
specting them and raided without their consent. While they often attributed this 
to the introduction of the gun culture, I have argued that the gun may rather be 
seen as a symbol not only of the fear of the elder generation to be superseded  by 
the younger generation, but also of the rejection of traditional moral standards by 
the latter.  
This chapter has shown that, as Waller (1993: 302) noted for the Maasai, eth-
nicities are “in an endless process of transformation”. Following the theory of 
Schlee (2008), it was illustrated that the Pokot have made use of both including 
and excluding identity strategies by emphasising different identity markers, 
whereby the choice for these strategies was based on securing resources crucial 
for survival. The absence or presence of conflict in the form of livestock raiding 
has been a defining factor in shaping these strategies.  
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This paper
1
 explores the recent ethnic frictions of a pastoral group with its 
neighbours in Northern Kenya. The changes in the social setup, due to political 
and economic discrepancies, culminated in the ‘Turbi Massacre’ in 2005. This 
event and its aftermaths serve as a case study to explore the vicissitude of ethnic 
violence in a marginalized area where individual choices, collective action, poli-
tical and economic marginalization, local and global influences are interrelated but 
obscure in its genesis due to an incessantly altering palette of group alliances. It is 
argued that seemingly ‘traditional’ fights like raiding are motivated by modern po-
litical tools that are used in the struggle to exclude and marginalise the ‘hostile 
neighbour’. 
Introduction 
Marsabit District in Northern Kenya has always been pictured as an insecure 
area. In the colonial time it was a closed district governed by military rule. Today 
it still features in the media as an insecure area where banditry, raids and ethnic 
clashes seem to be part of every day life.  
Marsabit District is mainly occupied by pastoralists of different ethnic back-
grounds. Pastoralism is a traditional production system based on livestock, that 
engages in various degrees of mobility. Most people in this very dry area are no-
madic pastoralists, whereby the whole family moves the homestead according to 
the rainfall pattern. The area is for over 80 per cent semi-desert and savannah 
                                                 
1
  The field data for this paper were collected in January-February 2007 and July-August 2008. 
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bush land, which is presently mainly used for extensive livestock rearing. Some 
groups only move the animals, but leave the homestead behind with some milk 
animals. Sometimes such households also engage in agriculture, once they have 
settled in an area where rainfall is high enough for crop cultivation. The popula-
tion has grown steadily and fast since independence in 1963 (see Figure 6.1). The 
number of people living in the district has more than doubled over the past 30 
years, but also the number of ethnic groups has grown due to immigrating refu-
gees from wars and droughts in Somalia and Ethiopia. The main ethnic groups in 
the District are presently the Borana, the Gabra, the Rendille, the Samburu, the 
Burji and the Turkana. Smaller groups are the Somali (traders from Somalia), 
Degodia, Ajuran, Garre, Sakuye, Dassanetch, Waata, Konso and Sidam. Most of 
these groups have their near of kin living in Ethiopia and/or Somalia, except the 
Samburu, Rendille and the Turkana. Ethnic identities are dynamic, in the sense 
that individuals can identify themselves with different ethnic groups. Not only 
because of intermarriage, but also because in every group there are clans and 
subclans that overlap with neighbouring groups. Equally dynamic are the rela-
tionships between groups. Most have histories of animosity, temporal alliances 
and violent conflict. It is in a situation of conflict that clear boundaries between  
 
 
 Figure 6.1 Human population trends in Marsabit District
2
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 Source: Adano & Witsenburg 2004, p. 139. 
                                                 
2
  In the era of the British colonial administration, Marsabit and Moyale Districts together were 
part of the Northern Frontier District. Until 1995, Marsabit and Moyale together formed one 
district. For these reasons, all data referring to Marsabit District also include present day 
Moyale District. The figures are based on population censes; of which the last one was con-
ducted in 1999. 
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ethnic groups are drawn. This paper will narrate a situation where that suddenly 
happened.  
The dotted trend line in Figure 6.1 shows an important change in lifestyle: The 
sedentarisation process among nomadic people. This trend line indicates the 
rapid settling down of pastoral people who, due to herd losses and impover-
ishment, increasingly inhabit towns and villages on Marsabit Mountain where 
they engage in arable farming, trade or casual employment. Impoverishment is 
partly a result of frequent droughts associated with heavy livestock losses and 
increasing insecurity. Not only pastoral impoverishment and insecurity caused 
settlement growth; also trade opportunities, a better access to educational and 
health services and the desire to leave the nomadic pastoral system attracted peo-
ple to settle down (Adano & Witsenburg 2004).  
Marsabit District was always known for its violence; frequent border attacks, 
military activities, banditry attacks (shifta) and animal raiding seem part of daily 
life (see also the report of the Kenyan Human Rights Commission for an over-
view of violent incidents since 1990 – KHRC 2000). However, there was a 
steady decrease in violence since colonial times, and the 1990s was a decade that 
showed a relatively tranquil situation (Adano & Witsenburg 2004). Since 2001 
the situation seems to have changed for the worse.  
Marsabit District is a vast area (over 66,000 km
2
), where on all sides skir-
mishes and raids occurred in a relatively short period of time since then. 2005 
may be one of the most violent years in the recent history of the District. Not all 
incidents are related, and not all Gabra and Borana were involved in an ‘ethnic 
war’. However, there are many convergent factors resulting in deteriorating inter-
ethnic relationships between these groups in the process, which had the potential 
of becoming a true civil war.  
The number of people that have been killed in interethnic violence fluctuates 
each year (see Table 6.1). On average it is about 36 persons per 100,000 inhabi-
tants (what we call the ‘Kill rate’) each year from 2002 to 2008. From 1949 to 
1959 it was about 25 persons per 100,000 inhabitants. There seems to be an in-
crease in this last decade. With this high kill rate it comes close to the most inse-
cure urbanised areas in the world.
3
 Often, urbanised areas are perceived to be 
                                                 
3
  Nairobi (1997): 76.6 – Washington DC (1997): 56.9 – Pretoria (1997): 43 – Moscow (1997): 
17.1 – London (1997): 2.5 – Amsterdam (1997): 5.6. 
The figures in Marsabit are underreported compared to the other regions, because the Marsa-
bit figures only include violence deaths as a result of interethnic fights or raids. The other re-
gional statistics include also killings within families or within the own ethnic group. The 
London and Amsterdam statistics also include cases of death as a result of neglect or abuse 
(but not euthanasia). It is indeed very difficult to compare such figures, but the gap between 
Amsterdam and Marsabit is in reality certainly much wider. [Sources: Home Office, Gov-
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much more insecure, as in essence everyone can fall victim to a violent attack, 
while in pastoral areas only specific groups are targeted at any time. Insecurity is 
therefore perceived to be higher in urbanised areas, since everyone feels threat-
ened. By comparison, security in the pastoral drylands is enhanced by living and 
working in close proximity to the own ethnic group, whereas in urbanised areas 
this protection is lacking. We may therefore suggest that feelings of insecurity 
are partly instilled by the number of potential enemies. In an urban setting the 
number of potential enemies seems endless, because no one may know their true 
enemy. In the pastoral setting, the potential enemies may come from this one 
hostile ethnic group only. Therefore, just comparing kill rates does not say much 
about the quality of insecurity. Yet, looking at the high kill rate nevertheless 
raises questions about the capacity of the present government, the NGOs and lo-
cal cultural formations to cope with life-threatening violence. 
 
 
Table 6.1 Violence in Marsabit District, 2002-2008 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
People killed
a
 23 9 11 155 35 33 44 
Injured 8 6 7 65 47 8 18 
Livestock stolen
b
 849 1,071 1,289 11,601 39,477   
Raids   8 42 45 8 10 
Kill rate
c
 18.9 7.4 9.1 127.6 25.5 27.6 36.2 
Notes:  a) This is the sum of people that were killed as ‘bandits’ and in raids. 
 b) This is an estimate. 
 c) Based on population census 1999 when the Marsabit population was 121,520. 
Source:  Police records Marsabit Station, adjusted with information from the Peace and Justice  
 Committee Marsabit. 
 
 
In Figure 6.2 we portray a timeline of the latest records of ethnic violent 
deaths, reported by the Peace Committee of the Catholic Mission in Marsabit. 
The pattern is in line with evidence from earlier work (see Adano & Witsenburg 
2004, 2008), which generally shows an increase in violent deaths in the rainy 
season April-June, and a lower rate for the other seasons. An exception is July 
2005 which showed a very high number of violent deaths. This is the time of the 
Turbi Massacre when many people were killed in an early morning raid. In the 
following section we will elaborate on the exceptional situation of that event. 
                                                 
ernment of the UK (Barclay & Tavares 2002) and Police Commissioners Report (in Gimode 
2001)]. 
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The Gabra-Borana conflict: Fight over natural resources? 
In the morning of 12 July 2005, a gang of Borana fighters attacked Gabra inhabi-
tants of Turbi, a small village along the Addis Ababa – Nairobi road in Northern 
Kenya, some 60 km to the south of the Kenyan-Ethiopian border. Around 70 
people were killed with guns, spears and machetes, among them women and at 
least 22 school children. Around 15 Borana fighters were also killed on the way 
to Ethiopia where they wanted to seek refuge with thousands of raided animals.
4
 
The Turbi Massacre as it is named since then, received global media coverage 
and attracted worldwide attention. Until today, people are still wondering how 
such a cruel event could take place. 
 
 
 Figure 6.2 Seasonal fluctuations in rainfall and killings, Marsabit District, 2004-2008 
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4
  Figures vary per document. The Peace Committee of the Catholic Mission registered 85 
deaths, including 15 ‘bandits’ from Ethiopia. Nine Borana were killed in Bubisa on the same 
day. The ‘fact finding commission’ of the government reported 50 killed adults plus 22 chil-
dren. (Marsabit Conflict Assessment Report 21-28 July 2005, The mission team had Oxfam, 
ALRMP, SNV, SRIC, ITDG, NCCK, DAI, PEACENET, CEMERIDE and COPA participat-
ing in it. The Teamleader was James Ndungu, SRIC. 
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Even though the relationship between many Gabra and Borana had cooled 
down for a while, the attack came as a surprise. The relationship between the two 
groups has mostly been familial and peaceful, be it at times competitive, but 
never so violent. How closely they were related can be seen from their frequent 
intermarriages, the sharing of waterholes and pastures, and the way they looked 
after each other’s animals. Before the massacre most border villages were a mix-
ture of Gabra and Borana residents living in relatively undisturbed coexistence, 
and social cohesion was strong. Moreover, they assisted each other in raids 
against other neighbouring groups, and provided hospitality and accommodation 
for each other while on transit (see also Schlee (1989, 2008) for an extensive 
study on the relationship between Gabra and Borana). 
Since 2000, relationships between these two ethnic groups deteriorated. In 
August 2002 one Gabra was killed allegedly by Borana in Turbi. In retaliation, 
about 700 small stock were captured from the Borana by the Gabra. Despite 
peace meetings between the two groups no repayment was done. Borana herds-
men were denied access to Turbi town and its water dam, and Gabra were denied 
access to Rawana and Wolda boreholes. This situation continued through 2003. 
There was no sharing of resources, but no violence either. Both parties refused to 
pay the debt (100 Borana cattle to the Gabra for killing, the return of the small 
stock to Borana). Finally, at a peace meeting in May 2005, the Gabra agreed to 
return the small stock and the Borana said they would compensate for the killing 
of the Gabra in Turbi. 
But before this was done, three Borana men were killed, allegedly by Gabra, at 
Forole, a small border settlement between the Hurri Hills and the Ethiopian bor-
der. Borana retaliated and raided Gabra villages along the border and animals 
were stolen. Then three Borana cattle herds were captured from Marsabit and 
Hurri Hills, whereby two Borana men were killed. Borana retaliated by burning 
Gabra houses in Marsabit and the killing of one person. Then, Gabra killed six 
Borana in Forole, a mountain ridge straddling the border with Ethiopia.  
Between May and July 2005, before the Turbi massacre, there were around 10 
fights between the Gabra by Borana from Kenya and Ethiopia, of which one at-
tack was presumably carried out by Amarkoke from Ethiopia. About 30 people 
died in the raids and counter raids. This culminated in the large scale attack on 
Turbi town, when a large group of Borana attacked Gabra families in the early 
morning hours. The attackers killed a class of 22 school children, and shot dead 
many mothers who tried to run away with babies in their arms and raided thou-
sands of animals.  
The increasing hostility and frequent violent encounters show that the gap be-
tween Gabra and Borana had widened during that decade. The relationship be-
tween these ethnic groups deteriorated rapidly. The fact that people were killed 
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can be considered the sad outcome of the conflict. The reasons or triggering 
events remain to be discussed, and the following account of events presents 
those.  
Fight over a borehole 
In 2000, the Rawana borehole that is located between Turbi village and Wolda, 
was the focus of a power struggle between the chief of Wolda and the inhabitants 
of Turbi Town. The Rawana borehole was dug by the United Nations High Com-
mission for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1991 for the refugees from Ethiopia and So-
malia who were settled in Wolda in order to provide an alternative water source 
for the local communities. After the war in Ethiopia was over and the refugees 
returned, the borehole was handed over to the local people who organized them-
selves into a group called ‘Rawana Water Users Association’ who lived in Turbi, 
the village situated 3 km to the South of the borehole. This village was, and still 
is, mainly inhabited by Gabra herders. In 1997 however, a new administrative 
boundary was drawn which removed the borehole from Turbi Town. The bore-
hole was now located in Sololo Division, while Turbi was located in North Horr 
division. Initially, the borehole was run as it was before: Water Users who paid a 
yearly contribution managed it collectively, and anybody paying for water could 
use it irrespective of ethnic affiliation. However, Borana from Sololo wanted full 
control over the borehole they claimed was theirs because of the new boundary 
that was drawn. It became a long and tedious struggle between the Gabra of 
Turbi and the Borana in Sololo, in which a number of politicians were involved. 
The battle was mainly headed by the chiefs of Sololo and Turbi, but soon also 
people in the administration and the Members of Parliament of Moyale (Borana) 
and North Horr (Gabra) were involved. The Gabra eventually decided to give up 
the borehole in Rawana, and revenged by obstructing Borana herders to use the 
dam in Turbi town.  
This struggle marked a severe weakening of the traditional mechanisms of wa-
ter allocation; Borana and Gabra have always used and shared each other’s water 
sources (see also Adano & Witsenburg 2004). They could both own and use wa-
ter holes in each other’s grazing area without this being a source of discontent. It 
is important to note that it is not scarcity of water per se that motivated people to 
fight; no one was excluded from water as long as people adhered to the rules. The 
fact that it was not possible anymore for Gabra to own or manage a water hole in 
Borana territory (which it only became after the new boundary was established!) 
points at a serious deterioration of a previously relatively uncomplicated relation-
ship. The reason for this deterioration was the problematic link between ethnicity 
and territoriality in Kenya, and the feeling that people had that what was located 
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outside their administrative division could no longer be considered theirs to man-
age. 
Fight over the Hurri Hills 
The Hurri Hills is a mountain ridge located close to the Ethiopian border, within 
Marsabit District. It is located within North Horr Division, and is now used by 
both nomadic pastoralists and agro-pastoralists of Gabra, Waata and Borana ori-
gin. Hurri Hills is a green and fertile place where rainfall is higher, and which is 
therefore attractive for settlers to practice rain-fed agriculture. Gabra and Waata 
perceive the Hurri Hills as originally theirs, since it has historically important rit-
ual and symbolic meaning in Gabra and Waata culture. Gabra accepted Borana 
families in the past to come and settle, especially at a time when inter-ethnic rela-
tionships were friendly and resources not so scarce. Over the years, Borana from 
Ethiopia came in large numbers and joined their relatives in the Hurri Hills, 
while the Gabra felt that their hospitality was abused. In an attempt to create or-
der between Gabra and Borana, the government ordered Borana to leave, since 
they had no identity cards and did not qualify to get them. The Borana felt furi-
ous about it, since they felt they had the right to live there like many of their rela-
tives who are Kenyan citizens and who lived there already for 20 or 30 years 
(Daily Nation, July 10, 2005). 
For a long time, the Hurri Hills served as a host area for Ethiopian poachers on 
the way to Marsabit Mountain. It is a source of pride for young Borana men to 
kill an elephant. Gabra spoke up against their coming, and started killing poach-
ers who sought refuge in their villages.
5
 Early 2005 more and more Borana were 
leaving their farms in Hurri Hills, though not with the intention to leave forever. 
As one man narrated to a journalist: ‘I am not going forever. We are going to 
Ethiopia to strategise with our relatives who live there on how we can counter 
our enemies (the Gabra) who have forced us to move out of our productive 
farms’ (Ibid.).  
 
The Oromo Liberation Front: Visitor or trouble seeker? 
The deterioration of the relationship showed itself clearly when the Gabra started 
to refuse hosting Borana travellers from Ethiopia. For years the Borana from 
around the Ethiopian border used to come to Marsabit to poach elephants, but 
also to raid Rendille and Samburu herders. Militia’s from the Oromo Liberation 
Front (OLF), which is mainly a secessionist movement against the Ethiopian 
government, were also residing in Northern Kenya, and were hosted by some 
                                                 
5
  This is claimed by Borana and confirmed to me by some Gabra informants. There are how-
ever no police records or mission records showing these killings.  
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Gabra and Borana families. The Gabra have politically never really had an inter-
est in joining a secessionist movement. After the colonial administration left 
Kenya, the Gabra were not interested in joining the Somali’s for an independent 
Northern Frontier District. In a similar vein, most Gabra in both Ethiopia and 
Kenya were now not willing to participate in the OLF movement, preferring their 
independent albeit marginalised position in the present Kenyan or Ethiopian 
state, rather than being dominated by the Borana. 
Borana travellers from Ethiopia who also came as refugees, escaping war and 
conflict in Ethiopia, and seeking a new home in Marsabit District, could however 
enjoy some hospitality among Gabra. This migration started a long time ago; the 
English colonial government tried to prevent Ethiopians from poaching and stay-
ing illegally in the country since the beginning of their administration in the 
Northern Frontier District (NFD).  
But since the early 1990s not only Gabra, but also Rendille and Samburu be-
came wary of this incessant influx of Ethiopian Borana, whether they were OLF 
fighters, poachers, refugees or family members of Kenyan Borana. Around 1999, 
after the Ethiopian government complained to the Kenyan Government about 
lack of support against the OLF, the Gabra in Dukana were punished severely by 
Kenyan government troops for ‘hosting’ OLF guerrilla fighters (KHRC 2000). 
Many Borana in Kenya, even though they might not have been ready to actively 
fight for an independent Oromia, sympathised with the Borana from Ethiopia 
who fought in the OLF. Gabra at the time however did not feel much sympathy 
for the OLF. Especially since 2001 when OLF fighters were suspected to hide in 
Marsabit Forest, where they killed some Rendille and Samburu women on the 
notorious Songa/Badassa road and Gabra were accused, the Gabra started won-
dering whether these visitors came as allies or as trouble seekers. A typical inci-
dent happened on 18 and 19 April 2005, when three boys and a 7-year old girl 
were shot dead on or around the Songa road, of which the OLF was accused. 
The contribution of the OLF to the present hatred between Gabra and Borana 
is however difficult to establish. Many Gabra declared that the OLF was by no 
means a united army. Some factions treated the Gabra politely, and paid for their 
own food and accommodation. These factions returned to Ethiopia in 2001, 
‘leaving the Gabra behind in peace’. Other poorer factions raided Gabra villages, 
raped women and treated villagers rudely and authoritatively and stayed around. 
This caused hatred against OLF fighters. What complicates the matter is that Bo-
rana also accused these OLF factions of mistreating local Borana villagers, not 
only Gabra (see also Marsabit Conflict Assessment Report 2005: 21). The OLF 
factions differed in their attitude; some proclaimed that Oromo speakers should 
not fight each other; some said that Gabra Migo (the Southern Ethiopian Gabra) 
did not support the Oromo Liberation Movement enough, especially when the 
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Gabra Migo voted for the government candidates during the Ethiopian elections 
in May 2005. It was in 2005 widely believed that the OLF was directly or indi-
rectly involved in the Turbi Massacre.  
Interestingly, the accusation that the OLF was involved in the ethnic struggle 
between Gabra and Borana had changed in 2008. It was then said that OLF war-
riors had gone to Somalia to fight in the Islamist war against the Somali and 
Ethiopian governments, where many of them died. This rumour cannot be veri-
fied, as it is probably just a rumour indeed, but the fact is that in 2008 none of the 
informants at the study sites had heard about or seen OLF soldiers since 2005. 
Some informants now say that OLF soldiers may actually not have been in-
volved, but that these assertions just served to exonerate locals from their respon-
sibilities in the conflict. 
 
Ethnic mobilisation after the Turbi Massacre 
Before the Turbi massacre, not all Gabra felt as if they were at war with Borana. 
For instance, Gabra in Nairobi felt not involved in the conflict that developed in 
Hurri Hills or in other rural areas. However, the Turbi Massacre marked a turning 
point. Had there been killings and raids before, the magnitude of this attack was 
different, and it was widely felt as an act of war. People render a symbolic mean-
ing to the killing of women and children. As children are the next generation and 
represent the prospects and hope for the future of a people, and women represent 
its procreation, inflicting harm on them is an assault on the ethnic group as a 
whole. This time, the Gabra felt attacked as a group and they resorted to taking a 
uniform stand against the Borana. Gabra moved away from Borana villages and 
settled in small refugee camps. All Borana from small centres like Turbi, Kala-
cha, Maikona and North Horr were chased away, some were killed, their houses 
were burnt and their livestock taken. Most of the formerly shared pasture land 
was quickly divided up, with the ‘enemy’ being excluded from use of water and 
pasture. Borana cattle then moved and concentrated on the Marsabit Mountain 
area, even in the wet season, and could not trek to Moyale anymore because they 
could not pass through Gabra territory. Neither could Borana livestock from the 
Sololo-Ethiopian border be permitted to graze around Turbi and Dida Galgalu 
plains.  
The way Gabra reacted to the Turbi attack is a clear example of how ethnic 
sentiments only became stronger and social cohesion tighter in a conflict situa-
tion. Nothing creates more social cohesion in a society than an attack from a per-
ceived common enemy or ‘outsider’ for that matter.  
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The conflict between Gabra and Borana turned out to have positive economic 
outcomes for some Gabra
6
 who extended their grazing area in the aftermath of 
the Massacre. The Gabra could for security reasons effectively close off previ-
ously shared grazing ground. The Borana were left with small parts of grazing 
around Marsabit Mountain. Since the Gabra camels survived all the dry years 
much better than Borana cattle, there was a worsening economic situation for Bo-
rana since the Turbi massacre. 
In Marsabit Township, Gabra responded by separating all Gabra transactions 
from the rest of the market. For a while, Gabra traders only bought and sold their 
goods from other Gabra, out-competing the other traders on the market. They 
then build their own market place for cloths, vegetables, hardware and livestock 
where no other groups were welcome. Separating a market does not seem eco-
nomically efficient, especially because the Borana are the largest ethnic group in 
Marsabit District, but Gabra traders and businessmen declared that the separation 
between Gabra and Borana was economically profitable. By 2008 the market 
separation was still in place, even though customers did not restrict themselves 
and just bought their goods there where it was cheapest.  
 
Economic stratification 
Economically, there was a perceived growing difference between the Gabra and 
Borana of Marsabit District which showed itself most clearly in Marsabit Town. 
Perceived economic inequality usually troubles relationships between ethnic 
groups, especially when the smaller or ‘junior’ group economically outwits the 
one who feels dominant or ‘senior’.  
Many Borana in the Marsabit Mountain area claim to be considerably poorer 
than the Gabra inhabitants. No empirical research on economic stratification 
along ethnic lines has been done yet, but there seems to be a regional wealth dif-
ference on the Mountain. A residential area called ‘Small Bubisa’, an area to the 
west of Marsabit Township, and mainly inhabited by Gabra, is seen as the villa 
quarters of the Mountain. The type and size of houses, the presence of solar pan-
els and satellite dishes and the number of cars in the compound show that there is 
a layer in this society becoming increasingly wealthy when judged by local stan-
dards. Most of the wealthy, educated and employed people in Marsabit are of 
Gabra descent. At present, most wholesale shops and lorries in Marsabit are 
owned by Gabra traders. And as in European history, those who have the best 
means of transport stand a better chance of economic improvement as compared 
to those who don’t ‘own the road’. Ironically, this was once the opposite. Before 
                                                 
6
  Not all experienced a positive effect; the internally displaced refugees and those who lost 
herds greatly suffered.  
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the Northern Frontier District was governed by English rule, the region was in-
habited by people who were related to each other through the Pax Borana; a 
loosely organized number of ethnic groups who adopted the Borana language and 
accepted a Borana hegemony in political laws. The Gabra paid a tribute to the 
Borana (tiriso), but kept their own camel-related rituals, ceremonies and time-
reckoning (see Tablino 1999 and Schlee 1989, 2008). The Borana were horse-
men, and had power over those whom they considered their ‘clienteles’ like the 
Gabra, Waata, Konso and Sakuye. The English colonial administration however 
effectively undermined the military power of the Borana by disowning them of 
their horses, and since then the Borana authority dwindled slowly but steadily. 
Within Borana culture, seniority over other ethnic groups is still felt, but to what 
extent this exists only as a social construct within Borana society is a matter of 
interpretation. This seniority is presently not recognised by the Gabra of Kenya, 
whose self-confidence was boosted by changes in the nation state, the socio-
economic landscape and their increasing economic capabilities.  
This newly acquired self-confidence is partly inspired by the work of the late 
MP of North Horr, Dr Adhi Bonaya Godana, who died in a plane crash in April 
2006, along with other prominent political leaders when they were all on the way 
to a peace meeting. The late MP of North Horr was under Kenya African Nation 
Union (KANU) reign a countrywide respected Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
later Minister of Agriculture (1996-2002). Coming from a small pastoral com-
munity he had no ethnic-political enemies in wider Kenyan politics, and with his 
outstanding educational profile (a PhD from Switzerland) he was a highly re-
spected spokesperson and representative at international level. Since 2003 he was 
in the opposition and felt the NARC government increasingly undermining his 
efforts and activities to promote his Constituency (with North Horr as headquar-
ter). The Borana resented the position and status of this former minister, whom 
they accused of only helping his own people. Even though Gabra informants told 
me that he played an instrumental role in keeping Gabra-Borana relations non-
violent, even after the Turbi Massacre in 2005, others say he was one of the rea-
sons behind the Borana hatred against the Gabra. Both MPs of North Horr and 
Moyale were at times accused of intensifying the conflict between Borana and 
Gabra. 
After his untimely death in the plane crash in 2006 there was a brief interlude 
of one year with a NARC affiliated MP, after which an MP was elected who 
seemed no threat to the other MPs in the region. The unstable co-existence be-
tween Gabra and Borana was sustained with army forces, police and Kenya Po-
lice Reservists (KPRs or home-guards). A true arms race resulted, whereby all 
villages competed for government guns and bullets.  
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Environmental conditions 
In addition to the economic and political differences, Gabra herdsmen have suf-
fered less from the droughts than the Borana did. Even though Gabra inhabit the 
driest part of the district, their camels and goats were better resistant to the 
droughts than the Borana cattle. Borana in Marsabit District have therefore tried 
to acquire camels, but this did not translate into an improvement of their eco-
nomic position yet. This is also partly due to the fact that they have relatively 
limited access to dry grazing land.  
Borana in the Mountain area developed an intense feeling of being more mar-
ginalised than other groups in the region. Interestingly, competition and self-
victimisation played a role in the Borana-Burji violence in the early 1990s as 
well. Burji then occupied most formal positions in the government ranks, because 
they were enrolled in education much earlier than the Borana. The considerable 
ownership of fertile land among Burji on the Mountain is historically explained 
because they were settled by the English colonial administrators who needed 
farmers to grow food. Borana envy was at the time claimed to be behind the re-
sentment against the Burji in the early 1990s. 
 
The Modogashe Declaration 
To control raids and counter raids, the community representatives signed a treaty 
for compensation of stolen livestock and people killed in raids: the Modogashe 
Declaration. This basically entailed that the bereaved party would be compen-
sated with 100 or 50 livestock in case of death of a man or a woman respectively. 
Also stolen cattle should be compensated according to the declaration. Apart 
from the fact that the fine was high and therefore hardly put into practice, the rea-
son as to why the death of a man should be compensated twice as much as the 
death of a woman became a controversy, especially since the killing of women is 
more often seen as an act of war, while the killing of a man merely treated as a 
consequence of an ordinary raid. In addition, Gabra and Borana used to have 
their own compensation rules. A killer was supposed to pay 30 cattle for one per-
son, not 100. Compensation was usually only paid when peace was established, 
and not to establish peace. Among the Gabra and Borana the Modogashe Decla-
ration was not really popular, and later failed blatantly. It is not known whether it 
actually ever resulted in full compensation for the bereaved parties since it was 
signed in 2000. Its failure partly originated from the lack of a legal backing, and 
after the DC declared in 2003 that the Modogashe declaration is not a legal 
agreement, it lost its teeth forever.  
 
 
 
 
 Ethnic tensions in harsh environments 133 
 
Obscure politics 
The political situation is capricious and not transparent. As described in an earlier 
work on local informal institutions, the area is governed by a coalition of formal 
governmental administrators and local leaders (Adano & Witsenburg 2004). The 
power of current informal local leadership is mainly based on wealth of any kind, 
be it livestock, land, assets or monetary income. In some rural areas local leader-
ship is still determined by seniority in family and clan, combined by status 
earned through the age set system. However, informants widely complained that 
traditional forms of leadership among village elders is undermined and out-
weighed by the power based on wealth. Wealth is not stable, and has to be con-
tinuously secured. Neither can formal positions within the government be se-
cured and sustained. Positions within the government are usually not earned with 
educational achievements only but also through ethnic alliances and networking. 
A combination of clan affiliation, political ties and personality may eventually 
determine the position within government ranks. This also seems to apply to po-
sitions within local NGOs. The continuous competition for such places creates 
temporal alliances that no one can predict or sometimes understand without thor-
ough knowledge of clan politics. There is for instance the Constituency Devel-
opment Fund (CDF). This is a large sum of money that used to be spent through 
the line ministries, but is now flowing to the ´community´. This is a policy out-
come of the promise by president Kibaki before his election in 2003. The area 
MP is responsible for establishing a committee, who then can decide how to 
spend the money each year. The spending of this CDF money is presently highly 
politicised along ethnic lines, and serves as an incentive to create ethnically 
‘cleansed’ areas. Since Saku Constituency (the Marsabit Mountain area) has a 
Borana MP, the other ethnic groups feel discriminated and complain that they get 
less money from the CDF. The same applies to people other than Gabra in North 
Horr constituency, who complain that all the funds go to Gabra projects.  
A new political alliance was formed before the 2005 violent outburst. Some 
political leaders among the Rendille, Gabra, and Burji combined efforts to for-
mulate a programme for cooperation, called REGABU. This ‘ethnic coalition’ 
had their teachers won an election during the Marsabit Teachers SACCO. To-
gether, Burji, Gabra and Rendille form a majority over the Borana, which poses a 
direct threat against the Borana hegemony in Saku constituency.  
 
The conflict after the Turbi Massacre 
The recent Borana attacks against Rendille, and the reconciliation efforts towards 
the Gabra are often interpreted in that light. In 2006, Leyai was attacked by Bo-
rana. Leyai was an agricultural village on the east side or Marsabit Mountain, oc-
cupied by a mixture of Rendille, Borana and Gabra farmers. The settlement is 
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built on the last mountain ridge between Badasa and Songa, and therefore a con-
tested boundary between Borana and Rendille/Samburu speakers. A Rendille was 
shot at in Songa, and in 2007 a Rendille KPR was killed in Marsabit. In March 
2008 there was a Borana-Rendille clash where eight people died. Leyai was 
again attacked by a large number (at least 50) of Borana who raided the village in 
plain daylight. Leyai was almost deserted in August 2008. In all these skirmishes 
Gabra refused to side with the Borana against the Rendille and Samburu, which 
echoes the conflict between the Borana and the Burji in the early 1990s when 
Gabra did not support the Borana.  
 
Ethnicising politics 
The numerous raids and counter raids, the fight over territories in Turbi and 
Hurri Hills and Leyai, the refusal to share waterholes and the Turbi Massacre are 
all symptoms, but not causes, of a process of growing political ethnicity. This 
may be a process that is characteristic for other places in Kenya as well, in the 
case of Marsabit where scarcity of resources is nothing new, but raids between 
two related groups like Gabra and Borana are, the explanation should not draw 
attention to symptoms only. Consciousness about one’s descent, one’s clan af-
filiation and all the social constructs that belong to clan affiliation has always 
been there, but this overriding concern, or rather obsession with the own ethnic-
ity at the expense of one’s ethnic neighbour has only recently reached consider-
able proportions in Marsabit. Nowadays, all human transactions in Marsabit are 
motivated by ethnic- or clan affiliation. When political aspirations of MPs, coun-
cillors, chiefs and other local political leaders are frustrated by the national gov-
ernment because of lack of attention, leaders turn to local ethnic politics in order 
to score at the lowest level where grief can cause havoc: Between local ethnic 
groups. Ethnic politics shows itself in a leader-initiated fight over control of ac-
cess to resources; which does not arise from scarcity (valuable resources are al-
ways scarce, otherwise they are not valuable) but from the chance to consolidate 
power, as is for instance the struggle over Rawana borehole, or the squabble over 
the Constituency Development Funds (CDFs).  
The CDFs is a tool and a target to create ethnic pure areas. Local opinion also 
maintains that the creation of new administrative boundaries is directly fuelling 
the interethnic hostilities:  
“Raiding today is not for the same reason as in the past. Today, it is a way to express resent-
ment against the authorities, for instance in the creation of administrative boundaries. For the 
nomads there is no other way to express their resentment. You cannot, like in Europe, 
demonstrate in the street and media coverage will take place. People here are out of commu-
nication. They want to show their resentment, through raiding neighbouring groups whose 
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political leaders are powerful, and who are seen as the oppressors. If you go out fighting over 
land, and you see goats, there is no way you will leave them.”7  
Of course we recognize that there are many other motivations behind raiding, 
and this claim that raiding can also be an expression of outrage against govern-
ment policy seems a very relevant one.  
 
New administrative boundaries 
The creation of new administrative boundaries refers to a very important current 
problem in pastoral societies, which causes politically motivated raids. Pastoral 
land in Marsabit, as in many other districts, is trust land, open to all. Accessibil-
ity of land is usually determined by availability of water. Use-rights are, tradi-
tionally, overriding ownership rights. This means that every nomad has in prin-
ciple the right to use a well, also in the land of a neighbouring ethnic group if he 
negotiates well. With the creation of boundaries, whereby new Districts (like 
Moyale District in 1995, Chalbi and Laisamis District in 2007), new divisions 
and locations are meant to mark ethnic ‘pure’ territories, it is increasingly hard to 
maintain the traditional arrangement of water and land sharing. The violence be-
tween Gabra and Borana in Turbi (2005), between Rendille and Gabra around 
Medatte (2007), and between Gabra and Turkana in Moite (2007/2008), can be 
seen in that light. In all these places, water points were ‘territorialized’ after the 
creation of new boundaries, and traditional use rights were violated. This is in 
line with our earlier finding on creating clear territorial boundaries triggering vio-
lent conflicts (Witsenburg & Adano 2007).  
 
The role of the world religions 
Marsabit can be characterised by its relatively peaceful coexistence of the world 
religions. However, since 2005 there is an increasingly violent and fundamen-
talist Muslim community in and around Marsabit. Rumours about a possible OLF 
and Al Qaeda link were spread, especially after December 2006 and January 
2007 when a number of OLF fighters were claimed to have died in the Islamist 
war in Somalia. Some politicians claimed in 2007 that there is cooperation be-
tween OLF and Al Qaida, but hard proof was lacking. The Oromo Liberation 
Front is essentially a non-religious movement, and siding up with one religion 
would not serve their political purpose. In 2008 these rumours had stopped. Islam 
is established among all the ethnic groups in the District, and has therefore little 
potential to play a serious role in ethnic conflicts. The same is true for Catholi-
cism. The Catholic Mission is one of the most respected institutions within the 
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  Interview with Hilary Halkano, Marsabit July 2008. 
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villages in the District. During times of conflict it is the Mission who sends their 
priests and peace workers to provide help, consolation and a listening ear. 
During the 2005 clashes however, the priests and other peace workers in-
formed us that their activities were increasingly being undermined by Muslim 
leaders, who refused to participate in peace meetings, and also instigated people 
not to participate or accept proposals for negotiation. This could turn out to be a 
major social tragedy. 
By and large Muslims, Christians and ‘traditionalists’ lived together harmo-
niously in the settled villages in Marsabit District. The Catholic Church main-
tained a peaceful interaction with Muslims. Muslims were usually not excluded 
from the health and primary educational services provided by the Catholic 
Church, nor did Muslims harbour outspoken resentment against Christians. 
Christians and Muslims have always invited each other to their religious festivi-
ties like Christmas and Idd (end of Ramadan), and as people in one family can 
belong to different religions there was no forthright tension between them. In ad-
dition, one can observe in Marsabit that ethnic affiliation is stronger than reli-
gious affiliation. As long as families are split and both religions present amongst 
all the communities, religion is not expected to play a significant role in intereth-
nic conflict in the long term. However, these recent signs of religious animosity 
seem new and a worrying trend. 
 
The problems and chances of neutrality 
Even though such group conflicts as the one that developed between the Gabra 
and the Borana is called ‘ethnic’ and ethnic boundaries and territory seem clearly 
defined, at individual level many people have loyalty struggles and problems 
with taking sides. By no means are all Gabra in conflict with all Borana. This is 
the danger when talking of ethnic groups. Many individuals do not share the ha-
tred against the other group, nor do they want to participate or be party to a vio-
lent conflict. Among them are for instance the many children from Gabra-Borana 
mixed families. If they resist being pulled to take one side, the price they pay for 
neutrality is high. They cannot go to ethnically ‘cleansed’ villages because they 
are treated as spies. Those who did not explicitly support one group against the 
other can hardly expect any support from anybody when in danger. And who can 
afford that? Those who refuse to take side are therefore a silent minority. 
Likewise, women who under normal circumstances form a social link between 
clans and ethnic groups through intermarriage and love affairs, had to take sides. 
In the traditional setting, they sometimes form an intermediary between feuding 
clans or ethnic groups. But the scale and magnitude of the conflict in 2005 be-
tween Gabra and Borana paralyzed every traditional conflict-resolving institution 
or intermediary position of women. They either divorced and joined their own 
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ethnic group or broke the ties with their own families. Some became very mili-
tant to over-scream their previous loyalties. The role women play is usually ob-
scure, as they are not supposed to publicly express their views and they are also 
left out during peace meetings, but many of them seemingly supported the sepa-
ration between Gabra and Borana. An interesting detail is the frequent inter-
ethnic love affairs between the Gabra and Borana. These affairs had to stop for a 
while, but in 2008 these affairs were eagerly rekindled. It is even suggested that 
these affairs eventually helped stop the interethnic hostility. Inter-ethnic love af-
fairs are popular, because love affairs within the own ethnic group are more diffi-
cult to keep secret. One informant in Marsabit showed us the new foot paths 
through the fields where people cross over to the neighbouring village in the 
night to meet their lover unseen. The influence of women in reconciliation may 
as well be positive in that sense, but in reality very hard to verify.  
 
Who benefits from violent conflicts? 
Ironically, since the violent outburst of conflicts between the Gabra and Borana, 
numerous NGOs are suddenly present in the District. The conflict has put Mar-
sabit on the map, and this has generated sympathy and brought in a lot of money. 
‘The Peace Maffia’ as it is sometimes called also thrives on the number of con-
flicts, and has many reasons to extent their contracts with Non Governmental Or-
ganisations (NGOs). NGOs, dry-land rehabilitation projects, these are all part of 
the war-and-peace machine and used by the warring groups against each other. 
Numerous people earn high salaries since the outburst of violence. Extra relief-
food and water distribution to villages in the most remote part of the country, re-
stocking of raid victims, shelters for the refugees, extra health workers and medi-
cal supplies were all needed, and new houses and offices that had to be build. It 
made people realize that it may actually not be beneficial for the economy to 
have peace at any moment. Every proposal for funding with ‘peace-building’ as a 
target gets accepted and brings more money now that NGOs and government in-
stitutions operate within the ‘development-security’ paradigm. The much ne-
glected North got finally some attention, is a feeling widely expressed.  
This conflict has no one sole aggressor. Even though an outsider may pinpoint 
the Borana as the aggressive party after the massacre in Turbi, this event should 
be merely seen as a stage in a wider process; a process of marginalization of the 
previously dominant, and emancipation of the previously smaller group. This 
marginalization finds its genesis also beyond the border of the Kenyan state, be-
cause in Ethiopia the Borana have had a very long struggle for existence and for 
adequate political representation against the Ethiopian government. It is obvious 
that the Borana do not benefit from this conflict in any case. To apologize to the 
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Gabra would go against their nature, yet this is what Gabra want of them if there 
is peace to be negotiated and if there is going to be a return of peaceful relations.  
 
The role of the government 
The Gabra of Kenya are by nature independent people who hardly tolerate any 
kind of externally institutionalized leadership. Yet, they would rather support the 
Kenyan Government than participate in a liberation movement (like the OLF) 
under the leadership of the Borana. Especially now that the relationship has 
turned sour, a joining of forces between Gabra and Borana seems not feasible in 
the near future; which serves the interests of both the Kenyan and Ethiopian gov-
ernment. The Kenyan government is aware of the secessionist feelings of the 
Oromo-Borana, and would not like these feelings to spill over to Kenya.
8
 Like-
wise, the Ethiopian Government benefits from the Gabra refusal to host Borana 
OLF fighters in their villages. To what extent both governments can be held re-
sponsible for the split-up of Gabra and Borana people is therefore an interesting 
question that nonetheless cannot easily be answered. Oskar Mwangi (2006) di-
rectly implicates the government in its neglect of the region, and its passive role 
in preventing the conflict from escalating into a massacre. Obviously the gov-
ernment facilitated the conflict by not intervening at the time of escalation. 
Whether the government played a more direct role in fuelling the conflict is how-
ever a more interesting question but may be impossible to prove. The feuds over 
administrative boundaries could have been avoided if the government would 
have been willing to do that. The area MPs of Moyale, Saku, North Horr and 
Laisamis, who could have known how the government was directly involved, and 
were all accused of instigation, all died together in a plane crash in Marsabit in 
2006. 
Conclusion 
The deterioration of the Gabra-Borana relationship to this magnitude is new in 
this region’s history. The trajectory of discontent between these two groups how-
ever, seems to follow a combination of ‘old’ and ‘new’ pathways. Livestock raid-
ing is an old, institutionalised way of pushing someone out of contested territory. 
Livestock raiding has also been called a way of redistributing wealth (see Flei-
sher 2000 on the Maasai), and an ‘educational exercise’ for young men to train 
their survival skills and gain social standing in the pastoral society, but also a 
powerful way to force the neighbour ‘to move out’. Gabra interpreted the Turbi 
Massacre as an attempt to push them out of Turbi. Also Rendille and Samburu 
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  Interview with an Oromo-speaking MP in Nairobi, January 2007. 
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interpreted the attack on Leyai as a Borana attempt to chase them away from the 
Marsabit Mountain area. However, before these ethnic groups who have a history 
of intermarriage and co-habitation mobilised and defined themselves as separate 
and hostile neighbours, a whole process of loosening ties and deteriorating 
friendships went on in a foregoing timeframe. The creation of new administrative 
boundaries, the closing off of resources for neighbouring groups, the allocation 
of CDF funds to particular groups in society are the new, or modern tools to cre-
ate division between ethnic groups. There is therefore a connection between the 
old and modern ways of creating these divisions. The creation of administrative 
boundaries and the allocation of CDF money to certain groups, and thereby mar-
ginalising the other can precede a rougher fight (which may look like a ‘tradi-
tional raid’) to push out perceived enemies.  
It is therefore important to study seemingly ‘traditional’ ways of fighting, like 
livestock raiding, in its relation to modern ways of exclusion and marginalisation, 
within a context of altering palettes of modern political alliances. 
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The Horn of Africa is viewed as a battleground of violent conflicts which are 
prompted by growing resource scarcity and population increase. Such conflicts are 
argued to be particularly violent in poor regions where many ethnic groups have to 
compete for scarce natural resources and where people lack capacity to develop 
adaptable and ingenuous approaches to avoid or resolve conflicts. This paper tests 
the validity of such claims using a long-term data of inter-ethnic conflicts and as-
sociated incidents such as raids, banditry attacks and killings between pastoral 
communities in Marsabit District, Northern Kenya. The analysis is strengthened us-
ing case studies of access to a severely scarce water resources in rural Kenya. Ac-
cording to the herders, it is more rational to cooperate with people from different 
ethnic groups in times of drought in order to share the scarce water resources than 
it is to fight over them. This view was also supported by the yearly statistics on 
violence which show that twice as many deaths occurred in wet years than in 
drought years. We find no evidence that violence is increasing in relative terms, 
nor that ethnic violence is related to environmental scarcity. On the whole, the 
study cannot verify the assumption that increasing competition over scarce re-
sources on Marsabit Mountain results in more ethnic violence. In particular, water 
resources seem to play a vital role in social interaction, reconciliation, sharing and 
cooperation in survival strategies. The result shows how important conflict-avoid-
ing institutions are in societies which have learned how to deal with scarcity by 
century-old experiences in hardship areas. These conflict-avoiding institutions are 
shaped and reshaped through time, subjected as they are to natural hardship, exter-
nal stress, modernity and technological change. 
The tenets of conflicts among East African pastoralists 
The East African pastoralists occupy arid and semi-arid environments. The eco-
logical marginality of pastoral areas means they are mainly suitable for keeping 
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livestock, and crop cultivation is limited to a few relatively high altitude areas 
where rain-fed agriculture or riverine cultivation are practiced. Livestock signifi-
cantly contribute to food production of pastoral households while also serving as 
different forms of capital, acting as a store of wealth, cementing social relations 
and mediating other cultural and ritual practices such as marriage and traditional 
ceremonies (Tablino 1999). Household ownership of a large herd is not only a 
source of social standing and prestige, but also serves as savings and insurance 
against future livestock losses. It is for these reasons that any means of herd ac-
cumulation is economically, socially and culturally rewarding. Herd accumula-
tion is also stated as, and seen to be, the strongest justification for interethnic 
raids among pastoralists. 
Scholars have developed and applied several approaches in trying to under-
stand the causes and the underlying motives of interethnic conflicts (Fearon & 
Laitin 1996) and between pastoralists in particular (Oba 1992; Salih 1999; Osam-
ba 2000). Here, two of these reasons are worth pointing out when keeping in 
mind the pastoralist groups under study: The changes in livestock as the principal 
assets and as a store of multiple values, and access to environmental (or ecologi-
cal) resources in tipping inter-ethnic tension over into violent conflicts (Oba 
1992; Hussein et al. 1999; Salih 1999). The arguments stated as mainly fuelling 
ethnic conflicts can be summarised as follows: Declining livestock wealth with 
differentiated holdings between ethnic groups, and ecological stress that bad 
rangeland policies are partly responsible for. We briefly reflect on each of these 
factors in turn. 
 
Droughts and their effects on livestock numbers 
The East African pastoral communities inhabit areas prone to high risks, where 
severe droughts and outbreaks of animal diseases occur regularly. The impacts of 
drought and other adverse factors cause considerable livestock wealth differentia-
tions between households (Fratkin & Roth 1996) as well as between ethnically 
different groups. The need to rebuild and accumulate herds, and smoothen out 
differentiated herd losses after droughts are considered as strong motivations of 
the inter-ethnic raids and violent conflicts (Osamba 2000). According to this 
thinking raids constitute vehicles for climbing out of poverty and gaining social 
status. With repeated droughts and accompanying losses of livestock, and assum-
ing conflict resolution and reconciliation mechanism are not in place, cycles of 
interethnic raids and counter-raids are likely to reinforce each other. The lack of 
peace building institutions is a given in view of the weak nation-states and poor 
enforcement of the rule of law in many African countries today. If this line of ar-
gumentation is true, then periodic droughts in the past few decades and pastoral-
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ists impoverishment, would cause increased raids and violent conflict incidents in 
recent years, compared to the distant past. 
 
Ecological stress  
The pastoral production system is founded on flexible herd mobility that opti-
mises production by making use of diverse livestock species combined with spa-
tially distributed rainfall and patchiness of the rangelands. However, the colonial 
boundaries and present national boundaries are at odds with the pastoral strate-
gies of making opportunistic use of rangelands and of obtaining better livestock 
production. The national boundaries therefore restrict herd mobility in pursuit of 
better pasture and water. Restrictive policies on herd mobility result in rangeland 
degradation, which in turn is followed by negative effect on the pastoral welfare 
as livestock numbers decline. In so far as political powers define territories and 
physical boundaries hinder herd mobility, then geopolitics becomes a decisive 
factor in environmental conflicts and a cause of insecurity across border lands 
(Salih 1999: 22). 
Today many pastoralists depend on smaller livestock assets than ever before 
because of declining animal numbers. The downward trend in the livestock 
wealth among the pastoral communities has put human consumption derived 
from livestock and other obligations that animals fulfil at jeopardy. Indeed, pas-
toralists are today one of the poorest groups of populations in sub-Saharan Af-
rica. The question is, if the widely held view that poverty is the cause of ethnic 
raids holds, has the occurrence of interethnic raids and incidence of violent con-
flicts increased with substantial decline in per capita livestock wealth over time? 
And, if resource scarcity and degradation causes conflict over these resources, 
are raids more numerous in dry than in wet years and seasons? This paper pri-
marily deals with inter-related issues of resource availability with regards to ac-
cess to water resources and changes in livestock wealth in northern Kenya. The 
overriding aim of the paper is to investigate the empirical basis of conflicts as it 
relates to the natural resource scarcity-causes-interethnic violent conflicts para-
digm. 
A study in Marsabit District, Kenya 
This paper is a result of a research conducted in Marsabit District of Northern 
Kenya (see Map 7.1). In particular, an investigation on water resource issues of 
the use and management of shallow wells receives special attention in the paper. 
Ownership and access rights, allocation and use of water during drought, were 
the main topics of investigation that was carried out between 1997 and 2000. The 
fieldwork for the study coincided with the time of heavy El Niño rains in 
1997/98 and the severe drought in 2000 in the region. 
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Map 7.1    Marsabit Mountain and its surrounding areas 
 
Source: Adapted from Map 1, Survey of Kenya, GTZ/MDP (1988). 
 
 
The well sites seemed the right places to collect the data because most house-
holds and animals in Marsabit District use water from man-dug wells. The water 
table in the wells has sunk deeper and deeper with increasing drought in 2000. 
Scarcity of labour, time and space at the few well sites demand that not everyone 
could come to drink at a convenient time. In such a situation, a considerable 
amount of labour is needed to water a herd, requiring a high level of organisation 
and cooperation to get this task done. Tight rules and water schedules were 
drawn. Moreover, ownership of resources can be ethnically linked, so we were 
particularly interested in how newcomers or people from different ethnic groups 
without their own well were treated at the well site. We made case studies of the 
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wells and their use, for which we interviewed the well owner and all the impor-
tant elders related to a particular well. Groups of well users were interviewed at 
the spot, while individuals were interviewed in their houses. 
The case studies of wells reported here were carried out around Marsabit 
Mountain, which is a high inselberg of volcanic origin, rising to an altitude of 
1,700 m out of the surrounding semi-desert at 400 m altitude. A dense mist forest 
grows on its peaks and is responsible for the cool and sub-humid climate on the 
mountain. The average rainfall on the mountain is 800-1,000 mm annually, and 
drops to 200 mm in the surrounding lowlands, dispersed over a bi-modal rainfall 
pattern. Vegetation growth in large parts of the district is scanty due to low rain-
fall and high salinity of soils and water resources. 
Marsabit Mountain supports farming, which can be successful in years of 
normal rainfall. During the colonial era, pastoralist groups were attracted by the 
green mountain, but were not allowed to settle by the local colonial administra-
tion (Adano & Witsenburg 2005). However, a large movement to the mountain 
started in the 1970s as a result of the Somali secessionist war, large losses of 
livestock and the droughts of 1973/1974. The Ethiopian war also caused wide-
spread immigration into Kenya. Marsabit Mountain has become an area of refuge 
for victims from war and droughts. 
 More than one fifth of the population in the District has tried to establish a 
livelihood on the fertile slopes of Marsabit Mountain. The population density on 
the mountain has increased from 1 person/km
2 
in 1959 to 18 persons/km
2
 in 
1999. Impoverished pastoralists of Rendille, Samburu, Gabra, Borana and Tur-
kana origin, as well as Ethiopian migrants with a farming background, live in 
close proximity trying to establish new livelihoods in an insecure environment. It 
requires little imagination to guess that the population pressure on land, vegeta-
tion and water resources has increased tremendously. The mountain area there-
fore provides a suitable location for investigating issues of interethnic conflicts, 
with a primary focus on water, at the height of water scarcity during and after the 
driest year in the history of rainfall records.  
Annual reports and intelligence reports of the Northern Frontier District in the 
British colonial era until 1960, and the Kenyan Human Rights publication of 
2000 on Marsabit and Moyale Districts
1
 were the main sources of information for 
the study. Especially the historical overviews from Marsabit District Annual Re-
ports of the colonial period, Tablino (1999) and Sobania (1979) were a valuable 
                                                 
1
  In the Colonial period, these districts together were part of the Northern Frontier District 
(NFD). Present-day Moyale District was part of Marsabit District until 1995, and the inci-
dents in both districts have been counted together and weighted for population growth for 
comparison reasons. Adano & Witsenburg (2004: 736-748) provide an overview of incidents 
derived from various reports. 
146 Wario Adano, Ton Dietz & Karen Witsenburg  
 
source in assessing whether violence
2
 in the region had increased over the past 
century, since they describe each and every incident in great detail. All the inci-
dents and killings that were reported by the colonial government were listed and 
compared to the number of incidents and loss of life in the last decade. The an-
nual reports of the present-day government do, however, not systematically list 
incidents and numbers of people killed in armed conflicts. Unfortunately, we had 
no data for the period from 1960 to 1989, which was an extremely violent time 
due to the Somali secessionist (shifta) war during part of this period.  
Issues linking resource scarcity to ethnic conflicts3  
The availability of natural resources in relation to increasing population densities 
is to some extent problematic to address, as the danger of severe resource scarcity 
seems to be ever-present. Development workers and scholars alike have ex-
pressed fears of increasing tension between different groups in society in degrad-
ing environments (Kaplan 1994) and in their competition for access to resources 
(Homer-Dixon 1999). The fear about the relationship between environmental 
scarcity and violent conflicts is presently receiving considerable attention. It is 
widely assumed that in less developed countries environmental conflict is likely 
to happen because of high population growth and high dependency on renewable 
natural resources. Moreover, Homer-Dixon (1999) argues that poor countries 
cannot allocate (enough) wealth to research and development to invent new tech-
niques to produce or substitute scarce resources (the so-called ‘ingenuity gap’). 
In addition, developing countries are thought to lack well-defined or enforceable 
property rights to govern renewable resources (Maxwell & Reuveny 2000: 301-
302). A substantial feature of the argumentation is the neo-Malthusian assump-
tion that food production cannot cope with population growth, leading to all sorts 
of problematic events, including violent conflicts. At the core of this thinking lies 
the assumption that poverty is related to a lack of social institutions that are nec-
essary to deal with increasing resource scarcity, which will inevitably result in 
violence. As Homer-Dixon (1999: 108) asserts: 
‘Poor countries start at a disadvantage: Many are under-endowed with the social institutions 
that are necessary for an ample supply of both social and technical solutions to scarcity …’ 
                                                 
2
  Marsabit District is considered a ‘hardship area’ by the Kenyan Government; meaning civil 
servants get a ‘hardship’ bonus on top of their salaries. It does not benefit the police to un-
derreport ethnic violence and raids, as that would reduce the chance that their area of service 
earns the ‘hardship status’. Neither can one rule out the possibility that it might result in over 
reporting. 
3
  The following subsections are based on Witsenburg & Adano (2007).  
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Thus, the explanation is that violence that results from competition over scarce 
resources is triggered by governance failures like unequal access to resources and 
social exclusion, the misuse or overuse of a common property resource and free 
riding problems among others. In the scarcity-causes-violence paradigm, this 
lack of good governance is held responsible for increasing tension and violent 
conflicts in developing countries in general and Africa in particular.  
In marginal areas like semi-arid northern Kenya, people have coped with scar-
cities for centuries. Many institutions exist that have been shaped and reshaped 
over time to avoid ‘resource conflicts’ between ethnic groups during crisis times. 
In pastoral areas, scarcities increase during droughts. Lack of rainfall is directly 
linked with a number of environmental problems, which undermine the well-
being of livestock and pastoralists.  
The supply of and demand for resources fluctuate through time. Our first 
fieldwork period in 1998 was characterised by abundant rainfall. While excessive 
rainfall can cause its own scarcities, such as lack of food supplies in town, fuel, 
transport and medicine because of flood-caused inaccessibility, for nomadic 
households it is also a time of herd growth, enough milk for consumption, good 
pastures and relatively adequate water supply. However, in 2000 a severe 
drought had caused severe problems for farmers and nomads alike, and Kenya as 
a whole experienced an economic crisis. Salaries had gone down, shops closed, 
projects stopped, children dropped out of school and a famine was threatening 
the lives of thousands. Only relief food prevented this from happening as more 
than 80% of the households in the District received relief.  
The above situation shows that resources are so dynamic and so fluctuating in 
their supply and demand that quantifying relative scarcity is difficult. There are 
nonetheless indications that point in the direction of increasing resource scarcity. 
One way of throwing some light on scarcity would be to assess trends in live-
stock numbers – the principal assets of the pastoralists. The absolute number of 
people and livestock has increased over the last century but livestock wealth rela-
tive to population has gone down. Whereas rangelands have had to support a lar-
ger number of animals, the number of animals (expressed in tropical livestock 
units (TLU
4
)) per person has decreased tremendously (Table 7.1).  
Based on a study in the district, Fratkin & Roth (1996) observe that 8 TLU per 
capita is generally considered sufficient for subsistence livestock production as 
pure pastoralists.
5
 In 1984, the measured TLU per capita of 5.3 was already 
                                                 
4
  1 camel = 1.2 TLU, 1 cattle = 0.7 TLU, 1 sheep or goat = 0.1 TLU (Lusigi 1993: 243). 
5
  A threshold of 4.5 TLU per capita is the recommended minimum required to generate subsis-
tence production. The estimate of minimum 4 TLU per capita is based on different TLU val-
ues for other parts of Kenya, but does not incorporate the livestock requirements needed to 
support a social network. 
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barely sufficient to support the population (Table 7.1), and the 2000 survey fig-
ures give much lower values. In 1998 we measured 5.3 TLU per capita only in 
the lowlands among the mobile pastoralists at Korr and Maikona centres of Mar-
sabit District. The settled households on the mountain had 1.3 TLU per capita 
both in 1998 and 2000, and settled households in the lowlands had 3.4 TLU per 
capita in 2000. Similarly, Fratkin & Roth (1996) found a decline in the average 
TLU per household in the District of about 36% between 1976 and 1985 among 
Samburu Ariaal. McPeak (1999) reports average household herds of 6.9 TLU per 
capita in Chalbi and 3.9 TLU per capita in Dukana among Gabra nomads. 
 
 
Table 7.1 Human population and TLU measures in Marsabit District 
 Rendille country
a
 Household survey
b
 
 1932 1984 1998 2000 
Population 7,250 24,501 2,036 1,901 
TLU 106,118.3 129,554.2 4,278.8 3,498.2 
TLU per capita 14.6 5.3 2.1 1.8 
Sources:  a)  Rendille country is part of Marsabit District and is inhabited by Samburu and Rendille  
  (from O’Leary 1990). 
b) Authors’ surveys, 1998 and 2000. The 1998 figures are for mobile pastoral households in 
the lowlands and Marsabit Mountain, while the 2000 figures are for settled households in 
the lowlands and Marsabit Mountain. 
 
 
The downward trend in livestock wealth among pastoral groups is evidently a 
general phenomena, and not unique to Marsabit (see Dietz et al. 2001 for four 
Kenyan case studies). This suggests that livestock as productive capital has be-
come increasingly scarce, while livestock is still considered the most valuable 
household capital, and herd accumulation remains critical in building up assets.  
In many arid and semi-arid areas like Marsabit District, rainfall remains the 
most significant factor that influences conditions of the range, resource availabil-
ity and herd growth. Yet, the relationship between livestock numbers and rainfall 
pattern for the period of which data is available does not show a significant corre-
lation (Adano & Witsenburg 2005). While rainfall is quite variable, livestock 
population per capita has declined dramatically over the last 30 years, and the 
human population continued to grow. 
Water and other natural resources became increasingly scarce during the 
drought. Many people with large herds moved away from the area in 2000 to es-
cape local drought effects, and in so doing released the pressure on water and 
pasture. Still, people and animals had to queue for long hours to get access to wa-
ter. The demand for forest resources, especially firewood needed to cook relief 
food, increased since 1998, and demanded high labour inputs of household mem-
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bers. One could argue that these scarcities are cyclical, but cyclical scarcities 
have had an increasingly impact. Despite high level of poverty in the region, 
there was nevertheless a (temporary) situation of peace, cooperation and recon-
ciliation between the ethnic groups. Many authors deal with violence as a static 
phenomenon, as if it would not come to an end (Mkutu 2002; Kahl 1998). Yet 
violence often suddenly stops, even when resources do not suddenly stop being 
scarce, because local people find ways to share or to cooperate, but this seldom 
gets emphasis. Also the assumption that common property resources are used as 
open-access resources still guides the ‘scarcity-causes-violence’ paradigm, even 
though others (Bromley 1992; Berkes 1989) have provided convincing examples 
which falsify this assumption. Local property regimes and conflict solving or 
conflict-preventing mechanisms are thus ignored, while these mechanisms are of 
crucial importance in mitigating conflicts.  
The following example illustrates how existing institutions in societies deal 
with the allocation and management of natural resources without resulting in vio-
lent interethnic conflicts.  
Ethnic tension and reconciliation in Marsabit  
Increase of violence in 1998 and 1999 
From 1994 to 1999, ethnic violence in Marsabit District seemed to increase. In 
1998 and 1999, the local residents talked about nothing else than raids and kill-
ings and during certain months our research was seriously hindered. People were 
afraid to travel on the roads, especially after some bandit attacks on the main 
roads and murders on the forest road between Songa and Badassa on the moun-
tain. It was absolutely impossible to ask people questions on ethnically delicate 
topics and to acquire reliable answers. In 2000, the Kenya Human Rights Com-
mission published a report in which most of the armed incidents that took place 
between 1992 and 1999 in Marsabit and Moyale Districts were described in de-
tail. In 1998, 24-armed incidents were registered, in which at least 93 people 
were killed and 12 people were wounded. There were 50 incidents in 1999, with 
38 people killed and 69 people wounded. These were years in which tension and 
fear were almost palpable in Marsabit town. In 1998 and 1999, the situation 
looked like an escalation of ethnic violence, and it was tempting to interpret the 
violent conflicts in this ethnically diverse area as arising from competition over 
scarce resources.  
 
Reconciliation in 2000 
In 2000, the severe drought situation seemed a ‘good’ opportunity to find out 
how the ‘traditional ways of resource management’ would deal with this in-
creased scarcity situation. Surprisingly, we found a peaceful atmosphere on the 
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mountain, even though the drought had caused widespread starvation among 
animals due to a lack of pasture. People with large herds had moved away from 
Marsabit, to places in Ethiopia and southwards to places like Waso and Garba 
Tula in Isiolo, Wamba and Maralal. This reduced the pressure from large herds 
on the Marsabit wells. However, thousands of poorer herders with small herds 
still had to use the mountain waterholes. Only waterholes with a greater capacity 
were used. This resulted in a situation where ethnically different groups all de-
pended on a few water holes. Contrary to the expected outcome, the situation 
around the waterholes was one of cooperation, sharing and mutual understand-
ing.  
A perfect example was the temporary reconciliation around Bakato wells.
6
 In 
1998, the water site was the scene of fighting and shooting, killing and raiding. It 
proved impossible to visit that well site because of the fights. At the time, there 
was high rainfall, the pastures were and there were lots of raids. According to the 
herdsmen, long distance raiding tends to increase in a wet year when there is suf-
ficient grass and water to get stock home, while the environment provides good 
possibilities to hide. The result of the violence in 1998 was that the Bakato wells 
were not used for a long time. With the onset of the drought in 1999/2000, pas-
ture on the mountain deteriorated and the number of usable wells decreased. 
Herdsmen of both Rendille and Boran groups (usually rivalry groups) met and 
agreed that they should stop fighting (temporarily) in order to use the wells and 
pasture of Bakato. They said that they used to reconcile in such times of stress, 
for the sake of sheer survival. They pointed out that people with small herds are 
not as inclined to engage in raids and murder as those who have larger herds. In 
addition, wealthy herd owners and politicians like to instigate conflicts for their 
personal gain, without considering how poorer herdsmen suffer from such con-
flicts.  
Although fights often happen during the wet season and around water places, 
people do not fight over access to water, as is often reported. Raids happen at wa-
ter places because so many animals accumulate around a watering point and peo-
ple are extremely busy with providing water for their animals. They are therefore 
completely unprepared for attack.  
In any event, the situation during 2000 drought was a very illuminative contri-
bution to our investigation of the mechanism of water use rights allocation and 
emphasised the importance that everybody should have access to water in times 
of drought, irrespective of ethnic or clan affiliation.  
                                                 
6
  Bakato is a watering site in a grazing area between Badassa and Songa, exactly on the 
boundary between the Borana and Rendille/Samburu speaking communities. 
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In this respect it is interesting to mention the historical claims to the same wa-
ter source by Rendille and Boran herdsmen on Mount Marsabit. The Rendille 
Galmagor was the first settler in Hula Hula. He said that the spring at Hula Hula 
was used by Laikipiak Maasai and Loroguchu Samburu before the Boran came to 
occupy the mountain with their cattle. By the time Galmagor settled in Hula Hula 
in 1969, Boran had dug wells and improved them with troughs. The Rendille 
were initially refused access to the water there. The Provincial Commissioner 
came to settle the case and in 1970 the Rendille were allocated one day in the wa-
tering schedule. Since then, the watering schedule has been such that the Sam-
buru/Rendille, the town and the Burji and the Boran, Gabra and Manyatta Ginda 
are assigned one day. Every household pays Ksh. 10 per month to the water 
manager who opens the tap and manages the equipment at the well of Hula Hula 
(field notes, 2000).  
In times of ethnic tension, Boran and Rendille/Samburu claim ownership over 
wells such as the Hula Hula and Bakato water sites, which lie on the border be-
tween the groups. During times of reconciliation, people admit they understand 
why the enemy has a rightful claim to the same well. Boran readily admit that the 
Rendille and the Samburu have used the water on Mount Marsabit long before 
they migrated from Ethiopia. The Rendille/Samburu admit, in turn, that the Bo-
ran have improved the wells over a long period of time. Everyone in Marsabit 
knows that improving a well and contributing labour and investments means 
building up use rights.  
 
Situations of peace and cooperation in the colonial era 
This case study shows how in certain situations resource scarcity can contribute 
to reconciliation and cooperation between otherwise antagonistic ethnic groups. 
Evidence from the colonial records shows that, also historically, this situation oc-
curred often. The following was reported in both 1939 and 1955 respectively, 
which were years of severe droughts: 
During part of the year it was common to find Boran, Rendille and Gabra using common wa-
ter holes, and surprisingly little friction occurred between them. (MDAR 1939: 7) 
There was no internal unrest; in fact relations between the three tribes were most friendly – 
which is most surprising in view of the severe drought conditions prevailing throughout the 
year. As with the Boran, the Rendille-Gabra relations remain most friendly and have shared 
their water and grazing. (MDAR 1955: 7-16) 
The suggestion of the herdsmen is interesting, that more violent ethnic con-
flicts take place during the rainy seasons because of high grass, strong animals, 
and the availability of surface water. That implies that there should be a correla-
tion between years of high rainfall and number of violent attacks. This contra-
dicts the ‘scarcity-causes-violence’ paradigm, which stipulates that higher num-
bers of violent conflicts ought to occur at times of severe droughts and higher 
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scarcity. However, one could argue that after severe droughts herdsmen have to 
wait until the rains have started to raid their enemies to replenish their stock 
losses. That suggests that resource scarcity caused in a dry year could be a prob-
able reason for conflict during a subsequent wet year. This also agrees with the 
hypothesis that restocking after heavy livestock losses to drought is one of the 
main reasons of raids. Evidence should show an increase in violence in a wet 
year following a drought, and this hypothesis can be tested empirically using 
long-term incidents data (see below). 
Is there a trend in increasing violence? 
Armed violence
7
 is regarded as a typical characteristic of Kenya’s drylands, or of 
the Horn of Africa in general. 
... in the Horn of Africa in recent times, conflict among pastoralists has taken on new, exag-
gerated dimensions. A shrinking resource-base has provoked a desperate struggle for sur-
vival in which the existence of some groups is threatened. (Markakis 1993: 13) 
The most obvious threat to pastoral survival is the increase in violence in the sparsely popu-
lated pastoral areas: Warfare and raiding have been constant features in the lives of most pas-
toral peoples, but automatic weapons and grenades have revolutionised the intensity and 
deadliness of conflicts and quite altered their nature. (Baxter 2001: 236) 
It is true that modern weapons have a different level of destruction, causing 
more deaths in a short time. Yet, to avoid misinterpretation of the present, it is 
necessary to look at the past. One can only claim ‘an increase of violence’ when 
there is evidence of an upward trend in violent incidents over time. While litera-
ture claiming ‘increasing conflict’ fails to give evidence of trends (Hussein et al. 
1999), absolute numbers of incidents do not say much in an area where popula-
tion growth is high. Thus, a trend in conflict incidents should be adjusted for 
changes in human population over time.  
Markakis (1997: 5) states in his book Resource conflict in the Horn of Africa 
that ‘the Horn of Africa is a textbook case of environmental degradation and con-
flict’. He convincingly quantified the trends of population growth, resource deg-
radation and increasing food insecurity, but remained silent on trends in conflict 
                                                 
7
  In this paper, violent conflict encounters refer only to those incidents resulting in death, ab-
ductions and torture or injuries. The incidents are classified in the original reports as ‘raid’, 
‘armed attack’ or ‘murder’ (Adano & Witsenburg 2004: Table 17.6). ‘Raid’ is an armed at-
tack where livestock is involved, and ‘murder’ is an armed attack where one or two indi-
viduals are assassinated for various reasons. These incidents have an ‘ethnic’ character, as 
the identity of the groups involved was almost always reported. The incidents also includes 
‘violent’ abductions of Kenyan residents by the Ethiopian army where threaten and abducted 
people are usually tortured severely. The militia operate more openly under the questionable 
protection of uniforms and legal possession of guns.  
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incidents over time. His book largely describes how tribal (descent) groups, and 
cultural movements confront each other (or the state) in different ways.  
Mkutu (2002: 4) claims violent conflicts involving pastoralists is widespread 
and increasingly severe in much of the Horn of Africa without listing any trend 
in numbers.  
Kahl (1998) shows how trends in population growth and increasing scarcity of 
resources in Kenya seem to have contributed to widespread politically motivated 
ethnic clashes in Rift Valley, Nyanza and the Western Provinces. The reported 
number of 1,500 deaths and about 300,000 displaced people were counted from 
1991 to 1993 (Ibid.: 7).  
The question is how large the population was on which these numbers are 
based. It has been suggested that Kenya has long been a relatively calm country, 
but we have no proof of population growth-related ethnic violence in the past. 
Despite a large number of studies on civil war, only a few have systematically 
tested scarcity-violence links using hard data (De Soysa 2002).  
Although there have been a number of qualitative and descriptive case studies 
that tried to prove the ‘scarcity-causes-violence’ paradigm, the lack of statistical 
evidence is not compensated for by convincing qualitative studies. To come to a 
reliable and fact-based conclusion regarding trends in violence and population 
pressure, in the remainder of this paper, we will attempt (i) to use hard data to 
indicate trends in violent conflict incidents; and (ii) to combine quantitative and 
qualitative information on the governance of water resources (Adano & Witsen-
burg 2004: 271). So let us first look at what statistical data on violence in Mar-
sabit, related to population numbers, tells us.  
 
Analysing trends according to population and rainfall data 
In addition to sources of information stated before, rainfall data from the Mar-
sabit Meteorological Station was another important source of data for the study. 
In this regard, droughts in the rangelands in Marsabit District (Sobania 1979; Ta-
blino 1999) correspond fairly accurately with an annual rainfall of 700 mm or 
less on Marsabit Mountain. As years of low rainfall usually result in scarcities of 
resources – reduced vegetation and pasture for animals, a lack of surface water in 
pools and wells, a lack of milk and crop harvests and starvation of animals – a 
drought year can also be taken to represent environmental scarcity. 
Adano & Witsenburg (2004: 736-748) show that past conflicts were often 
raids, but the proportion of incidents
8
 in which the Kenyan and Ethiopian army 
                                                 
8
  Interestingly, the majority of firearms deaths in several Kenyan districts are attributed to po-
lice activities (Leyan 2002): ‘six out of every ten Kenyans who are shot dead are victims of 
police shootings’. But the statistics rise dramatically in 2001, when the police shot dead nine 
 
154 Wario Adano, Ton Dietz & Karen Witsenburg  
 
was involved in the 1990s is quite substantial. For example, twenty-three of the 
fifty incidents in 1999 were caused by the Ethiopian militia against Kenyan civil-
ians, causing eight deaths and numerous abductions. In the same year, the Ken-
yan army was involved in nine incidents in which 17 civilians were killed in an 
alleged attempt to stop people from supporting the Oromo Liberation Front 
(OLF). In only 16 incidents, in which 12 people were killed, was the army not 
involved.  
 
Analysis of the relationship between resource scarcity and ethnic violence 
The question as to whether violence is related to the scarcity of renewable re-
sources is more difficult to answer. Scarcity of resources is a relative variable and 
scores of indicators should be measured against scores in the previous years.  
Figure 7.1 shows trends in absolute numbers of incidents, numbers of people 
killed
9
 and rainfall. In some years it looks as if the number of incidents is higher, 
in line with increased rainfall. However, correlation measures do not show a sig-  
 
 
 Figure 7.1 Absolute number of armed incidents, people killed, and rainfall figures  
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  Sources: Compiled from MDAR (several years), KHRC (2000) and Meteorological  
 Station, Marsabit. 
                                                 
out of every ten victims. The study, first of its kind carried out in Kenya, attributes an aver-
age of 60% of firearm deaths to police and 39% to criminals in the past five years. 
9
  409 people were killed in 1943. This is omitted in the graph, for ‘distortion of scale’ reasons 
but is included in the following calculations and explanations. 
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nificant correlation between rainfall (in mm) and violence in absolute and in per 
capita terms (Table 7.2). One could think of a situation that droughts in one year 
could result in violence in the following year. That is tested in the row ‘one-year 
time lag’ in Table 7.2, which shows no direct significant correlation between 
rainfall and violence, and neither is there correlation between armed violence and 
rainfall in the previous year (violence rates lagged one year). However, using 
theaverage number of incidents and killings
10
 in wet, average and dry years of 
rainfall produces interesting results (Table 7.3). What is most clear from this ta-
ble is that more than twice as many people are killed in wet (or wetter) years (50 
versus 23) than in drought (or drier) years, in both relative and absolute terms. 
Surprisingly, the number of incidents and killings does not rise in wet or average 
years following a drought. In fact, fewer people were killed (23) in wet years fol-
lowing droughts than in wet years in general (50). While the standard deviation is 
too high to derive firm statements based on these figures, there is clearly less vio-
lence in and directly after drought years than in wet years. Therefore, the vio-
lence occurring in the District is not related to drought-induced scarcity of 
resources (see Table 7.4 for details). 
 
 
Table 7.2 Relation coefficient for rain, armed incidents and killings  
in Marsabit District 
 Absolute number  Relative number Absolute number Relative number 
 of incidents of incidents of killings of killings 
Rainfall -0.156 0.237 0.078 0.045 
1-year time lag   0.141 0.128 0.094 0.016 
Note: All figures are not significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
 
Table 7.3 Average number of killings in dry, average or wet years (mean, std dev.) 
 Drought years Average years  Wet years Average and wet yrs* 
Event   (<700 mm) (701-850mm) (>851 mm) (>700mm, <701 mm)
       (n=13)       (n=10)      (n=16)               (n=8) 
Incidents 7.6 (13.84) 6.2 (6.3) 6.5 (6.0) 5.5 (3.4) 
Killed 23.5 (34.06) 40.1 (57.5) 50.1 (99.7) 23.4 (22.2) 
Incident rate 14.7 (12.67) 24.0 (22.7) 27.1 (26.8) 27.5 (25.8) 
Kill rate 127.4 (339.3) 142.9 (203.5) 262.5 (676.5) 79.7 (83.6) 
* This refers to average and wet years following drought (years >700 following years of <701 mm). 
Sources: Compiled from MDARs (several years) and KHRC (2000). 
 
                                                 
10
  ‘Incident rate’ and ‘kill rate’ is the number of incidents and killings, respectively, divided by 
population numbers and multiplied by 100,000. 
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The absolute number of violence-related deaths is twice as high in years in 
which rainfall exceeded 700 mm, and there were even fewer deaths in the year 
following a drought (Table 7.3). In a sequence of years following a drought, the 
highest death rate is measured in the second and fourth year after a drought (Ta- 
ble 7.5). This table also shows a decrease in per capita deaths in years following 
a drought. There is a sharp increase in the second year after a drought year. 
 
 
Table 7.4 Average number of incidents and deaths in drought and other years, per year 
 Sample Absolute Absolute Incidents rate Death rate 
 size (n) number of number of (weighted for (weighted for  
  incidents  deaths  population)  population)  
Drought years 13 7.6 23.5 14.7 127.4 
Other years 26 6.4 46.3 26.0 216.5 
Source: Compiled from MDARs (several years) and KHRC (2000). 
 
 
Table 7.5 Mean number of incidents and deaths in drought years and years following 
droughts 
No. of years   Absolute Absolute Incidents rate Death rate Rain- 
after drought    no. of    no. of   (weighted (weighted  fall 
(<700 mm) N incidents   deaths    for pop.)   for pop.) (mm) 
Drought year 13   7.6   23.5 14.7 127.4  531.4 
1 year after drought   8   5.5   23.4 27.5   79.7 1048.4 
2 years after drought   7 10.1   72.1 26.0 235.8 910.0 
3 years after drought   6   4.2   6.2 20.2   36.1 910.1 
4 years after drought   4   5.0 111.0 28.2 732.6 918.3 
5 years after drought   1   6.0   30.0 38.7 193.3 1344.7 
Source: Compiled from MDAR (several years). 
 
 
The first rains usually cause more death and disease among the weakened live-
stock, and the first wet year after a drought is crucial for herd survival. After 
rangelands and livestock have improved, especially in the second year after a 
drought, there are more incidents and higher death rates. Most interestingly these 
results suggest that it is not during times of environmental scarcity that ethnic 
violence increases. An additional question is whether the situation in Marsabit is 
different compared to places elsewhere, where scholars found apparently enough 
evidence to relate violent conflicts with resource scarcity. We will discuss this 
below. 
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Explaining the decrease in violence in drought years 
The explanation offered by the herdsmen at the well sites in 2000 suggests a 
situation where cooperation or fighting between parties in question depends on 
which situation is expected to offer most advantages. Game theory, which is 
based on the analysis of choices in situations where the outcome of a decision by 
one player depends on the decision of another player, and where these decisions 
of others are not known in advance (i.e. game theory decision-making under un-
certainty), may offer insights into this phenomenon. As vast field of game theory 
is beyond the scope of this paper, we would only suggest a pattern in part of the 
violence which is occurring in Marsabit. 
 
Intervening circumstances: Game theory under uncertainty 
In Marsabit we could test a simplified game theory model for two different ethnic 
groups who can chose between three possible types of collective action: They can 
cooperate, fight, or avoid each other. In the first type of collective action people 
cooperate, for example, by using water from a source together. Similar to the 
Folk theorem which says ‘make a deal to cooperate every period, if you don’t, 
you don’t ever cooperate again’ (Gravelle & Rees 1992), herdsmen of different 
ethnic groups tend to cooperate during periods of water scarcity because the deal 
ensures that they will always have access to certain water sources, and the pay-
off is survival. The second form of collective action is to fight where groups of 
herdsmen raid each other’s livestock and try to ban the other group from the wa-
ter source. The pay-offs vary from stolen cattle to blood revenge, honour and in-
creased unequal power relations between different groups and status for a local 
political leader. The third action is avoidance of each other resulting in a neutral 
outcome.  
The question is now which type of collective action is more likely to occur 
during droughts? The herdsmen themselves suggested that cooperation and mak-
ing deals during droughts was more rational, while they (sometimes) fight in 
times of high rainfall and abundance. The ultimate aim of each herder is that he 
and his livestock survive a drought. Negotiating access to a water source and co-
operation as regards maintenance of this well, even if it belongs to another ethnic 
group, will increase the chance of survival for all. If fights were to occur and 
people were to try to steal each other’s animals, there would be no place to water 
them. Tracking stolen animals during droughts can be rather stressful because of, 
the difficulty of trekking weak animals, limited availability of water points and a 
high labour demand among pastoral communities during droughts in general. The 
lack of information about the other parties’ behaviour is limited because of the 
deal that is made: No cooperation during drought will mean a ban from the water 
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wells forever. It is thus more rational to fight during wet times and death rates are 
therefore lower in drought years.  
The herdsmen in 2000 also contributed another aspect to the discussion, 
namely that of poverty. Pastoral households require a large herd and pack ani-
mals to make mobility possible and necessary. During droughts, the poor herders 
remain behind on the mountain because they have too few animals to move, and 
ethnic groups reconcile to be able to use the pasture and water that is left. The 
interviewed herders suggested that it was more rational for the poor who stayed 
behind to cooperate and share their resources, in the absence of the wealthy el-
ites.  
Mancur Olsen challenged the idea that if members of a group have a common 
interest or object they would all be better off if that objective were achieved 
through cooperation and that as a result individuals in that group would act to 
achieve that objective, assuming they were rational and self-interested. He says 
that ‘unless the number of individuals is quite small, or unless there is coercion 
or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, 
rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group 
interests’ (Olsen 1965, cited in Ostrom 1990: 5-6). This idea usually serves to 
explain why people lack enough incentives to contribute to common goods, but it 
explains precisely why large-scale fights are not likely to occur in Marsabit Dis-
trict during periods of drought. Ethnic conflict is a type of collective action 
where the benefits to the group do not outweigh the costs of fighting to each in-
dividual. The advantages of conflict might be higher in wet years, when the costs 
are low and fights can be carried out more easily.  
 
Intervening circumstances: Non-resource related causes 
The next step in the analysis of violence should be to identify the years of high 
occurrence of armed violence
11
 and study for each specific incident such as 
which circumstances could have played a role. We will discuss the most impor-
tant intervening variables in the following paragraphs. 
When herdsmen say that raids take place in the wet season because of bush 
growth and improved livestock body conditions, there must be a time-lag be-
tween rainfall, improved range condition and the time of raids. This time-lag var-
ies from weeks to months during which animal health might be disturbed by 
epidemics, the rangelands may be infested with locusts, or bushfires might de-
stroy pastures. 
                                                 
11
 The circumstances of years with high numbers of armed incidents and killings are described 
in Adano & Witsenburg (2004: 748-749). 
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Anthropological studies have shown that raids often take place as revenge for 
previous attacks. However, revenge activities are not supposed to coincide with 
religious ceremonies, which take place in certain periods corresponding to the 
lunar cycle, irrespective of rainfall which is highly variable in distribution and 
amount, and uncertain in timing. In addition, a slight increase in violence is said 
to take place after age-set ceremonies, during which groups of warriors are initi-
ated or ritual leaders are installed (Paul Baxter, personal communication 2002). 
Age-group warriors might also see raids as a form of adventurous sport which 
carries some sense of pride and achievement. The occurrence of ethnic violence 
in Marsabit Town from 1997 to 1999 was also linked to political activities of the 
1997 multi-party general elections. Moreover, a lot of violence in the 1990s re-
sulted from the agreement between the Kenyan and Ethiopian governments to 
eradicate the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) from Marsabit District (KHRC 
2000; Osamba 2000: 21). These considerations mean that the best way to investi-
gate armed violence is a good analysis and explanation of specific case studies.  
In sum, if ecological parameters influence incidents of violent conflicts, they 
might not be scarcity induced because times of rain are times of relative abun-
dance. Although we do not deny that environmental conditions can correlate with 
conflicts, we think that other factors, which presently feature less prominently in 
the inter-ethnic conflicts and raids literature, might better explain eruptions of 
violence. In questioning the applicability of the ‘scarcity-causes-violence-para-
digm’ in Marsabit District, it seems that increasing scarcity does not couple with 
ethnic violence. Neither do we find an increasing trend in ethnic conflicts in per 
capita terms, leading us to the question of how Marsabit might be different from 
the areas in which this relationship does seem to exist. 
 
Intervening circumstances: The fluidity of ethnic identity 
The reason for ethnic conflicts in times of scarcity being different in the Marsabit 
Mountain area might partly lie in the fluidity of ethnic identity. Territory in areas 
like Marsabit District and Mountain is not as strictly and permanently defined 
along ethnic lines as may appear at first glance. For instance, the ethnic identity 
of an individual, or even a whole family, is not as strict as it might seem. So far 
we have dealt with ‘ethnicity’ as if it is easy to define and distinguish ethnic 
groups. Ethnicity seems to be an important variable in explaining all sorts of 
problems in Africa, including violent conflicts. But what role does ethnicity actu-
ally play? 
Although individuals carry identity markers like beads, ear holes, and spears 
to show to which ethnic group they presently identify themselves, it does not 
mean that all their relatives belong to that group too, or even that they have been 
born into that ethnic group. For instance, anthropologist Günther Schlee (1989) 
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found that every ethnic group in this area includes clans which can also be found 
in neighbouring ethnic groups. People can decide during their lifetime to move to 
a neighbouring ethnic group if that is advantageous, using their clan identity as a 
vehicle. These clans seem to be quite large in villages like Kituruni and Songa 
around Marsabit Mountain, where people have relatives in both Samburu and 
Rendille families. In Samburu-dominated Hula Hula for example there are many 
who belong to or have relatives in the Rendille Odhola clan. People do not like to 
emphasise this duality in ethnic identity, but double ethnic identity is especially 
used or reinforced when people marry or migrate and change their livelihood. For 
instance, when pastoralists settle on Marsabit Mountain, some redefine their own 
identity, and adopt the ethnicity of the receiving area which maintain their clan 
identity. Such people do not profit from conflicts at all as it forces them to take 
sides and this reduces the chance of obtaining assistance from another ethnic 
group. Thus, while sedentarisation increased the pressure on certain resources, it 
actually might also have increased the peacekeeping tendencies in society. 
Though many households have settled, they have to keep the peace to be able to 
negotiate access to resources in times of environmental stress. Unable to move 
away, settled people can quickly suffer the death of women and children, and the 
loss of houses and food stores, when violence breaks out.  
Even though this fluidity of ethnic boundaries is a characteristic of Marsabit 
District, it would be wrong to suggest that this phenomenon would not exist out-
side this area. Barth observes flexibility in ethnic identity among the Basseri in 
South Persia (Jenkins 1997), Salih (1999) observes ethnic merging and alliances 
in the Sudan and Nigeria, and Duijzings (1999) observes it even in Kosovo be-
fore the war. Multiple ethnic identities might be a more common phenomenon 
than appears in studies when the existence of a single ethnic identity is assumed. 
But, as Markakis (cited in Salih 1999) commented: 
A persistent confusion between form and substance has often confounded our understanding 
of social conflict in Africa. Ethnicity, for instance, is often the ideological form such conflict 
takes, but its substance is seldom a clash of cultures. Like all ideologies, ethnicity is a symp-
tom of social disorder, not its cause. 
The social reality is a rather dynamic and complex pattern of multiple and 
changing ethnic identities, where cultures, norms and values merge and change 
until conflicts create boundaries and ethnic ‘clarity’. 
 
Intervening circumstances: Fluidity and flexibility of property regimes 
Contemporary studies on resource conflicts have emphasised problems in land 
tenure and property regimes governing natural resources. Hardin’s (1968) idea 
that the use of common property resources will inevitably lead to over-use and 
degradation, based on the assumption that common property resources are used 
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as open-access resources, still informs much of the literature on scarcity and vio-
lence (Homer-Dixon 1999; Maxwell & Reuveny 2000). However, it appears that 
in Marsabit strong common property regimes governing water resources cope 
well with increasing water scarcity, despite poverty and population growth 
(Adano & Witsenburg 2005). Numerous other studies have described similar 
phenomena (Berkes 1989; Bromley 1992), showing that in fact very few scarce 
natural resources are open-access resources.  
Where it is needed to avoid conflicts, there is a strong enforceable property re-
gime over natural resources, which does not change when population pressure 
increases. Interestingly, use rights to common property seem to be vaguely de-
fined to avoid conflicts. Evidence shows that the traditional institutions of natural 
resource management, and stress coping mechanism are effectively blended with 
current practices to make wise use of available resources. The Bakato well site 
described earlier does not belong to a specific ethnic group. Some of the wells 
have been dug by the Boran, and therefore, ownership is legitimately claimed by 
Boran clans. However, the area of high water tables where the wells are located 
now was used as a watering area by the Rendille long before the Boran emigrated 
from Ethiopia to Kenya, so it is obviously and equally legitimate to call it part of 
Rendille territory. This well site is a typical example of a case in which double 
ethnic use rights exist. This suggests that vaguely defined property systems leave 
room for negotiation. It is important therefore to recognise such ‘duality’ in such 
areas, not only for possible conflictive claims, but also especially for their poten-
tial peacekeeping functions during times of severe scarcity such as droughts.  
Proponents of the ‘resource scarcity-violent conflict’ paradigm might still be 
right in their assertion that the situation in Marsabit is different to that in other 
areas where the relationship is evident: Violent conflicts are not caused by a 
scarcity of natural resources, because there are clearly defined and enforceable 
property rights. But what about the Bakato well site where vague ownership 
rights exist in order to prevent conflicts? Unfortunately, many scholars and pol-
icy makers fail to see these nuances in property systems and easily deny their ex-
istence. Policies thus often result in defining and enforcing new legislation based 
on ethnic territories like group or individual title deeds and boundaries where 
previously duality existed, this legislation thus creates conflicts.
12
 There are nu-
merous examples in Kenya of attempts to implement ‘high-order’ policy deci-
                                                 
12
  In this regard, the ‘water conflicts’ along Tana River between Pokomo farmers and Orma 
pastoralists started after the government launched a land adjudication programme there 
(Daily Nation Team, 10 March 2001, and Martin, this volume). Where vagueness in property 
rights along the Tana River existed, the attempt to define territory triggered violent conflicts 
resulting in at least 60 deaths and numerous injured and displaced families, while being ex-
plained as a typical case of scarcity-induced conflicts. 
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sions without prior consultation with local-level players, resulting in negative 
impacts on resource use arrangements at the communities’ level. Ethnic violence 
resulting from land adjudication activities may, for instance, be reinterpreted in 
this light or seen as conflicts over natural resources, rather than that ethnic vio-
lence is attributed to lack of ingenuity and institutions. 
Explaining the existence of ethnic violence 
One important question that still remains unanswered is: What causes these erup-
tions of violent conflicts in Marsabit if not the scarcity of natural resources and 
traditional cattle raiding or revenges of past conflicts? Ethnic violence in the 
area, though no more violent now than in the past, is a problem and hindrance to 
development. Where violence is partly an institutionalised and organised pattern 
in society, the breakdown of traditional social institutions might mean that vio-
lence is reducing or changing its appearance. What is apparently clear is that the 
character of conflicts has changed over the last century (Adano & Witsenburg 
2004): the number of traditional raids in the overall ethnic violence is decreasing, 
while the violence during election time and during land adjudication programmes 
or state-sponsored violence is increasing.  
We observed that in the genesis of a violent conflict, people consistently refer 
to resourceful and powerful individuals who seem to orchestrate confrontations 
between less resourceful people. A study of the psychology of the sly and ma-
nipulative ways these leaders operate could illuminate much more on ethnic con-
flicts than a general ‘scarcity-causes-violence’ paradigm. That means that a study 
on the origin of violence should focus more on the people who own resources 
rather than on those who lack them and on those who profit from violence in-
stead of those who suffer from it. This means that the present focus on poverty 
and resource scarcity disguises the causal factors behind ethnic violence, because 
the ‘resource owners’ who coordinate violence go unseen. This implies that the 
role of traditional elders and the new political elites for instance, should be inves-
tigated rather than the warriors who perpetrate the violence. The possession by 
ethnic groups of firearms illuminates more failure of the state to provide physical 
security entrusted in her than that it proves the prevalence of cultures of violence. 
At this higher level of analysis the role of the police, the army and (arms and 
livestock) businesses at district or national level should be the main focus. On a 
global scale, an analysis of the role and profits of multinationals and international 
organisations, and the arms industry could provide new insights.  
The correlation between resource wealth and violence might thus be much more re-
vealing than a focus on resource scarcity. A number of studies on a high scale of analy-
sis have been carried out in this context (Collier & Hoeffler 1998; Collier 2000). De 
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Soysa (2002: 28-29), for example, correlated the scarcity of renewable resources and the 
occurrence of violent conflicts for 76 countries over 11 years and found that: 
… at no time did natural resources, both renewable and non-renewable, come close to pre-
dicting conflict negatively, nor human and institutional development positively. The results 
find ample [evidence] … that greed rather than grievance is likelier to generate armed vio-
lence.  
In line with these results, a test needs to be carried out as to whether this rela-
tionship also exists at lower levels of analysis. A focus on the ‘flow of wealth’ to 
and from war-torn areas, and the identification of those groups or individuals 
who benefit will offer better causal explanations for the occurrence of violence. 
Given that such a focus is much more difficult and also dangerous for the re-
searcher and his/her informants might partly explain why there is a lack of stud-
ies at this level of scale.  
Conclusions 
According to Homer Dixon (1999), resource scarcity can cause violent conflicts 
when populations increase. Such conflicts are particularly violent in poor, mar-
ginal regions where many ethnic groups have to compete for scarce natural re-
sources and where people hardly have the capacity to develop ‘ingenuity and 
adaptation’. However, results from our research cannot verify the assumption that 
increasing competition over scarce resources on Marsabit Mountain results in 
more ethnic violence. Water resources seem to play a vital role in social interac-
tion, reconciliation, sharing and cooperation in survival strategies.  
The poor herdsmen for whom transhumance is not affordable are left behind in 
drought areas. For them it is more rational to cooperate with people from differ-
ent ethnic groups in times of drought in order to share the scarce water resources. 
This was verified by historic statistics on violence which showed that more than 
twice as many deaths occurred in wet years than in drought years. There is also 
no evidence that violence is increasing in relative terms, or that ethnic violence is 
related to environmental scarcity. The study shows how important conflict-
avoiding institutions are in societies which have learned to deal with scarcity af-
ter century-old experiences. Such institutions are shaped and reshaped through 
time, and subjected to external stress, modernity and technological change. 
At national level, there are many examples in Kenya where policy interven-
tions have tended to ignore the importance of local institutions in resources allo-
cation and conflict resolution. The role of such institutions is fundamental in 
enhancing inter-ethnic cooperation. Exploiting the synergies between local-level 
resource governance issues and national level policy prescription might hold a 
key to a mutual understanding of the state and the local communities.  
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To date, the respective governments have attempted to respond to the conflicts 
through punitive measures (Dietz 1987), which treat only the consequences but 
not the causes of unrest. Unfortunately these do not seem to resolve the problem. 
What is more, such measures have been associated with human right abuses 
(Osamba 2000; KHRC 2000) and a general increase in violence. In our minds, a 
serious redress of the problem requires a clear understand of the underlying 
causes of inter-ethnic conflicts in the region. Getting the underlying causes 
wrong aggravates interethnic tensions rather than solves it, and thus creates 
waves of ethnic hostilities that are likely to result in endless raids and counter-
raids.  
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Conflicts between pastoralists and 
farmers in Tana River District 
 
Pilly Martin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This study has been conducted in Garsen division, Tana River district, Kenya be-
tween the Orma and Wardei pastoralists on one hand and the Pokomo peasant 
farmers on the other. There is an urgent need to address the conflict situation in 
Tana River and sustainable solutions to the problems of the conflict ought to be 
sought to ensure development in the research area. The study aimed at finding out 
the causes of the conflict, factors that compel the Orma/Wardei to be in a state of 
preparedness for war, the socio-economic and cultural impact of the conflict and 
finally ways of managing the conflict. The conflict had multiple causes related to 
ownership of and access to of resources (land, pasture and water). The factors that 
lead pastoralists to be in a state of preparedness for war were cultural in character, 
related to their need to control the harsh physical environment they live in. The im-
pact of the conflict is likewise multidimensional, and is characterised by the inter-
action between socio-economic and cultural resources. Traditional rules or norms 
on conflict seem not to be observed any more, bringing us to question if culture is 
being degraded, and thus control reduced. From the research findings it is felt that 
policies on resources availability and access based on existing traditions land in the 
research area would be needed. In particular, it is recommended that the traditional 
rules on land use and ownership should be taken into consideration during land ad-
judication exercises that presently favour sedentary populations. 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of a study on the eruption of a violent conflict in 
Tana River District between two ethnic groupings: the Orma and the Wardei on 
the one hand, and the Pokomo on the other. The justification for studying this 
particular conflict is that studying this could assist in finding sustainable solu-
tions to the problems of the conflict. There is an urgent need to do so in view of 
the limited level of development in the District. The study aims to identify the 
factors that compel the Orma and Wardei to be in a state of preparedness for war 
allowing the actual undertaking of hostilities, the socio-economic and cultural 
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impact of the conflict, the wider causes of the conflict, and finally ways of man-
aging the conflict.  
Both field methods and secondary sources of data were utilized. The results of 
the study show that in this conflict the traditional rules or norms of conflicts were 
not observed. This brings us to question whether either the culture of which these 
norms belong is being degraded, or whether the conflict had external causes to 
the extent that traditional ways of controlling it did not suffice?  
Our view is that the latter scenario applies, and the bone of contention is the 
land ownership and access issue. From the research findings it is felt that there is 
need for proper policies on land in the research area. It is recommended that the 
traditional ways of land use and ownership should be taken into consideration on 
the land adjudication exercise. In addition the local communities need to be in-
volved and consulted in the land adjudication process. This is to be done in order 
to attain acceptable alternatives for peace and development. 
Pastoralists and farmers – history of a co-existence 
Browsing the existing literature on pastoral societies shows that pastoral groups 
have usually had security problems with their neighbors over resources like live-
stock and pasture. Writing about the Nuer of the Sudan, Evans-Pritchard (1940) 
said that the primary objective of war (among pastoral communities) is acquisi-
tion of wealth, for cattle is a form of wealth that not only lasts a long time and 
reproduces itself, but is also easily seized and transported. The mode of life of 
pastoral societies that is centred on the care of livestock has therefore 
... given pastoral peoples a bias in favour of the acts of war rather than the acts of peace … 
(because they) are not entirely dependent on their own cattle, but can augment their herds 
and restore the ravages of rinderpest, and have, in fact, for a long time increased their stock, 
and hence supplemented their food supply by raiding; a condition that has shaped their char-
acter, economy, and political structure, skill and courage in fighting well as the most profit-
able occupation, and some measure of political agreement and unity a necessity (Ibid.: 50). 
In contradistinction, it is a common belief that farmers who have usually prac-
ticed agro-pastoralism by keeping some livestock mainly for milk and meat to 
supplement their predominantly grain-based diet have historically not invested a 
lot of resources, skill and energy in preparing for war in terms of weapons and 
training. Whenever they have encountered pastoral neighbours therefore, they 
have usually been disadvantaged militarily. In Kenya today, there are good ex-
amples of such one-sided military encounters as witnessed this century between 
the Pokot and Marakwet in the North Rift area, Orma and Pokomo in Tana River 
area and Maasai and Kisii in Trans-Mara District respectively, to just name but a 
few cases. 
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In the past, the culture defining what the relevant resources were, where they 
existed and how they should be exploited also prescribed the system of organiza-
tion and social relations pertaining to the exploitation and – if possible – conser-
vation of resources. The principles of fusion, when alliances and unity were 
required to facilitate reciprocity; and fission, when each individual, family or 
group could go alone, provided some element of balance of power. A code of 
ethics was also invoked to control excesses (Gluckman 1956), and ritual per-
formed to placate the spiritual world and to reconcile the conflicting parties (Vis-
ser 1989). It was possible therefore for ‘normal’ life to go on within a society or 
between societies despite the existence of feuds (Gluckman 1956). Conflicts 
around resources were part and parcel of the culture of adaptation to the envi-
ronment.  
What is surprising in many parts of the country today is the use of excessive 
violence on neighbours by pastoral and agricultural societies alike despite the ex-
istence of modern institutions such as the provincial administration, the police 
and the army which are expected to oversee and to restore the existence of law 
and order (Gluckman 1956). It is in the light of this that a study of the Pokomo 
and the Orma was hatched. 
Research area 
Tana River District in Kenya covers an area of 38,782 km
2
 (Republic of Kenya 
1997). The main water resources in the district are the Tana River, seasonal riv-
ers (lagas), groundwater, water pans and water holes in the inter-laga areas (NES 
1985). The land in Tana River District is mostly Government owned and the sys-
tem of land tenure is largely communal. Figure 8.1 shows the map of the research 
area. 
The district is largely semi-arid and its population is mainly composed of 
Pokomo peasant farmers, Orma and Wardei pastoralists and the Waata, a former 
hunter/gatherer group who nowadays mostly combine farming, hunting, livestock 
keeping and trade. Most parts of the district are susceptible to drought conditions 
(Ibid.). There were severe drought conditions in 1978-79 in Tana River district 
and subsistence had to be sought from outside. During the 1984 severe drought in 
middle Tana River district, many Orma and Wardei pastoralists were forced to 
move into the delta region, or the Lower Tana River area (Garsen Division). 
Though the delta region is the permanent home to Pokomo farmers who farm 
along the river banks, it also serves as a fall back area for nomadic pastoralists.  
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Map 8.1 Map showing location of study area  
 (Source: Republic of Kenya 1997: 8) 
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The Pokomo 
The Pokomo are a coastal Bantu group of people said to have come from the 
Shungwaya, and believed to originate from the territory of the former Somali re-
public (Prins 1952; Ogot 1976; Osogo 1968; Bonaya 1969). The Pokomo prac-
tice subsistence farming on an average farm size of 1.5 hectares per household. 
The crops grown include grains, mangoes, and bananas. Most farms are situated 
next to the River Tana and along the beds of the seasonal Rivers (lagas) where 
the farmers use residual moisture when the rain stops. Flood plains are also used 
as farming areas because of the fertility brought about by silting when the river 
floods. The farmers in the district live in clustered villages for security reasons 
(NES 1985).  
The Orma and Wardei 
The Orma is a sub-group of the Oromo linguistic group. The Oromo are made up 
of a number of various ethnic groups that live in Ethiopia, Kenya and parts of 
Somalia, such as the Gabra, Boorana, Waata, Burji, Guji, Arsi, Ittu, Karrayyu, 
Qottuu, Wollo, Rayya, Azebo, Macha and Tullama. The majority of these groups 
live in Ethiopia. They currently number 25-30 million (Kassam & Megerssa 
2002). The Oromo are mainly pastoralists. The Wardei is a Somali-speaking pas-
toral group. During this conflict they were allied to the Orma, but during other 
confrontations they are portrayed as Somali newcomers. The history of conflict 
and cultural differences shows no evidence of open interethnic integration be-
tween the Pokomo and the Orma, as the two groups have not been intermarrying. 
The main connector between the two groups is the market. Pokomo families have 
close ties to specific Orma and sometimes Wardei sales women, supplying them 
with milk. In return, the Pokomo supply the pastoralsist with grains.  
Pastoralism as defined by Cohen (1974) is a system of production devoted to 
gaining livelihood from the care of large herds of animals based on transhu-
mance. The Orma and Wardei like many pastoralists practice, mobility as an ad-
aptation strategy, in order to search for water and grass and to avoid the presence 
of raiders (Netting 1986). By the dry season pastoralists reside near permanent 
waterholes, where they build huts from reeds to allow air circulation in the heat 
of the day (Smith 1992). In the dry season, many pastoralists move to the Tana 
delta for pasture and water. 
Keeping large herds is an adaptation strategy. Netting (1986) argued that a 
man who loses one-third of his stock is much better off if he begins with sixty 
cows than with six. Distribution of herds over a vast territory through complex 
forms of lending and borrowing is another form of adaptation practiced by pas-
toralists (Moran 1982). An individual pastoralist may lend his animals to another 
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pastoralist who temporarily needs a greater number of animals. It is agreed that 
the lender will be paid back the equivalent of the animals at a later date. The 
Orma/Wardei pastoralists practice these adaptation strategies and other alterna-
tive livelihood strategies. 
In terms of alternative livelihood expansion strategies some pastoralists have 
started farming and small scale businesses as a way of supplementing livestock 
products (and a coping mechanism against droughts). Encouraged by a group of 
Wardei newcomers from Southern Somalia, some Orma and Wardei had em-
braced farming and were doing well. This was triggered by the need for an alter-
native livelihood system as well as the need to participate in “grabbing” land in 
anticipation of the process of the land adjudication that the Kenyan Survey was 
preparing, and which turned out to be one of the drivers of the conflict.  
The pastoralists in Tana River District are largely Muslims or traditionalists. 
The Pokomo farmers are both Muslims and Christians. However, there was no 
unity between the Muslim pastoralists and the Muslim Pokomo farmers – they 
attacked and killed each other. The Pokomo Christians turned to their Mijikenda 
cousins living in Kwale district for ‘help’. It is interesting to observe the critical 
role of rituals or traditional religion during conflicts, generally when Christianity 
seems to lack practical solutions. The normally faithful people turn towards ritu-
als that would otherwise be considered unchristian. The Pokomo traditional relig-
ion is almost non-existent and has been replaced by Islam and Christianity. 
However, during the conflict people sought help from the lexicographically 
closer group – the Mijikenda of Digo sub-ethnic group (the Digo people as an 
ethnic group are largely Muslims but they still maintain some aspects of tradi-
tional religion) from Kwale District, southern Coast. The Pokomo then got help 
from the kayas or traditional Mijikenda shrines. 
 
A history of conflicts  
The Pokomo and Orma/Wardei inhabitants of Tana River district have had per-
ennial conflict since time immemorial. Conflicts were usually caused by a com-
bination of factors. Economic competition triggered many, mainly when pas-
toralists allowed their animals to graze on planted farms, But environmental 
factors were also important, such as droughts that increased the movements of 
pastoralists from the hinterland to the riverine areas. British colonial intelligence 
reports reveal that the Pokomo and the Orma have had a long history of conflicts, 
partly because raids and conflict caused similar actions in revenge.  
The development of negotiating and conflict management institutions (such as 
the Gasa and Matadeda Council of Elders) as well as the developing role of 
more modern State actors shows that the daily sharing of resources and the con-
comitant competing claims between farmers and pastoralists were managed to a 
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certain extent, with some level of 
success. However, failures did oc-
cur and violence still erupted.  
The colonial government for in-
stance, designated water corridors 
for use by pastoralists during the 
dry seasons as means of managing 
persistent conflicts. Pastoralists 
were to strictly follow the desig-
nated routes leading to the water 
corridors. The Oromo and Somali 
had different water corridors to 
also manage conflict between the 
two groups.  
 
The Pokomo and Orma traditional conflict management mechanism 
The Pokomo and the Orma traditional governance structures are the Gasa and the 
Matadeda Pokomo and Orma Council of Elders respectively. The Gasa and 
Matadeda settled disputes when the need arose, ranging from civil to criminal 
cases which were referred to them, or when they felt necessary to intervene. They 
also maintained peace and order in the community. They were responsible for all 
the resources ranging from land to water and forests. They could deliberate on 
issues related to individuals, clans and inter-ethnic conflicts. The decisions taken 
within these structures were binding and respected in the past. However, today, 
traditional structures are weak mainly due to parallel State government interfer-
ence. 
When interethnic conflicts occurred in the past, elders from both communities 
would involve a neutral community – Msidhacha (ALRMP 2001). The parties to 
the conflict would convene, look into the causes of the conflict and where possi-
ble resolve it and then reconcile. The offender would be identified and fined. 
Thereafter a reconciliation ceremony would be conducted to make peace – Ibisa1. 
The ferocity and extent of the most recent flair up of inter-ethnic conflict in Tana 
River in 2001 provides clear evidence that it is no longer possible to entirely use 
traditional instruments of reconciliation to restore peace.  
 
Traditional rules of warfare 
According to focus group discussions and key informant interviews the Orma 
and Wardei pastoralists have the following rules of war: 
                                                 
1
  The traditional system of conflict resolution between the Orma/Wardei and the Pokomo. 
According to an Intelligent report [5
th
 January 
1950] from the District Commissioner’s Office 
(DC) Kipini, Tana River to the Provincial 
Commissioner (PC), Coast Province (KNA, 
1940-1950) it is reported that  
Fighting amounting to native war broke out on 
the 9
th
 and again on the 11
th
 (December 1949) 
between Oromo and Pokomo … One Pokomo 
man was killed; two Pokomo women and three 
Pokomo men were injured. One Oromo is be-
lieved to have been killed though the body has 
not yet been found and two Oromo women were 
injured … the initial blame lies clearly on the 
Oromo who begun the first attack.  
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1. Women, children, the very old and mad people are not to be killed or attacked and should 
not go to war. People who kill such people become Yakka or outcasts. Also it is believed 
that killing such people leads to bad luck during conflicts – such as defeat. 
2. Food stores and livestock were not to be destroyed or killed. 
3. Women should not be raped. Women and children may be captured. Women in captivity 
should not be “touched” until they are socialized into the community and then married off 
properly in the community. Alternatively, if they wish, they should be returned to their own 
communities after the conflict is over. 
4. In the process of spying or Doya, spies should not be killed. They should be taken to the 
Matadeda elders where they would be warned and released. 
5. People found worshipping should not be killed. 
6. Taking loot is acceptable.  
7. The Pokomo should be fought only with walking sticks and not the spear or a knife so that 
no blood is shed since they are weaker in strength and are like brothers.  
8. Fugitives even if they belong to the enemy camp should not be killed, but should be taken 
care of until it is peaceful for them to go to their land. 
The development of conflict culminating in outright violence described below 
may give reason to believe that there are many factors that motivate pastoralists 
to be in a state of preparedness for violent conflict as they try to guard their live-
lihood. 
The initial steps towards a new form of conflicts 
In December 2000 we find a new twist in the traditional conflict that shows the 
weakening of the traditional conflict management mechanisms; a violent gun 
conflict erupted after the introduction of a government activity to survey land for 
land adjudication for the people of Tana River. The Pokomo farmers were to get 
title deeds on their farmland. The land adjudication programme was embraced 
well by the Pokomo who saw it as a possible way to end the pastoralist-farmer 
conflicts. The Orma opposed the programme as they perceived it as a threat to 
their livelihood. It would threaten access to fall-back grazing areas and it was 
perceived as a program that would limit access to the Tana River waters. It is to 
be noted that the Pokomo farms are lined along river Tana, Thought there are 
designated water corridors these have not always been respected by both the 
Orma and “visiting pastoralists” such as some of the Somali speaking Wardei. 
This in turn led to livestock grazing into farms, causing damage to crops, which 
instilled resentment among the Pokomo. For this reason they welcomed the sur-
veying exercise, Initially it was reported that the Orma and Wardei communities 
feared that the land adjudication programme would close out the water corridors 
for their use (despite the presence of designated water corridors in place), and 
thus resisted the surveying forcefully, it was later on revealed that more and more 
pastoralists were also interested in riverine land to be able to farm there.  
The fact that the conflict was characterized by the use of small arms was a 
new development. Because of anarchy in southern Ethiopia – where their broth-
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ers across the border are waging a war against the Ethiopian government – and 
Somalia – where there has been no government to speak of since the fall of the 
Siad Barre Regime in the early 1990s – the residents of this area of Kenya as 
well as seasonal nomadic pastoralists who occasionally visit it have had easy ac-
cess to sophisticated and small arms. 
In their protest for the land adjudication programme the Orma and Wardei 
started by killing a Pokomo farmer who was clearing his farm and reinforcing his 
farm boundaries in Ngao village, Garsen division, on the 7
th
 March 2001 by a 
group of armed pastoralists. This happened as he was marking the boundaries of 
his farm ready for the land adjudication and registration exercise, which had be-
gun in the district. This first incident led to the deadly conflict which lasted until 
the end of election 2002.
2
  
It was reported that the Orma and Wardei sought help from their brothers in 
Somalia
3
 (UNOCHA 2001), and that as many as fifty militia had been recruited 
from neighbouring Somalia to assist the Orma and Wardei. The Pokomo on the 
other hand resorted to the use of “supernatural powers” – the Kaya Bombo as-
sisted by their Mijikenda ‘cousins’ in Kwale – and embarked on arming them-
selves with crude weapons such as machetes. By 2001, more than 130 people 
were killed. Table 8.1 shows an overview of incidents from 2000 to January 
2002. 
The media played a critical role in reporting conflicts in an otherwise lost part 
of Kenya where insecurity manifested by “shifta-banditry attacks” has been on-
going for years, illegal arms race by some so-called Shifta has been going on 
without so much of government action seen to curb the issue.  
Impact of the conflict 
Some general impacts of conflicts are dislocated valued relationships, and stress 
on structures on which relationships are based (Mwagiru 2000). Some scholars 
have argued that conflict can be beneficial too (Reuck 1984), but when conflicts 
turn out violent, the impact on society can be quite disruptive. In Tana, thousands 
of people fled their homesteads that were set on fire (see Table 8.2). 
 
 
                                                 
2
  The elections turned out be an important factor: would it be won by a Pokomo candidate, the 
conflict would see a break for the next five years; a subsequent loss would have meant that 
the conflict continued between the Pokomo and Orma. As 2002 elections neared it became 
obvious that whether a Pokomo or Orma candidate (MP) won or not, the Orma and Wardei 
conflict had ripened and no action was on-going to see its resolution.  
3
  UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) 30
th
 No-
vember 2001. 
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Table 8.1 Summary of conflict incidents reported in the media 
Period Incidents 
2000 Some 70 people have been killed over the last year (i.e. 2000) as a result of 
repeated clashes between the Pokomo and Ormas.
a
 
2001 “The bodies of at least 30 people killed in ethnic clashes in Kenya are  
reported to have been dumped in the River Tana. Kenyan television quoting 
local officials said armed gangs from pastoral Wardey community attacked 
members of the Pokomo community in the area.”b (BBC News, September  
19, 2001). 
18/11/2001 A total of 3400 displaced people,
c
 Ngao location (Tarasaa and Ngao). 
20-22/11/2001 19 killed, 20 seriously injured, some 600 pastoralists who had fled the area in 
search of greater security were also in danger of food shortages as they had 
been forced to move away from essential grazing lands, humanitarian sources 
told IRIN. “Everybody has run away from the place,” Murithi said.a  
4/12/2001 Over 1000 (at Catholic Church Tarasaa some report the figure to be 1200) 
Pokomo who lost their homes as a result of conflict with Orma wanted to sue 
government for compensation.
a 
 
Entire 2001 “Over 130 people have been killed in the (Tana River) district over the past 
year in violent clashes between the Pokomo and the Orma (IRIN, January 14, 
2002).
b 
 
14/1/2002 5 people killed, two injured.
d 
 
Notes: 
a) “KENYA: Tana River farmers claim compensation”, at http://www.irinnews.org/report. 
b) Armed Conflicts Report, Kenya (1991 – first combat deaths), update: January 2006. 
c) Kenya Humanitarian Update 11, 01-30 November 2001 at  
     http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/ 
d) Kenya Update: January 2006 – http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-
Kenya.html 
 
 
 
Table 8.2 Population of displaced people in Garsen division, Tana River District4 
Village Families Population 
Tarasaa 160 800 
Oda 178 1,276 
Lailoni 104 569 
Chamwanamuma 150 702 
Tara 10 58 
Total displaced 602 3,405 
Source: UNOCHA, Kenya Humanitarian, Update Issue 11, 01-30 November 2001 
 
                                                 
4
  The internally displaced person’s figures cited above are for the Pokomo farmers, the pastor-
alists were also displaced but they tended to move to places where Orma/Wardei outnum-
bered the Pokomo, for example most of the pastoralists moved to Oda when a total of 1276 
Pokomo left to the Catholic Mission at Tarasaa village. Oda as a village became an “IDP 
camp”. 
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The people, who were internally displaced, suffered badly, as reported by the 
nurse in charge of the Catholic Church dispensary at Tarasaa (where many Poko-
mo families had camped). She reportedly appealed to the government to send in 
medical supplies to combat diarrhoea and typhoid before the situation got out of 
hand as there were worries of impending deaths in the camp (Peacenet-Kenya 
2001). Further, pastoralists could not go to most of the hospitals to get medical 
care because the hospitals were situated in Pokomo areas. They felt insecure.  
Many of the 3,405 displaced persons urgently needed food aid, emergency 
healthcare, clothes and cooking utensils. By November 2001, UNOCHA esti-
mated that at least three months food rationing was needed for the populations of 
Chara, Ngao, Oda, Ozi and Kilelengwani locations, Garsen division, (UNOCHA, 
November 2001).  
Obtaining necessities was a great challenge; most of the people (46%) ob-
tained their necessities through moving in groups to farms, herding areas and 
trading centers for security reasons. The people also depended on relief aid (both 
food and non-food items) and ate wild foods too. In some cases government se-
curity personnel escorted the locals to their farms and shopping centres. In addi-
tion, the pastoralists slaughtered their animals for food. This showed the gravity 
of the situation, as usually they would depend on cow’s milk as a product for 
sale. This was one of the causes of the collapse of the food markets, causingaddi-
tional hardship. The market for cow’s milk is dependent on Pokomo farmers buy-
ing and selling grains in return, with terms of trade that would allow the 
pastoralists to survive. Since there was poor intercommunity relations during the 
conflict period; the Pokomo did not buy anything from the Orma and vice-versa, 
hence the markets collapsed.  
According to IRIN News (4 December 2001) over 1000 members of the Poko-
mo community who lost their homes as a result of violent clashes with Orma pas-
toralists were planning to sue the government for compensation. The government 
of the day was perceived by the Pokomo as unwilling or incapable of securing 
their safety. The Pokomo communities therefore took their sons to train in the 
Kaya Bombo, providing them with the skills of traditional fighting that has its 
roots in supernatural powers of the Digo Mijikenda people.
5
 This was done in an 
effort to create a force against the Orma and Wardei and to counter a ‘third force’ 
or what UNOCHA (November 2001) reported as 50 militia men recruited from 
neighboring Somali to support the Orma and Wardei. 
                                                 
5
  The Digo language has 58% lexical similarity with the Lower Pokomo language at the Tana 
Delta. See http://members.jcom.home.ne.jp/mi-hamamoto/research/mijikenda/Mij_language. 
html. 
178 Pilly Martin  
 
People were wounded (as shown in Photo 8.4) and killed. By the end of 2001 
it was estimated that over 130 people were killed in Tana River district in the 
violent conflict between the Pokomo and the Orma and Wardei (Ohlsson, ed., 
EDC news, 2001-2002). Livestock herding became a problem, the herders could 
not freely move around for fear that their animals would be attacked by Pokomo 
farmers. Houses (Photo 8.1) and manyattas (temporary shelters) were burned. 
Farms, manyattas (as shown in Photos 8.2 and 8.3) and sometimes the whole vil-
lages were abandoned. 
 
Insecurity 
In order to improve security in the area, the Kenyan government disarmed 638 
police reservists in the district, to strengthen relative peace that had returned to 
the area ‘after violent conflict between the two communities in November and 
December (UNOCHA 22-28 December 2001). Further, the government trans- 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 8.1 A burnt house at Tarasaa Photo 8.2 An abandoned manyatta  
  village  (temporary shelter) 
 
 
 
  
  Photo 8.3   Abandoned farms overgrown  
   with weeds 
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Photo 8.4 Youths wounded in the lower  Photo 8.5 A schoolboy from Golbanti  
 Tana Ngao village  village killed by raiders 
 
 
ferred some policemen to stations away from the conflict area. As they belonged 
to the two communities and served in the area, they were believed to have taken 
sides in the conflict (Ibid.). 
The government embarked on a disarmament process. The local District 
Commissioner (DC) at the time said 80 illegal guns suspected to have been used 
in the conflict had been recovered, the Standard reported (UNOCHA, 22-28 De-
cember 2001). 
The majority of the respondents (60%) reported that they were not safe when 
the government brought in security officers during the conflict. The reasons they 
gave were that the security officers harassed people and beat them up for no rea-
son. The security officers, it was claimed, embarked on their own parallel pro-
gram of sexual based violence by raping some women, and this only served to 
increase the fear of insecurity. The security officers were also accused of taking 
people to prison (as they conducted forceful disarmament) for having weapons in 
their possession, though many were legal tools such as machetes (panga) and 
spears,in this area quite ordinary agricultural tools. Communities reported that 
the security officers were few and lacked sophisticated weapons to deal with the 
‘raiders’. Lastly, the communities felt more insecure and vulnerable to further 
attacks when police reservists were disarmed as some community members had 
camped in the police reservist’s homes. 
Government security, informants claimed, was biased, and went to disarm 
only the Pokomo and not the other groups. They would also go to conflict areas 
too late after attacks had occurred. They were allegedly also involved in some of 
the village attacks, thus they formed an ‘external force’, and at some point people 
were puzzled as they did not know whether to trust them or not. It was also re-
ported that at other times they were “glued” at their stations most of the time and 
seemed undisturbed by what was happening in the areas under conflict. As a re-
sult, attacks still occurred despite the presence of security personnel (see Photo 
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8.4 for wounded youths in the Ngao village). The security officers seemingly 
were not confident about tackling attackers that were armed to the teeth. The 
same officers were said to be after money and looting. They were seen by local 
farmers as adding to the problem rather than solving it. 
 
Impact on education 
The indirect effects of conflict can also disrupt a society. Students could not con-
centrate in class because of the deaths of some of their schoolmates and relatives. 
They started to distrust each other since some of them were known to carry 
knives around the school compound. Some of the students, since they were a mi-
nority (Orma and Wardei) would leave the school compound during class breaks 
for fear of the majority of Pokomo students. This in turn frightened the Pokomo 
students, who thought they were planning to attack. The schools had turned into 
centres of fear and tension, they had to close early. The conflict in Tana River is 
one of the critical factors that contributed subsequently to poor performance of 
school children in the district.  
 
Cultural impact  
In Oda-Wachu location, at the Oda village, Orma and Wardei internally dis-
placed persons settled on Pokomo graveyards. This caused tension in itself, as 
the Pokomo claimed they had no place to bury their dead. The graves of the 
Pokomo generally are unmarked, and it may have been a lack of knowledge that 
led to the choice for the site, but it caused tension just the same. 
Observation of rules of war 
There was a general feeling among all respondents that this conflict was different 
in many ways from those of the past. This was also shown by the lack of adher-
ence to the traditional rules of engagement. During the most recent conflict, most 
of these rules of war seem not to have been observed. For instance, children were 
killed (Plate 5), women were wounded and killed, and food stores were de-
stroyed. The flouting of traditional rules of war and the fact that the police came 
to the scene as spectators instead of enforcers of new rules of law and order 
caused people to feel abandoned. On the one hand, newcomers and those who 
have acquired new weapons ignored traditional local mechanisms for conflict 
prevention, containment, and the restoration of peace. On the other hand, the mo-
nopoly of government over the use of force for the sake of peace and security 
cannot match the determination and firepower of the pastoralists. This situation 
put to question the government’s sincerity in the drama in the minds of the agri-
cultural Pokomo. They felt abandoned as a people, and the conflict obtained an 
additional ethnic dimension.  
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The Orma and Wardei were not happy that their traditional rules of war were 
being ignored during the conflict. Initially the Orma and Wardei who started the 
fight this time, only attacked the able men. They were bitter that Pokomo at-
tacked women. The Orma and Wardei then started attacking men, women and 
children. As the traditional balance was broken, the Pokomo, being not used to a 
full-fledged war, had to resort to ritualistic conflict assistance.  
 
Positive impact of the conflict 
One of the positive impacts of conflict was that the clans, usually divided, were 
united during the conflict period. The Pokomo peasant farmers are usually di-
vided and likewise the Orma and Wardei communities, such that when either of 
the groups is not conflicting with one common enemy they conflict internally. 
This is in line with the sociological hypothesis which suggests that conflict is not 
only negative in impact; it can have some positive functions. For example, the 
pastoralists, who had to pay a little fee to be ferried across the river by the 
Pokomo, have in some places managed to ferry themselves and have acquired 
their own canoes, and are presently able to cross the river without the monopolis-
tic assistance from the Pokomo. The Pokomo would never charge fees to their 
fellow Pokomo for crossing the river but would charge the Orma and Wardei 
pastoralists. This shows some institutionalized security measure taken or even 
some stereotyping that Orma and Wardei are hostile people and favours should 
not be accorded to them.  
Causes of the conflicts 
Of course, this conflict did not develop to the level of violence only because a 
land survey team appeared in the area. There are more fundamental reasons for 
the conflict, and we will discuss in more detail the process that lead to the situa-
tion described.  
 
Demise of rules to guide the use of resources 
In the past, during the dry season pastoralist groups were expected to ask for 
permission from the Pokomo farmers to use their land and water resources. Iden-
tified corridors were set aside to facilitate access to water and pasture and were 
not to be encroached by the farmers, since such areas were to be used whenever 
there was a need by the pastoralists. Further, pastoralists were only expected to 
use the accepted water corridors, because most of the farms were lined along the 
riverbank. This was therefore an institutionalized system by which people of dif-
ferent modes of livelihoods used the resources of the Tana River area with rela-
tive mutual consent, which created inter-group harmony. As we have seen, this 
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has changed as short cuts are taken by pastoral producers, and access is indeed 
threatened by the surveying exercise.  
In addition, pastoralists were to graze away from the farms and had to ask for 
permission from the owner of the farm to graze their animals on the farm after-
harvests. In case of crop damages caused by livestock, elders would decide 
whether the person grazing should be fined or forgiven. Pokomo farmers would 
be mostly forgiving when damage was done to avoid escalation of conflict, im-
position of fines was rare. Presently some of the farmers report crop damages to 
government authorities and pastoralists are fined. A much harsher stance is taken 
generally. 
However, though they are often seen as one category of people together with 
the Orma as pastoral people, the Wardei people are different. They generally do 
not seem to know the rules that guide the use of resources in the study area. They 
are aware that such rules used to exist in the past between the Orma and the 
Pokomo, but seem to have no knowledge of any rules presently being in use. 
Some of the Wardei pastoralists are newcomers in the district, and seen as visi-
tors of the Orma people from Somalia. Others have been in and out of the district 
because of conflict with the Orma over pasture resources. Although some Wardei 
speak the Somali language, they are originally Orma people who had been en-
slaved by the Somali and have become refugees in Kenya because of political 
instability in Somalia. Still, their regular revisits and their background has not 
given them an intimate knowledge of present-day rules on natural resource man-
agement. 
The rules of engagement no longer seem to be followed, and since Kenya's in-
dependence there have been too many pastoralist ‘visitors’ who do not follow 
these rules. These are pastoralists who do not normally reside in the area but 
come under the invitation and protection of the local Orma pastoralists. They are 
people who act in contempt of the Pokomo and whose herdsmen do not follow 
the designated corridors, thus destroying crops and attacking those who stand in 
their way. This makes the Pokomo wonder why these pastoralists behave in a 
war-like manner.  
 
Preparedness for war among pastoralists and farmers 
The causes of conflict are not simply related to resource scarcity, but causes of 
conflict not always lead to violence. Conditions must be met, and means avail-
able. According to the Akiwumi report (Republic of Kenya 1999) some cultural 
practices such as cattle rustling for example are meant to be a sign of bravery or 
an essential part of the initiation for boys into manhood. Often cattle rustling in-
volves violence for those who resist letting their livestock go. Therefore the pas-
 Conflicts between pastoralists and farmers in Tana River District 183 
 
toralist culture of cattle rustling enables pastoralists to be in a state of prepared-
ness for war; either waiting to be attacked or preparing to attack others. 
Another condition allowing for the war-like behaviour of these pastoralists is 
due to their exposure to sophisticated weapons. The seemingly unstoppable in-
flux of (small) firearms and ammunition into some regions of Kenya such as 
Tana River and the Northeastern province from neighbouring Ethiopia and So-
malia has increased banditry and made fighting almost a hobby by pastoralist 
groups according to the Akiwumi report (Ibid.). 
The belief by some pastoralists that they are the right owners of livestock or 
specific kinds of livestock for that matter justifies raiding and is a contributing 
factor to being “war-like” or in a state of preparedness for war; leading to con-
flicts with other herdsmen or farmers. Nunow (1994) argued that pastoralists are 
so dependent on livestock that they use any means available to access water and 
pasture for their livestock almost subordinating their own and other’s needs and 
welfare to those of their livestock. This allows for very little flexibility in the re-
lationships with sedentary farmers. 
It is often pertained that the harsh physical environment may have contributed 
to the pastoralists’ war-like nature as well. Pastoralists walk for long distances in 
bushy or desert-like areas and require arms and/or weapons for protection against 
enemies and wild animals. In order to be a successful herdsman therefore, one 
must be able to defend his animals as Netting (1986: 55) has argued: 
Since cattle are a volatile form of wealth, a man has the freedom to raise his status through 
initiative and skill. On the other hand he must be willing to defend his animals aggressively 
from predators and military raids to show fortitude and endurance when he meets with hard-
ship. 
The conditions for conflict are present at the other side as well; the Pokomo, in 
preparing themselves for resistance against the pastoralists have approached 
‘their cousins’ the Mijikenda people of Kwale district to help them fight the pas-
toralists through the use of ‘supernatural powers’. Young Pokomo men were 
trained in the bush using herbal medicine to also be mentally prepared to fight. It 
is interesting to note that the information was provided by an Orma key infor-
mant who said that the Pokomo are involved in what he called Kaya Bombo (this 
is the name of a Digo shrine). It is however notable that the Pokomo peasant 
farmers did not have easy access to modern sophisticated guns like the pastoral-
ists during the conflict described. Instead they used traditional weapons such as 
machetes which are still common amongst the Pokomo farmers. This is partly 
why the elders had to fall back on the use of supernatural powers and witchcraft 
as a means of countering the power of the gun. One can assert that if the conflict 
is not resolved or institutionalized in a manner tolerable to both sides the Pokomo 
will embark on the expensive (economically and in terms of human lives put at 
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risk) exercise of arming themselves with modern weaponry as has happened 
among the Marakwet in response to costly Pokot incursions into their territory 
(Kamenju et al. 2003). 
 
Other factors contributing to the conflict 
Conflicts at whatever level have many different causes (Mwagiru 2000). It can be 
argued that, the major cause of conflict, be it interpersonal, inter-communal or 
interstate is lack of fulfillment of needs and a clash over interests. Natural re-
sources of land form the most basic requirement in any social organization 
(Chisholm & Smith 1990). 
In the research area, the local population identifies a number of causes for the 
conflict. Mostly a fear by pastoralists of displacement due to land adjudication. 
The conflict was also caused by incitement by politicians in the period prior to 
the elections. More immediate causes are also mentioned. Grazing of livestock in 
planted farms is one such immediate cause. Similarly, land ownership creation 
and the creation of new administrative locations contributed to the conflict. Fur-
ther, closure of watering corridors for livestock, different uses of the same re-
sources all may have contributed to the conflict. Drought and the creation of new 
watering corridors is a cause of the conflict, as is the influx of 'visitors' and their 
animals into the district.  
The conflict, once started, was aggravated also by the violence itself. Wound-
ing and killing of livestock that damaged crops does not tally well with livestock 
owners. A general disregard of other people’s property (crops or livestock) in the 
view of the Pokomo angered them further. Further competition among pastoral-
ists for pasture and water also protracted the conflict. As a result, some of them 
were forced to migrate to other areas, conflicting with the people they encoun-
tered. Diversion of the River Tana’s water by pastoralists in Lower Tana through 
canals affected the flow of the river, affecting riverine farms and general liveli-
hoods which also led to conflict.  
 
Land adjudication 
Of course, a major trigger was the land adjudication procedure that was going to 
be implemented, and the creation of a new locational boundary, which could 
mean that ethnic identity and territory would be fixed. People, especially the pas-
toralists, felt threatened, and feared they would be locked out. 
Government had earlier on created locational boundaries, without considering 
ethnic groupings. That meaned that some of the locations where farmers lived 
were subdivided to include pastoralist areas, but the fact that an Orma name was 
given to a location made these pastoralists feel that they were now legally enti-
tled to possess their own location. They felt therefore it was justified to restrict 
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farmers from accessing their farms which were in the new “pastoralists’ loca-
tions”. 
For the Pokomo the names of the locations did not mean much; they are set-
tled people and they know their farms and villages and inter-village boundaries. 
For the nomadic Orma and Wardei having their own names meant having a spe-
cial attachment to the place. Owning that place, especially in the face of loosing 
areas elsewhere, made them keen to hold on to it. They regarded the new location 
as commons given to them by God (Allah). Similar conflicts arose between the 
Nuer pastoralists in Gambella Ethiopia and Anuak settled people who have seen 
pastoralists replacing Anuak names with their own names, and also between the 
Dinka and Shilluk in Malakal County. Pastoralists know nowadays the meaning 
of the unsaid rule “you either settle or lose the commons”.  
We discussed earlier the case of the Oda-Wachu area (initially called Furaha, 
but renamed by the Orma as Oda-Wachu), at the Oda village the Orma and 
Wardei internally displaced persons had settled on Pokomo graveyards. Here 
again we see the difference in perception of space and territory that contributed 
to misunderstanding and conflict. The Pokomo claimed that they had no place to 
bury their dead. Most of the graves they did have had not been built in a perma-
nent way; they were just mounds of sand, and the displaced pastoralist groups 
had resided near the graves. The Pokomo were therefore afraid to go and bury 
their dead because they had to pass by the newly erected manyatta or temporary 
housing of the pastoralists (who built on older graves which are unmarked. It is 
possible that the displaced pastoralists did not even know that they had settled on 
graveyards).  
External investments as threat 
In addition, the Tana Delta sugarcane (a controversial $370 million project) pro-
ject issue was pushed by the Member of Parliament in the area in a bid to in-
crease employment opportunities (about 20,000 jobs) to be created as a result of 
Mumias Sugar Company using 20,000 hectares of the Tana Delta land to plant 
sugarcane. The government was keen to start the industry Those who supported 
the project at national level argued that the industry would produce 150,000 ton-
nes of sugar, that the sugarcane plantation would therefore be good for all Ken-
yans, and that more sugar means more employment for all Kenyans and not just 
the Tana River people.  
The project was affecting (and was affected by) the conflict at different levels. 
At the general level, development versus traditional ways of nomadic pastoral-
ism, poverty alleviation versus environmental conservation, and plantation farm-
ing versus nomadism all played a role. Those who oppose the project at the 
national level such as local conservationists maintained that it would threaten 
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biodiversity and the livelihoods of local communities. Tana delta is home to over 
350 bird species, and is a large assemblage of globally threatened wildlife includ-
ing nine plants, five fish, two amphibians, two primates and two reptiles. The 
Orma and Wardei pastoral population was firmly against the plan, but many 
Pokomo who were strongly against the proposed development did not come out 
in the open, since it was the idea of the Member of Parliament who was a 
Pokomo.  
The majority of the Pokomo however trusted their Member of Parliament with 
the promise of employment, and yet there was no promise of adjudicating the 
land (be it ranches or farming land) that would have laid the foundation for com-
pensation of any land lost by them. Alternatively, land adjudication before the 
project would start would have given them the right to rent or sell it to the Sugar-
cane company if they so wished.  
The issues that the government needed to consider for both the Pokomo and 
Orma was the issue of entitlement of the land, proper compensation for the land 
and the provision of an alternative to the affected population. The Government 
however only saw an opportunity to access “free land”, much like what happened 
elsewhere in the Coast Province, where most land is “Trust land” and thus not 
legally owned by individuals, though used based on ancient use rights. The Gov-
ernment formally only recognized the legal implications, which with Trust land 
are very limited in their consequences. In reality, both farmers and pastoralists 
would be changed into squatters, indeed a common trend in coastal Kenya. Many 
indigenous coastal people have no idea or awareness that they need a piece of 
paper to prove that they are indigenous people who own the land. 
Some of the farmers did see that implication and their concern was that the 
project would take over the communal land that had not yet been adjudicated, 
with a high probability of not receiving any compensation for the land. They 
worried about how the government or TARDA (Tana and Athi River Devel-
opment Agency) and Mumias Sugar Company would acquire the land for the 
Sugar plantation. Pastoralists, who bring about 60,000 cattle from as far as the 
Somali and Ethiopian border regions to graze in the delta during the dry season 
were also angry. They disrupted public hearings on the project (The Guardian 
2008). 
Those who support the project at national level argue that the industry will 
produce 150,000 tonnes of sugar per hectare, that the sugarcane plantation is 
good for all Kenyans, and that more sugar means more employment for all 
Kenyans and not just the Tana River people. Those who oppose the project at the 
national level such as local conservationists oppose the proposal as it threatens 
biodiversity and the livelihoods of local communities. Tana delta is home to over 
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350 bird species, and is a large assemblage of globally threatened wildlife in-
cluding nine plants, five fish, two amphibians, two primates and two reptiles.  
 
Broken alliances 
As the tension rose, and increasingly the Orma felt the newly introduced Wardei, 
unfamiliar with the existing local rules, threatened the status quo between the 
Pokomo and Orma with their selfish behaviour in relation to the short cuts they 
made for the watering of animals, and with damaging the standing crops of the 
Pokomo. When an alliance is broken, tensions and sometimes feelings of betrayal 
emerge. After the Orma blamed the Wardei on many occasions as the conflict 
drivers in the Tana River conflict due to internal tensions between the two 
groups, violent conflict erupted between the two groups. The trigger of the con-
flict was the felt need for government representation by the Wardei. They felt 
that the Orma were using them to fight their own wars, and were upset that they 
threatened some of the Wardei that if they did not cooperate they would expose 
the fact that they came from Somalia, fuelling the government anti-terrorist pol-
icy and encampment policy (of all refugees). The Wardei decided to appease 
their ‘hosts’ the Orma for fear of being exposed. The Orma then blamed the 
Wardei for the farmer-pastoralist conflict with the Pokomo. When the Wardei 
saw the balance of power tilting against them, they acted fast, by creating friend-
ship with the Pokomo farmers to save themselves. They decided that during elec-
tions (2002 as well as 2007), they would have their own candidate for the 
Member of Parliament seat and would not support an Orma candidate. The 
Pokomo leaders saw an opportunity to divide the pastoralist vote and an opportu-
nity to win the elections, not having the majority vote in the area. This shows that 
alliances are dynamic and change all the time, interests and needs are at the heart 
of many conflicts. 
Conflict management 
Conflicts can be managed in different ways depending on the parties involved, 
and the type of conflicts experienced. In the Tana conflict, seminars, workshops 
and open-air meetings (baraza) have been arranged in an attempt to manage the 
conflict. All in all good leadership is an indispensable factor in conflict manage-
ment. Many strategies were tried. 
 
Organizations/institutions involved in managing the conflict in Tana River 
The more formal organizations and institutions that were involved in conflict 
management during the period of uneasy calm were numerous. The list included 
the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya, World vision, The Red Cross So-
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ciety, the various Council of Elders, Arid Lands Resource and Management Pro-
gramme (in conjunction with Oxfam). 
This high profile involvement did not have the expected impact however, 
Many local people saw no positive signs of achieving sustainable peace. Partly 
this was because the meetings took place outside the actual area of conflict, and 
people tended to get suspicious of peace meetings taking place outside the dis-
trict. The above mentioned NGOs were seen to select people of their own choice, 
and these were considered as poor representatives of the community for such an 
important task. The local people felt that the traditional Council of Elders would 
have been the best representatives as they are traditionally responsible for resolv-
ing conflicts in the community. Though they were involved (see below), they did 
not participate as representatives. Still, some success was achieved, if only be-
cause it was felt that the fighting had exhausted the parties involved. The loss to 
all parties was coming to be felt. 
 
Local solutions in conflict management 
The involvement of external parties did not contribute much to solving the prob-
lems, and perhaps they should have listened more to the local population. A 
number of ideas circulated and could have been tried. One solution was seen to 
be for farmers to press for the land adjudication process to continue. This could 
have at least safeguarded their and the Orma’s right to ownership and access to 
land. Another suggestion was for the pastoralists to  graze their animals in the 
hinterland away from agricultural areas, and in case of droughts to monitor the 
animals very closely when they were moved close to agricultural areas. The ma-
jor role proposed for the government was that the land adjudication programme 
should be made a reality in order to end the conflict between the farmers and pas-
toralists. It was seen (mostly by Pokomo farmers) as a programme that would le-
gally prevent pastoralists to graze livestock on planted farms. Above all, the 
government should have improved security in the area. 
 
Solutions contributed to the conflict by the Tana River Gasa elders 
According to a report made by the Gasa (August, 2001); for the conflict to be 
managed the killers should be brought to book. In addition, the government 
should not deny the farmers, land registration because the issue has led to con-
flict, while ranches have been registered and title deeds issued to the pastoralists. 
The Pokomo occupy only 10% of the land in the district. Elders felt that it would 
be unfair to deny them this small percentage; hence the land adjudication should 
be continued in order to establish secure boundaries for the farmers. 
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Possible solutions of the conflict obtained from participants of a workshop 
The above solutions all strike us as quite short-term, and therefore very valuable 
to quickly stop the conflict. More long-term solutions came from a report pre-
pared by Arid Lands Resource Management Project (ALRMP 2001). It suggested 
that traditional structures could be strengthened through for instance, conducting 
of peace ceremonies such as “Ibisa”. After conflicts occur, these ensure recon-
ciliation. Land could be adjudicated to fit the needs of the conflicting groups for 
farming and grazing. In relation to that, at least two water corridors or malka 
should be availed in every location for the pastoralists to water their animals. 
According to a Peace and Reconciliation Workshop for Councilors (by Caritas 
Malindi Development Office, February 2002) on the land adjudication issue, 
there could have been more involvement of community members so that both 
farmers and pastoralists would have known what was at stake. At present, theye 
were not very well informed. That process could have been more geared towards 
local cultural and traditional institutions as well. In addition, the involvement of 
the community elders proved crucial. 
To deal with poor inter-community relations, it was put forward that conflict 
occurring in one area should not spread over the entire district because of ethnic 
reasons. Also, communities should respect each other’s culture and lifestyles. 
Further, people should form a spirit of apology and forgiveness and finally that 
Tana River residents should have a common understanding towards visitors
6
 in 
the district, who should be vetted and monitored by the Provincial Admini-
stration to avoid security risks associated with their presence. 
 
Solutions contributed by the Orma and Wardei pastoralists 
The above solutions have a clear background: They coame from Pokomo farmer 
communities and external organisations mostly. The Orma and Wardei had their 
own interpretation of solutions. Riverine land should not be registered according 
to Pokomo customs alone, but the government should also consider traditional 
ways of land-use among the pastoralists. This is because the pastoralists have 
found the hinterland not productive for those who want to farm or are already 
practicing agro-pastoralism. Thus, the pastoralists in Tana River wanted to share 
the riverine land with the farmers. The pastoralists also wanted to be educated on 
the land adjudication process, so that they would have known what was at stake 
for them before the programme would have been implemented. 
 
                                                 
6
  Visitors here are nomadic pastoralists from other districts or countries such as Somalia and 
Ethiopia, as has been discussed. The visitors may also be self-settled refugees who ran away 
from their countries’ of origin together with their livestock. 
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Traditional method of conflict resolution 
As refered to already above, when the Pokomo farmers conflicted with the Orma 
(not the Wardei) pastoralists in the past, they would perform a ceremony called 
‘ibisa’, usually done in the area worst hit by the conflict and therefore always 
done in the Pokomo villages. The pastoralists would provide a bull and the farm-
ers their products, usually rice. People would discuss about the causes of the con-
flict and the perpetrators of violence. A prayer would be done, and anybody who 
would initiate the conflict afresh would be cursed such that bad luck would befall 
him and his entire family. According to Kamenju et al. (2003: 45): 
Unrestrained conflict escalation (involving pastoral groups) which have become quite com-
mon in Kenya, is therefore a sign of the elders’ inability to exercise their institutional role of 
conflict management and a creeping feeling of neglect by the government so much so that 
they also feel victimized. 
Conclusion 
It is clear that conflict between the two communities arose from a combination of 
factors, and was triggered by a number of occurrences: Lack of institutionalized 
channels of communications over problems that are bound to occur (grazing on 
planted farms and trespassing when watering the animals, closure of watering 
corridors (malka), etc.), contempt for each other through the process itself and for 
immigrants who do not know the rules, competition for resources and govern-
ment action at various levels that threatened to restrict access to them (as in crea-
tion of new boundaries without taking into account the local people’s opinions 
and feelings, incitement by politicians during election campaigns, and the intro-
duction of new land uses with powerful private interests). 
Tana River being an arid and semiarid district and thus has limited resources, 
in most policy circles, an important source of conflicts is the different use of the 
same resources by the pastoral Orma and Wardei and the agricultural Pokomo. 
On this point, a number of recommendations suggest themselves. Ideally, a 
freeze on the introduction of new forms of land use should be considered. With 
the scarce resources, a 20,000 ha sugar cane plantation will severely curtail 
breathing space of the local population. Second, it seems that with the full in-
volvement of local groups, a recognition and inventory of land use traditions and 
rights is necessary. Subsequently, pastoralists in particular but also cultivators 
should be educated on the land adjudication issue, and how that affects their 
rights. Any cooperation need in future on resource use needs to be institutional-
ized in rights mutually recognized. With regard to malka the government, in co-
operation again with the local land users should demarcate the existing watering 
points and maintain them, and where possible fence them to avoid trespass. New 
locations created should be revoked and the old ones to remain as before.  
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The above would prevent the reduction of the extent of existing resources. In 
addition, one could consider the improvement and extension of presently rare re-
sources, such as dry-season grazing. There are no proper drought coping mech-
anisms. This and scarcity in general could be tackled by using surface run off 
through seasonal rivers. Instead of letting it drain into the ocean, the water could 
be dammed for irrigation of crops and grassland and livestock watering. This will 
allow the pastoralist groups to both maintain herds and start cultivation, which 
has started now in the presently limited riverine areas. Finally there could be 
some form of monitoring of movements of visiting pastoralists from neighboring 
districts or countries. If they should cross international borders for grazing and 
watering purposes, they should be disarmed first. This is to ensure that local peo-
ple are secure. 
With regard to conflict management it is recommended that the government 
should as a matter of priority establish quality security services. A barracks in 
Tana River can be considered with regard to its strategic position to neighbouring 
unstable countries such as Somalia and Ethiopia. However, these security forces 
should be very closely monitored in their behavior in view of allegations voiced 
earlier and described above. Internally, the provincial administration should in-
voke both the modern security arrangements and traditional arbitration mecha-
nisms. 
The results of the study shows that, there is no intergroup, intercultural com-
munication between the Orma and Wardei and the Pokomo due to institutional-
ized conflicts and contradictions based on mode of livelihood, stereotypes and 
ultimately social segregation. This could be addressed more. In addition, there is 
a great need for proper policies on land in Tana River district taking into consid-
eration the traditional ways of land-use and ownership in which both the pastoral 
and agricultural communities are stakeholders. Concerning feuding communities 
that depend on each other for their livelihood, Gluckman (1956) states that it is 
essential for these various groups to be on some sort of friendly terms with one 
another, if they are to maintain their cattle (crops) and themselves alive. He per-
tains that ecological necessities force people to cooperate. 
There have been long periods of peace in the district, when mutual agreements 
on resource use has facilitated both groups to acquire a living. Now, human suf-
fering has already occurred in the district, as a consequence of the conflict and a 
fragile peace exists. The root causes of the conflict as seen in this study are com-
plex and intertwined bringing together ownership and use of natural resources of 
land, water and pasture and the differences in views on these issues between local 
populations and national government and private interests. If these are not at-
tended to as a matter of priority and in a way that would lead to the resolution of 
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the conflict and a positive conflict transformation then there will be no doubt that 
the existing peace will suffer unbearable strains. 
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A number of studies have looked at the convergence of economic, political and 
ecological marginality in several African countries. Yet, case studies focusing on 
livelihood and natural resources could inform us about violent behaviour as collec-
tive action or as individual decisions, and to what extent such decisions are in-
formed or explained by local institutions or specific climatic conditions. Indeed, 
several case studies have shown that violence is an enacted behaviour, rooted in 
culture and an accepted form of interaction. This chapter discusses the relevance of 
climatic parameters in explaining the connection between human population, natu-
ral resource-base and conflicts in Kenya’s pastoral areas. These issues are consid-
ered vis-a`-vis the role institutional arrangements play in preventing violent con-
flict over natural resources from occurring or getting out of hand. The paper uses 
historical records, archival information and a number of fieldwork notes. This 
chapter presents the case of the Loita forest and shows that traditional and intro-
duced institutions can moderate resource conflicts. In this case, a multi-level quali-
tative analysis gives insight in how external actors’ resource monopolisation can 
even be withstood on the basis of such a combined institutional framework.  
Natural resource wealth, climate change and violent conflict  
This chapter deals with the increasing tension between forest users within a con-
text of growing populations. The case described is that of Narok District, Kenya, 
where rapid transformation of land use is taking place from traditional pasture 
land to commercial wheat production, small scale agriculture, and the potential 
withdrawal of forest (dry-season grazing) resources for pastoral use to forest con-
                                                 
1
  This chapter is based on an earlier paper for the Special Issue of the Journal for Peace Re-
search which was published in early 2012.  
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servation and tourism development. According to mainstream explanations of 
environmental stress and conflicts, there is a causal relationship between declines 
in the availability of environmental resources and increasing occurrence of vio-
lent conflict over these resources (Homer-Dixon 1999; Kahl 2006). This would 
mean that a certain determinism is supposed between scarcity and conflict rather 
than between scarcity and institutional management of the access to scarce re-
sources. There are however divergent views about the connection between scar-
city and conflict, indicating the complexity of issues, and how they have been 
taken up in the academic debate (Homer-Dixon 1999; Collier & Hoeffler 1998; 
De Soysa 2002; Mehlum et al. 2006; Gleditsch 1998). When we do find cases in 
which this causal linkage does not materialise, we should reconsider the case for 
processes that foster cooperation over resources rather than conflict (see for in-
stance Buhaug et al. 2008). 
This debate is relevant in the context of the increasing attention for the poten-
tial role of drylands in Africa for future food production and the production of 
biofuels rather than for livestock production. Large tracts of land are being taken 
over by farmers for the large scale production of these commodities, though 
small scale farmers are also encroaching into the better endowed areas, effec-
tively blocking off the use of the dryer areas around them. Peri-urban uses of 
land are also on the rise, such as the establishment of schools and universities, 
flower farms and chicken production. Thus, the demand side of the equation 
shows that increasing tension could well result.  
On the other hand, there are climatic trends that cause reduced quality and 
quantity of grazing resources. This is the supply side of the equation, and one 
that could have potentially devastating effects if not addressed urgently.  
The UNDP’s Human Development Report 2007/2008 emphasised the conse-
quences of climate change for human security (UNDP 2007; IPCC 2007) rather 
than considering it as an environmental issue exclusively. Africa is considered a 
continent with climate-dependent economic sectors at risk of violent conflict 
(Kahl 2006; Carius 2009). Climate change evidence for Africa suggests increas-
ing scarcity of water resources in many dryland areas, and declining and failing 
agricultural yields in the Horn of Africa especially (OECD 2008). This trend is 
clearly expressing itself now, as a new wave of food shortages is devastating the 
people in the Horn. Political-ethnic factors have further exacerbated this problem.  
Others have argued that water (rather than food) scarcity will create violent 
conflict. Burke et al. (2009) have found correlations between changes in tem-
perature or high levels of variability in rainfall and the likelihood of violent con-
flict events in Africa. Kenya and Tanzania have recently experienced drying up 
of lakes and rivers, dwindling water supplies, food shortages and electricity 
shortfalls; a typical situation where we would expect environmental resources-
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induced conflicts (Kahl 2006). To date, these have not materialised, and one 
could wonder whether the institutional framework, including that of the well-
developed civil societies in these countries, has contained the situation.  
The changes in rainfall patterns and frequent droughts make the survival of 
pastoralist in arid environments particularly difficult (Boko et al. 2007). The tim-
ing of the start of the rainy seasons has become less predictable and the differ-
ence between a good year and a total failure in terms of rainfall is narrow. 
Cyclical droughts are increasing in frequency, with the drought cycle, on aver-
age, increasing from one in eight years to one every three years.  
At the same time, conflicts between pastoral communities in the arid border-
lands of northern Kenya, southern Sudan and southern Ethiopia are more numer-
ous, the consent in mainstream thinking being that these conflicts are over access 
to pasture and water, livestock and small arms (Leff 2009). The fighting between 
pastoralists and farmers in the Oromia and Ogaden regions of Ethiopia, and inter-
clan fighting in Somalia all seemingly indicate the links between the human im-
pacts of climate change and the threats of violent conflicts (Human Impact Re-
port 2009). The Horn of Africa, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia have suffered 
more drought-related deaths (estimated at 600,000) over the last century than any 
other part of Africa. The Darfur case, where conflict has been going on for al-
most a decade (Kevane & Gray 2008), also seems to imply a causal relationship 
between climate change and violent conflict over resources.  
In this tradition, many studies have extrapolated the trends and come with 
cataclysmic predictions. Lobell et al. (2008) for example predict a 54% increase 
in armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa by 2030 compared to the 1980 to 2000 
period. Burke et al. (2009) support this and state that there are strong historical 
linkages between civil war and temperature increases in Africa.  
However, not everyone is convinced that scarcity and conflict are causally re-
lated in such a straightforward fashion. Burke et al.’s claims were later refuted by 
Buhaug, who shows that, using a more accurate method of investigation and by 
making use of a more complete dataset, there is no causal relationship (Buhaug 
2010a, 2010b). Witsenburg & Adano (2007, 2009) have also shown that more 
subtle processes are at work, actually contrary to the trends implied in main-
stream thinking. Rather, the risk of increased conflict trends in Africa is likely to 
be a result of many complex reasons, including inadequate governance, uncon-
trolled corruption, heavy dependence on and conflict over mineral rather than 
natural resources and the impact of previous cycles of violent conflict. Some 
scholars have argued that climate change will not change the current security 
situation in Africa much since the existing socio-political structures are already 
prone to violent conflict (Halden 2007; Olsson et al. 2005; Schlenker & Lobell 
2010). Natural resources may seem the natural cause, but conflict may also be 
 Resource conflicts, governance and ethnicity 197 
 
triggered by the absence of good institutions and by external interference. It 
would therefore perhaps be better to say that in combination with economic, so-
cial and political uncertainties, climate change might increase the risks of conflict 
and instability, especially under conditions of poor governance. Buhaug et al. 
(2008) give an overview of multiple factors that may play a role in the evolution 
of climate change-related violence, yet emphasize that there is no up-to-date em-
pirical statistical evidence of violence directly related to climate change and envi-
ronmental scarcities. 
The actual impacts of climate change will remain controversial and specula-
tive. One idea is that common pool resources, a characteristic of most dryland 
grazing areas, lack rigorous and controllable governance systems. According to 
Ostrom (1990) and Young (2011), however, natural resources, including com-
mon pool resources such as forests, grazing pastures and fisheries, are at times 
better managed collectively than privately. Ostrom (1990) explains that self-
governing institutions under common property rights are able to regulate many 
resources for collective benefits, as people learn to cooperate when presented 
with a resource problem. In this regard, institutions subsequently could become a 
decisive variable in shaping human-environment interaction, and in preventing 
competition over resources turning into a violent conflict (Mehlum et al. 2006; 
Ostrom 2007; Young 2011). A continuation from resource management to con-
flict management seems more logical than a sudden breakdown of resource man-
agement into uncontrolled conflict and violence. The question whether resource 
scarcity brings about (violent) conflict or will generate modifications to institu-
tions that subsequently moderate these potential conflicts is the subject in this 
chapter. It shows the outcome of an enquiry into the relationship between popula-
tion growth, climate change, and reduced natural resources availability, and the 
result of continued and improved social and politico-institutional interactions be-
tween ethnic groups in a particular environment.  
The case concerns the Loita forest in southern Kenya. Though severely con-
tested, Loita forest turned out not to be a resource curse,
2
 because through the use 
of old and new institutions the loss of the forest to a private ‘developer’ was 
avoided. The benefits from the communally used forest remained well distributed 
among the local community. The area was and is now still one of the few natural 
forests remaining in Kenya, and least disturbed by land use changes (Nyariki et 
al. 2009) (Map 9.1). 
                                                 
2
  Popularly, the ‘resource curse’ refers to a phenomenon where countries, regions or areas 
with an abundance of natural resources tend to show less economic growth and worse devel-
opment outcomes than countries with fewer natural resources (Collier & Hoeffler 1998; 
Sachs & Warner 2001). In this chapter it refers to a situation where resource rich areas have 
a high chance of (violent) conflicts.  
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  Map 9.1 Location of Narok District and Loita Forest in Kenya 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This Loita Forest case brings to light a pluralistic (i.e. use of traditional and 
‘official’) form of resource regulation and access rights through collective or-
ganization of certain Maasai sub-groups. These sub-groups make ingenious use 
of common-pool resource institutions and legal courts concurrently to peacefully 
settle differences over common property resources, despite increasing pressure 
on these resources due to changing climatic conditions. This result links up with 
other studies (Ostrom 1990; Anderies et al. 2004; Mehlum et al. 2006) that find 
the role of local institutions crucial to resource management, avoiding a potential 
resource curse and instead turning it into a blessing.  
Ingenuity in social institutions moderating  
interethnic conflict over key resources  
The contested resource is the Loita Naimina Enkiyio Forest (LNEF or Loita for-
est hereafter), a source of water, dry-season grazing area and natural forest on the 
edge of the Great Rift Valley. The forest is used by the Loita Maasai, but coveted 
by the Purko Maasai, living to the North but still inside Narok District. This case 
seemed to be exemplary of many similar cases in Kenya over the last few dec-
ades, where ethnic groups or sub-ethnic groups compete or sometimes fight over 
key resources for access, use of revenues or claims over ownership rights. Water 
resources and dry-season grazing in pastoral areas are often seen as the natural 
capitals triggering conflict when issues of access, usage rights and ownership are 
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at stake. However, as we will see, the situation was slightly more complicated 
and pointed at quite different levels at which the conflict started from.  
Due to its character, size and fixed location, and given the context of the Ken-
yan economy and political constellation, the Loita forest is also a resource that 
national actors are focusing on. Not only the ethnic groups, but also their minis-
ters and even outsiders (private investors in the tourism sector for example, the 
most important economic sector in Kenya at the moment) wanted access for per-
sonal wealth. These two conflicts merged, and we describe the process chrono-
logically.  
The context is typical for Kenya and many other countries in Africa. The Ken-
yan population has increased rapidly, from 10.9 million people in 1969 to 38.6 
million in 2009 (KNBS 2010) and shows no sign of reaching a stable number 
anytime soon. In Narok District, population growth has been even more rapid, 
with about a seven-fold increase over the same period. Already among the most 
densely populated semi-arid areas of Kenya, the pressure on land in Narok Dis-
trict has increased further with commercial wheat production taking large tracts 
of land away from use by pastoral producers (Serneels & Lambin 2001).  
Figure 9.1 shows the result in terms of number of inhabitants of Narok Dis-
trict. An increasing part of the growing population is not Maasai by origin, and 
new groups appeared through in-migration. These are powerful in number and 
thus in political clout. They have influenced patterns of access to resources laid 
down in rules of access as determined by earlier judicial processes and present 
political pressures. 
 
 
Figure 9.1 Population growth and exponential best-fit trend line in  
 Narok District, 1948-2010 
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Source: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) (2010). 
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Population growth in Narok District clearly shows no sign of abating. Mi-
grants settle in the dryland in the towns and around the arable farms as labourers. 
Even when the Maasai themselves do not grow rapidly in number, the pressure 
on grazing resources of their herds increase due to the limits now imposed on 
grazing movements and fall-back areas around wetlands and water resources.  
This area has also seen an influx of Maasai from more northerly regions in the 
early years of the last century (Rutten 1992). In two moves, Maasai from the 
‘White highlands’ were deported after an agreement had been reached between 
the leaders at that time and the colonial government to present-day Narok and 
Kajiado Districts. Though this hardly mattered in terms of population pressure, it 
did bring the various groups of Maasai more closely together, and started the 
situation of close proximity of Purko and Loita Maasai and their continued en-
croachment on each other’s land, in particular the slow movement of the Purko 
Maasai towards the wetter Loita Hills. 
In addition and more recently, climate change seems to have begun impacting 
the wider region too, and long-term rainfall figures show a decline in the western 
part of Kenya in the 1970s, which is supported by (still scanty) data on precipita-
tion in Narok and nearby Kajiado Districts for this period. Droughts became 
lengthier, the rainfall within the rainy season more variable. However, rainfall 
seems not to have declined in the long-term thought the unreliability has re-
mained. Figure 9.2 shows an initial rapid decline, but a clear increase in rainfall 
particularly in recent years in Narok District. Apart from the unreliability, the 
temperatures have increased, and subsequently evapotranspiration as well, so that 
despite increased rainfall, the moisture balance remains in deficit.  
 
 
Figure 9.2 Annual rainfall and three-year moving average trend line in  
 Narok District (mm) 
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Source: GoK (2004, 2005, 2006) and Ottichilo et al. (2000: 277).  
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Loita forest is a fall-back area for the Loita Maasai and the neighbouring 
Purko alike and is therefore increasingly important for the survival of the pastoral 
production system. As a consequence, there is a slow migratory movement with-
in the District towards the forest. Therefore, this case also provides a long-term 
perspective on scarcity due to population growth, climate change and relative re-
source scarcity. 
Loita forest is set between the Nguruman-Magadi escarpment bordering Ka-
jiado District to the east, the Osupuko Oirobi (Purko Maasai land) to the north, 
the border of Tanzania to the south (though it extends into Tanzania for another 
25 kilometres or so, mostly in the valleys of the hills to the south) and the range-
lands towards the Maasai Mara National Game Reserve, the most famous tourist 
destination in Kenya, to the west. The Loita Maasai area encompasses a variety 
of ecosystems, of which the grasslands at lower altitudes and the Loita forest at a 
higher altitudes form dominant features. The forest is one of the few un-gazetted 
(i.e. with no legal restrictions of local access) and largely undisturbed indigenous 
forests in Kenya (Njogu 2004). The Loita Hills, with the Loita forest covering 
them are the main water catchments for the surrounding lowlands. The forested 
highlands receive, on average, an annual rainfall of between 700 and 1,200 mm, 
while rainfall in the surrounding lower rangelands is at 600-700 mm. The wet-
land areas and, during extreme droughts, the up-land semi-deciduous and mixed 
species forests form the ultimate fall-back grazing areas (Musyoka 1999; Dietz 
1996). During the extreme drought of 2005-2006, almost all Loita Maasai herds 
were grazed within the forest.  
The Loita Maasai community has an indigenous tenure system that gives use 
rights over natural resources to various groups in and outside of the community. 
There are certain resource types and uses that are strictly controlled, while other 
resources are more freely accessible. For example, the forest has considerable 
spiritual and emotional value. Many transition rites and other important rituals 
and ceremonies take place in the forest, such as the age-set initiation and clean-
sing rituals and fertility blessings for women who are unable to give birth 
(Maundu et al. 2001). Because of all these usage practices, the Loita community 
sees the spiritual leader, the Laibon, who performs his ritual duties at specific sa-
cred sites in the forest, as the custodian of the forest. He is central to forest con-
servation. The Laibonok (plural for Laibon) have unlimited rights and access to 
the forest to provide divine services to the wider Maasai society rather than for 
their own private gains (Karanja et al. 2002).  
The Loita community shares the grazing land with the neighbouring Purko 
Maasai community and the Loita Maasai of Tanzania. As long as the boundaries 
of the territories are undisputed and resource use is mediated and regulated by 
customary laws, the sharing of seasonal pastures by the different Maasai sections 
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poses no threat to any section. It is a reciprocal right used during emergencies 
and regulated by customary laws. In this case and depending on the season, the 
Laibon and the herders have overlapping rights to use the forest, for cultural 
ceremonies and grazing respectively (Ole Siloma & Zaal 2005). 
However, Purko Maasai have been migrating towards the Loita highlands for 
many decades now, starting early in the colonial period as part of early 20
th
 cen-
tury upheavals.
3
 The Purko population being more numerous and living in slight-
ly dryer areas of Narok had been invading the forest and Loita area. Over the 
years, the valleys leading into the forest were slowly being occupied by Purko 
Maasai. This slow intrusion into Loita Maasai ancestral lands and into the forest 
is resented by the Loita Maasai who are frequently in conflict with the Purko mi-
grants over illegal use of the forest, such as charcoal burning and timber produc-
tion. The relationship between these two groups has been ‘not cordial’ to quote 
an interviewee. Yet, the Purko Maasai maintain that as long-time residents they 
have the right to use the forest, especially when they claim access on the basis of 
belonging to similar clans, as mutually exist within both the Loita and Purko 
Maasai communities. 
 
Collective rights versus rent-seeking behaviour over the Loita Forest 
The Loita forest is located on land, entrusted to the local County Council of 
Narok (Maundu et al. 2001) and managed in accordance with the Trust Land Act 
(Cap. 288 of the Laws of Kenya). The potential of the forest as a conservation 
area and tourist site has been a source of conflict among the different interest 
groups; notably the local community and the County Council. The local balance 
of power became complicated when one of the most prominent leaders of the 
Purko Maasai, a Minister in the Kenyan Cabinet, tried to generate support among 
local elected leaders (Councillors of the various Divisions of Narok District of 
which Loita Division is only one) to gazette the forest (i.e. restrict local access) 
and turn it into a forest reserve and national park. This would have expelled the 
present local users from the forest and would have allowed a few entrepreneurs 
to build lodges and generate private and public revenues from tourism. The Min-
ister had a number of lodges in the neighbouring Maasai Mara District, and thus 
clearly had the business experience and opportunity to take over the forest and 
build tourist facilities there.  
                                                 
3
  The pressure on Narok and Kajiado Districts grazing resources had increased considerably 
due to the displacement, in two successive moves, of the Maasai community from the Cen-
tral Kenyan Highlands such as Laikipia, when white ranchers, supported by the Colonial 
Government, appropriated these areas. Within a decade, the population in Narok and Kajiado 
Districts almost doubled; see above in the text.  
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The Purko Minister had allied himself with a Loita Member of Parliament and 
a Loita councillor. The three men seemed to have agreed that the Loita forest was 
to be demarcated for gazettement, and the councillor drafted a letter incorrectly 
writing that the Loita people agreed to the gazettement decision. The intention to 
gazette the forest was communicated to the Minister for Environment.
4
 This min-
ister himself had earlier benefited from a similar procedure, when a neighbouring 
group ranch had been demarcated and leased to him when he was still a Member 
of Parliament for the neighbouring constituency.  
However, resistance began to build up, and the director of a regional develop-
ment project, the Ilkerin Loita Integrated Development Project (ILIDP),
5
 called a 
meeting of the Loita Council of Elders (LCE). The LCE had been installed earlier 
with the assistance from the ILIDP project to organize the community. The LCE 
was constituted with the intention to have a broad representation of the popula-
tion in the council. The formation of the council was an important part of the in-
tervention strategy of the ILIDP, and did ultimately lead to more relevant project 
work. Now, however, it also linked the population that started to resist the gazet-
tement with the ILIDP, the senior elders, the elected councillors, the Laibon, the 
development officers in the government, and some women and youth groups. 
Some of the LCE members were also on the Board of ILIDP, for example. The 
Narok County Council (NCC) was acknowledged at the time as being entirely 
justified in managing the forest and deciding on its future use, as the Council 
kept all un-demarcated and un-gazetted land in trust for the benefit of the local 
population. Even so, the earlier loss of access to the Maasai Mara and Kamororo 
group ranch referred to above (Zaal & Ole Siloma 2006), which was previously 
allowed by earlier Council members and had benefitted the Minister for the Envi-
ronment too, had made the ILIDP and LCE very concerned. Other similar cases 
included the destruction of the Mau forest in previous years which is also a 
Narok forest area under NCC trusteeship (Baldyga et al. 2007).  
The LCE resolved to organize a broad resistance movement. The Minister for 
Environment subsequently changed his mind and agreed to assist the Loita com-
munity. A lawyer established the Loita Naimina Enkiyio Conservation Trust 
(LNECT), a registered entity with the primary duty to protect and manage the 
                                                 
4
  This is according to Kenyan Law. As stipulated in the Forests Act (Cap. 385), a Minister has 
among others the powers, by notice in the Gazette, to either declare or alter the boundaries of 
a forest (GoK 1982). 
5
  ILIDP was started in 1968 as the initiative of a local Loita leader and a Dutch Catholic Mis-
sionary. Support came from Dutch Catholic development NGOs. The conflict coincided with 
a period in development thinking (in general and within this organisation in particular) that 
promoted empowerment, advocacy and networking as strategies for development. Two dec-
ades after its start, ILIDP was confronted with the Loita Forest conflict. A decade later, it 
was successfully solved.  
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forest and its associated ecosystem heritage held in trust by the local Narok 
County Council. 
Of course this merits the question whether the LCE, as an informal and non-
legalised institution informally representing the population was in a position to 
organize resistance against a formal and legally recognised institution such as the 
Narok County Council, which had the responsibility by law to decide on the fu-
ture of the forest.
6
 However, the timing of the conflict is worth considering in the 
context of Kenya’s history. The first truly democratic elections were to be organ-
ized in 1992, and at that stage of the conflict, the NCC could hardly be consid-
ered truly democratic in a representative and multi-party democratic meaning of 
the word. The conflict had erupted meanwhile, and protesters and those who 
wanted to appropriate the forest confronted each other violently. At one occasion 
opposite the ILIDP facilities in Narok Town, some people were killed when po-
lice started shooting prematurely (Dietz 1996). 
The Loita Naimina Enkiyio Conservation Trust (LNECT) took the matter of 
the appropriation of the forest to court. In this court case, many found it very dif-
ficult to choose sides. Conflicting points of view became apparent within the 
Loita community. Groups were divided along clan lines according to their Purko 
or Loita background, and old and young also often disagreed, with the older peo-
ple willing to adhere to old customs and informal rules of access while the 
younger generation wanted access for development of the area.  
So far, traditional institutions (age groups, Laibon) and modern organizations 
(the ILIDP, LCE and LNECT) had joined forces to fight against the Purko 
Maasai and their Minister, for control over the Loita forest. The national elec-
tions gave the opportunity for both factions to present their views and drum up 
support. Within the Loita community, councillors supported by the ILIDP faction 
were better positioned to win this election. ILIDP had made available some re-
sources to do this, such as transport. One item that came up for public scrutiny 
was the letter that the Loita Councillor had written, stating that the Loita people 
were supportive of the gazettement. This and many other issues ultimately led to 
                                                 
6
  In a recent landmark ruling, the African Commission found the Kenyan Government guilty 
of violating the rights of the Endorois community living around Lake Bogoria by unlawfully 
evicting them from their ancestral land in order to create a protected area (CMRD 2010). 
Two of the views of the African Commission in support of the ruling have relevance to the 
Loita example. First, the recognition that the State has a duty to ensure that indigenous sa-
cred places, linked to cultural beliefs and practices, and ceremonial acts that are central to 
freedom of religion, be preserved, respected and protected. Second, the State is to apply in-
ternational law concerning the protection of indigenous collective nature and of rights to 
lands and natural resources as a community, even in the absence of official title deeds. These 
aspects would support the Maasai community in defending their ownership rights to the local 
resources. 
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the political demise of the Councillor; he lost the elections. A new Loita Council-
lor took charge, split his constituency
7
 and had four other Loita councillors 
elected. This increased the representation of Loitans on the Narok County Coun-
cil considerably, and when a Loitan was elected as chairman of the NCC, the po-
litical clout of the Loita community in the NCC had improved. The power 
balance had shifted between the national elections of 1992 and the last years of 
the 1990s. The earlier Councillor and the Minister lost control in Narok District. 
As suggested by the new Loita Councillors and the Loita chairman of NCC, the 
case was withdrawn from court. The Loita forest did not gain the status of gazet-
ted national park, but remained open for use by the Loita community. A decade-
long conflict had ended at the start of the new millennium.  
The Loita forest case shows that individual actors can be quite influential in 
how conflicts start and develop, but the actual course that conflicts may take and 
play out is ultimately determined by larger forces. The underlying tension be-
tween Purko and Loita Maasai, dating back to well before the colonial period but 
strengthened by colonial policies of population displacement and boundary estab-
lishment of the Districts in which they lived, proved to be a fertile ground for 
both Purko players to gain control and Loita players to resist this usurpation. In-
terestingly, more modern sets of legal entities, both elected and non-elected, have 
been added to this sphere of conflict. The present status quo could not have been 
reached without a modern judicial institution, used successfully by the Loita 
Maasai through legally authentic institutions such as development projects and a 
re-established informal Council of Elders. This case shows that old ethnic con-
flicts between Maasai groups over a key resource can be peacefully contained 
through complex and unexpected alliances.  
The Loita forest case shows that with increasing pressure on resources due to 
population growth, land use change and resource withdrawal from pastoral use, 
and drought impacts of climate change, there are opportunities for moderation of 
potential conflicts. This evidence offers an important starting point for recogniz-
ing the importance of local knowledge and norms in crafting cooperate, non-
violent solutions in collective actions. This case also shows that old institutional 
arrangements can link up with new institutions and organizations to achieve this 
moderation. Within a changing and interconnected world, new threats in the form 
of commercial interests arise. To counter this, new local-level alliances are 
formed to deal with potential conflict over a common-pool resource turning re-
source abundance into a blessing.  
                                                 
7  This was implemented after discussions with the relevant authorities in Kenya at national 
level. Support was sought from the Office of the President, which influenced this decision 
positively.  
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Discussion and conclusion  
In Narok, around the Loita forest, a growing pastoral population was mobilized 
to fend against a neighbouring ethnic group that had high-level linkages to the 
national government to secure access to a typical common property resource vital 
for the livelihood of the Loita pastoralists. It also fended against the interest of a 
few elite individuals who aimed to control the resources for their personal bene-
fit. Individual and group actors among the Loita Maasai made clever use of old 
and new institutions to win a conflict over resources non-violently. The Loita 
forest did not become a resource curse, because a mixture of old and new institu-
tional arrangements prevented it from being grabbed by a collusion of competing 
pastoralists and a few rent-seekers. The benefits from the forest’s functions and 
financial revenues are now used and shared by a large number of producers. The 
results reveal a rare insight into the importance of hybrid customary-cum-legal 
institutions and ingenuity as to whether or not a common-pool resource becomes 
a curse. Therefore, human agency ultimately determines whether natural re-
sources turn into a curse, but we need the contextual analysis and historical 
pathway of institutional structures to inform us about the potential threats and 
opportunities.  
Equally in a scenario of climate change, when the potential threats to the envi-
ronment are known but cannot be influenced, coping largely depends on the insti-
tutional devices invoked by local actors. When south-western Kenya including 
Narok District indeed will become dryer, we may expect increased competition 
for forest resources or the water resources that are dependent on them. Yet, insti-
tutional development may address the need for conflict resolution.  
From this case study, the significant role that institutions play clearly emerges, 
be these institutions traditional or ‘official’ institutions. These institutions can 
prevent resource access conflicts, and allow reconciliatory situations to prevail 
between rivalry communities in Loita. Therefore, turning natural resources into 
either a blessing or a curse depends on the community, shaping and using its own 
institutional apparatus and other possible means, and within its historic institu-
tional context. This article, thus, shows that in areas where certain key resources 
are still abundant but where climate is changing, population is growing and pres-
sure is mounting, the local institutional arrangements can still be instrumental in 
moderating resource-related conflicts. 
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In a modern state, law and order are the elements that form the foundation for de-
velopment. And yet, in most of the African countries today, conflicts and contra-
dictions remain frequent and pervasive, as if they are part of the normal social 
process. The causes and consequences of these conflicts are multiple and diverse, 
making it more difficult to manage and resolve the conflicts. In this chapter, it is 
argued that African societies have had a past history of institutionalizing conflicts 
rather than resolving them. This has inhibited the emergence of social forms that 
are devoid of contradictions and conflicts in which tolerance of diversity, espe-
cially in the ownership and access or use of resources, are cherished virtues. By 
surveying some of the institutions that held many African societies together in the 
past, such as kinship; avoidance and joking relations; age or generation set systems 
of social organization; special friendship arrangements; the use of ritual, the rec-
ognition of safe havens and the role of arbiters/mediators, it is possible to appreci-
ate that in the past conflicts and contradictions were relatively contained. It is 
evident that the modern state in Africa lacks these institutions and so the use of 
brute force in the pursuit of individual and collective goals today are therefore 
very common when in fact some of the past mechanisms of conflict management 
could be revived to complement the law.  
Introduction 
Conflict and the need for conflict management have been pervasive phenomena 
in human experience since time immemorial. Management of conflict in human 
history has resulted in conflict resolution and peaceful co-existence required for 
the observance of human rights such as the sanctity of human life, the right to 
own and use property and consequently of social and human development. As 
Bekele observed of conflicts in Africa, “it is the ability to resolve conflicts peace-
fully that will enable Africans as other people's of the world, to put all their ef-
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forts at the disposal of the development endeavour” (Bekele 2002: 209). This is 
partly because escalation of conflict usually leads to violence, which destroys 
human life and property; negatively affects people's psyche through anxiety and 
fear, and leads to the breakdown of the social fabric of society. Such state of af-
fairs is inimical to people's participation in productive and reproductive activities, 
thus, the need for individuals, groups and countries to find ways of creating sus-
tainable peaceful conditions of existence.  
In the past, institutional channels of conflict management and resolution were 
varied, and, included public opinion, arbitration, song and dance, ridicule, duels, 
gossip, the invocation of the supernatural, kinship and other arrangements. 
Among the pastoral communities for example, stealing livestock did not only 
make economic sense in terms of provision of food, bride wealth and as currency 
in a very expensive social economic system (Pax Christi 2004; Letiwa 2008: 34), 
but it was also a value. Those who successfully raided their neighbors for live-
stock became heroes as they had the guts to act in risky situations befitting men 
worthy of their names. In a way, conflict brought both glory and shame to the 
participants, depending on what they were pursuing in the conflict and its out-
come.  
In many African societies today, there seem to be widespread ignorance of so-
ciety’s guidelines on how to pursue private and public goals, and in situations of 
conflict, how it should be managed. This may partly be because of the diversity 
in composition of groups and understandings of what is good and appropriate and 
what is not. There is widespread secularization too, by which symbols, institu-
tions and ideas that had previously been associated with the sacred/ supernatural 
power have lost their contextual meaning and moral authority, thus, diminishing 
the sanctity of human life and respect for other people’s property (Persell 1987). 
There are also many and diverse third parties that conspire to undermine institu-
tionalized peaceful co-existence. Such parties include politicians and religious 
fanatics, pursuing personal or group interests. It may be partly why there is a 
wide gap between what the ruling elite think should be done and what the com-
mon masses expect, resulting into the ideal-typical Durkheimian state of anomie. 
This situation is made worse by modern law, formal western oriented education, 
modern religions from the west and east, financial institutions and new ethnici-
ties, which do not look at reality from a single cultural point of view, leading to 
discordance between various co-existing systems. This is a situation that has the 
potential for misconception, misinterpretation and miscalculation, even miscar-
riage of justice in the process of conflict management and resolution (Samantha 
2002). 
Similarly, there is the emergence of government tolerated and sometimes, en-
couraged vigilante groups in East Africa as the “people’s defense force”. This is 
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a double-edged sword. On the one hand, people arm themselves due to “poor or 
too late government response to distress calls”, while on the other hand, the insti-
tution has no legal standing in a modern state (Paciotti & Borgerhoff Mulder 
2004). Thus, the vigilante groups and other mobs, which mete out mob justice, 
and which are common both in rural and urban areas in Kenya, can only be in-
dicative of a breakdown of the legitimate political and justice systems of govern-
ment. They are also evidence of individual and collective frustration and aggres-
sive tendencies reminiscent of an alternative government system. 
This discussion was provoked by some of the pertinent issues raised by Zart-
man (2002). According to him, the persistence of violent conflicts in the world in 
general and Africa in particular is not only an indication of the failure of home-
grown mechanisms of conflict management and resolution, but also the failure of 
inter-group methods as well. Inter-group conflict management mechanisms in the 
form of inter-family, inter-clan, inter- ethnic or international interventions, are 
usually viewed as interference in the internal affairs of others, thus ignoring na-
tive wisdom, interests or needs. His questioning of the wisdom of deploying old 
methods of conflict management and resolution in contemporary society is inter-
esting given the fact that character of society has since the pre-colonial times 
changed dramatically. The question is whether the causes, the scale, protagonists, 
and the character of conflicts have also not changed. Thus, is it possible to de-
ploy some of the pre-colonial native mechanisms of conflict management to 
solve contemporary conflicts or would these old mechanisms provide insight? In 
this chapter therefore, some of the perspectives on conflict causation are identi-
fied and some aspects of conflict management during the pre-colonial era in 
some African societies highlighted, before some recommendations are suggested 
on how to bring about sustainable management of conflicts in contemporary Af-
rican society. There is no suggestion in this discussion that conflict is always 
negative or destructive but that peaceful conditions are necessary for human and 
social development (Ritzer 2000: 259). 
The definition of conflict 
Conflict is experienced at various levels of human existence; at the intra-psychic, 
interpersonal, intra and inter-group, and the international levels. It is therefore, 
both psychological and social in cause and consequence. According to Boulding 
(1962: 5), conflict is “a situation of competition in which the parties are aware of 
the incompatibility of potential future positions in which each party wishes to oc-
cupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other”. It is question-
able whether it is exclusively a social process as suggested by Boulding (Ibid.: 
305), since it has psychological and other concomitants too. Doob, on the other 
hand, holds the view that “[T]he hallmark of Social Conflict is the existence of 
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two or more groups, at least one of which includes persons who believe that one 
or more other groups … are or will be depriving them of goals or values they 
would attain or preserve” (Doob 1975: 131). The two definitions would imply 
that a situation of conflict pertains when one party is blocking the possibility on 
the other hand to achieve a goal. However, conflict is not always manifest and 
deliberate in intention. Sometimes, it is unconsciously engendered and the parties 
involved need not be in contact with one another, aware of the existence of each 
other or even aware of the existence of conflict (Ritzer 2000: 259). In whatever 
form it occurs, it is about the exercise of power and that is why if left unattended 
for prolonged periods of time, can lead to frustration and destruction (Stig 2007). 
Doob however, gives us some insight into what conflict is about: Goals, values 
and we can add, culture, needs or resources and interests.  
The causes of conflict 
In Bernard Lonergan’s philosophy (quoted in Kubasu 2006), conflict has its basic 
origin in an individual’s psyche. This is because conflict begins in thought before 
it is operationalized in behaviour such as hostile speech acts, propaganda, denial 
of resources or attack. On the other hand, Matui & Kwonyike (2006: 118) are of 
the view that an attack is preceded by a psychological process of demonization of 
the other. It should be pointed out that it is this same process of demonization 
that is responsible for the formation and outward expression of stereotypes 
among the various races, religious groups, ethnic groups and countries, among 
others. Stereotypes inevitably lead to social isolation, alienation, segregation and 
even agression, as evidenced in recent times in form of xenophobic attacks in 
South Africa, in some Europeans countries, Russia and the USA. In a nutshell, 
stereotypes arise from unresolved, sometimes, unresolvable social, psychological 
and physical differences among individuals and groups of people. They may be 
institutionalized but can also develop, can be exploited and may come to the sur-
face at certain places, times and contexts. 
To Matza (1930), deviation from the norm, which conflict is, derives from the 
psychological process of neutralization of the law, norms or conventions of soci-
ety. Neutralization is a kind of rationalization by which the individual belittles 
the standard norm, normative practice, conventional understanding or belief. This 
act provides the individual or group of individuals with the necessary moral justi-
fication to do what is not allowed, and leaves them devoid of the feeling of guilt 
that would normally accompany the act. It is therefore a conscious or uncon-
scious process of deceptive reasoning that enables one to do or to hold views that 
the rest of society may consider wrong. 
Following the December 27, 2007 civic, parliamentary and presidential elec-
tions in Kenya as an example, people of all walks of life were mocked, insulted, 
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attacked, raped, maimed, killed, evicted and burned alive, all because they were 
perceived to belong to “other” ethnic groups who therefore, “deserved” to be 
treated as such. This was in total disregard of the law, conventions and beliefs 
governing neighbourliness, affinal and other forms of kinship, religion and hu-
manity. One of the most basic motivating factors was the psychological process 
of neutralization or demonization of the other. It only needed the immediate 
spark in the assumption that votes belonging to the presidential candidate from 
one or the other party, had been “stolen”. 
In his discussion of the relationship between social identity and culture in 
South Africa and the United States of America which are multi-racial and multi-
cultural in composition, O’Toole (1973: 30) demonstrates that when social and 
cultural interaction arenas are not coterminous there is bound to be prejudice and 
segregation in spite of the sharing of the same symbols by the various groups in-
volved. During the period of apartheid in South Africa for example, the white 
and coloured communities shared the same symbols in contradistinction to the 
black South Africans, who were also diverse in composition. The coloureds were 
however not accepted by the Whites as ‘proper white’, and could not share the 
same status, honor, prestige and consequently, roles and physical space. Up to 
about the 1960s, a similar situation pertained in the United States where all 
Americans were expected to share in the same (middle class) American dream as 
exemplified in virtues such as determination, success, wealth and self esteem. 
However, black Americans more particularly were not fully accepted as equal to 
the other groups, partly because of their slave ancestry and differential oppor-
tunity to the resources one needed to become successful. In this way, social iden-
tity may be in conflict with cultural identity, of course, with far reaching social, 
psychological, economic and political consequences as historically witnessed in 
South Africa and the USA. 
According to O’Toole therefore, conflict can arise from self image as opposed 
to group image. From time immemorial, self image or identity has normally been 
closely associated with group image, which partly accounts for the pervasive de-
sire by individuals to be counted as belonging to one or another group and not 
others, perpetually or in certain circumstances only. In Kenya for example, the 
Luo of Nyanza Province of Kenya categorize people in two broad categories: The 
Luo (Nya Luo), and the None Luo (Jamua). According to Lokira (2011), the 
categorization of people among the Pokot, a sub-ethnic group of the Kalenjin re-
siding in the North Western part of Kenya, the categories are even sharper be-
cause they are opposites. There can only be Pokot or enemies (pughung). One of 
the consequences of stereotyping is that even when the individual’s opinion and 
conduct are at variance with those of real or assumed group of membership, one 
is treated as reflecting the characteristics of the group.  
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What becomes apparent is that conflict is not only culturally and psycho-
logically constructed; it is also multidimensional in cause and manifestation, 
making it a relatively complex phenomenon to comprehend and to find solutions 
to. Secondly, it appears that regardless of cause and effect, each incidence of con-
flict seems to have its own character, which makes it to appear unique. If this 
were not so, the human race would by now have mastered the art of avoiding 
conflict and mechanisms of conflict management and of resolution when it oc-
curs. The numerous incidences of unresolved conflicts around the world are more 
than enough evidence to prove that successful conflict management on a perpet-
ual basis has historically been elusive. In Africa more specifically, levels of tol-
erance for diversity of opinion seem to be declining fast, leading to increased 
incidences of tension and conflict. This is taking place at a time when the state 
seems to have lost the goodwill invested in its legitimate authority to use coer-
cive power in preventing and resolving conflicts. 
The ineffectiveness of the state machinery to manage and resolve conflicts has 
generated many questions as to whether there are alternative arrangements that 
can be deployed to prevent and resolve conflicts. Such an imagination should 
never even arise given the fact that the main obligation of the government in any 
country is to ensure law and order. Is it that the ruling elite in most African coun-
tries, are yet to master the art of using the instruments of power for the benefit of 
the majority as it is in the Western World and among the Asian Tigers of the 
East? If this is the case, is that why ordinary citizens are yet to be permitted to 
participate meaningfully in the democratization processes taking place in techno-
logically less developed countries especially, in Africa? 
It may be possible that most African Countries inherited Western models of 
bringing about law and order without understanding how to apply them to the Af-
rican situation. This may have left a wide gap between the ruling elite with their 
self interest, and the rest of the population, whose point of view, needs and ambi-
tions remain frustrated. According to this view, ways and means must be found 
on an urgent basis to bridge this gap by identifying the manner in which some 
African Societies in the past handled incidences of conflict for the betterment of 
the society. The ruling elite probably, requires education on those aspects that are 
still functional, which can be adopted. The situation is quite urgent partly be-
cause of the fatigue in the Western world arising from the cost of humanitarian 
intervention and the moral considerations related to the inability of some states 
especially in Africa to protect their citizens. 
Out of frustration that some African counties are not doing enough to provide 
their citizens with adequate security, Western countries strongly advocate human 
rights (Snarr 2002), and even consider it a precondition for receiving develop-
ment and humanitarian aid (Kindiki 2003). This as it has happened in several 
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countries so far including Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia and Sudan, 
among others. In the case of Kenya in December 2007 and January to February, 
2008, a civil war was averted when the immediate former Secretary of the United 
Nations, Dr Kofi Annan, brokered a coalition government. What the Kenyan 
situation clearly demonstrated is that when a conflict occurs, effective cessation 
of hostilities, or management of conflict is dependent on many factors; causes of 
the conflict; the psychological and emotional involvement of the parties; the 
stakes, the timing; potential mustering of alliances; potential for arbitration and 
the potential for some shared understandings over a range of factors, including 
the costs and benefits of cessation of hostilities for the parties (Coser 1967: 50). 
Since this discussion is not focused on any specific conflict in any particular 
society or country, it is impossible to be exhaustive about its causes. This is part-
ly because the causes of conflict may be similar or different from time to time in 
any one society and from one society to another. What becomes important for 
continuity of society is whether mechanisms of management and control can be 
harnessed fast enough to avoid the degradation and destruction of human life and 
property. The chaos that have characterized the political landscape in Kenya, 
Zimbabwe and to some extent, South Africa in 2008 (a role model for other Afri-
can countries) are quite worrying, requiring a re-thinking of the meaning of in-
struments of democracy such as national constitutions, socio-political and econo-
mic institutions and elections. The issue is whether there is anything African 
democracies can learn from some of the native institutions of conflict inhibition, 
prevention, management and control if they cannot benefit from those in the west 
and east. The assumption by some of the African elites that conflicts in Africa as 
unique to the continent requiring African solutions may be flawed. What we have 
is a universal phenomenon that may require local approaches to its solution since 
ownership assures sustainability of the solution.  
Some anthropological perspectives to conflict resolution 
in some African societies  
Some of the first generation of anthropologists trained in British Social Anthro-
pology, have given us an excellent view of how conflict and conflict resolution 
was handled in pre-colonial African societies. Gluckman (1956) for example, 
was of the idea that culture or custom was not only the cause but also the solution 
to conflict. He stated that “Conflicts are a part of social life and custom appears 
to exacerbate these conflicts; but in doing so custom also restrains the conflicts 
from destroying the wider social order” (Ibid.: 2). According to him, conflicts 
were generated, resolved or institutionalized through structural arrangements in 
society using the idiom of kinship in such a way that “everyone should be an ally 
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of everyone else in some respects, and an opponent in several others, and no one 
conflict, envy or fear will predominate” (Ibid.).  
In his study of the Ndembu Society, Turner (1972) supported this view by stat-
ing that, “[C]onduct has been regulated over what we can assume to have been a 
very long period of time by norms, values, beliefs and sentiments associated with 
Kinship” (Ibid.: 90). Turner used processual analysis of events he referred to as 
“Social dramas”, to identify three levels of conflict in Ndembu society: 
1. Conflict arising from the contradiction between principles of social organization. This he 
referred to as structural conflict. For example, he, found that the matrilineal principle con-
flicts with virilocal residence for men who insist on bringing up their own children instead 
of sending them to their mother's brother’s households. 
2. Conflict between individuals or groups over scarce resources such as material goods like 
land and livestock; services; power, prestige and honor. 
3. Conflicts within the individual which may be psychological or social and physical in mani-
festation and are therefore, egocentric as opposed to social drives or needs which would af-
fect the collectivity. 
From this perspective, social conflict is therefore a challenge to a normal state 
of being. Thus, the breach of a norm divides the community into those supporting 
the offender, the offended and those who have no interest in it. Depending on the 
depth of the breach, its social significance, social inclusiveness, the nature of the 
social group the offender or offended is located in, and the degree of autonomy 
from the wider social group, mechanisms can be put in place to prevent escala-
tion through advice, informal arbitration, performance of a public ritual or formal 
legal machinery. These mechanisms may result either into re-integration or rec-
ognition of schism i.e. institutionalization of the conflict, which Gluckman re-
ferred to as “a feud” (Gluckman 1956).  
According to Gluckman, norms in a traditional society were public knowl-
edge, thus people did not so much differ about what was the appropriate legal or 
moral rule but over how the rule applied in particular circumstances (Ibid.: 9; 
Swartz & Jordan 1980). It may be true that, residents of particular villages in Af-
rica were aware of what was expected of them and what they expected of others 
partly through socialization, imitation, identification and also because of com-
mon residence, thus similar experiences. But it is an overstatement to imagine 
that conflict arises mainly from how rules are applied.  
In fact, in most African societies, kinship largely determined contiguity in 
residence. Households, lineages and clans, especially in patri-lineal societies, 
were localized, territorially based groups. One’s neighbours were therefore, rela-
tives of one kind or another. This is how conflict and the potential for its resolu-
tion were socially, culturally and emotionally constituted the same way social 
structure was. This is what led Gluckman (1956: 47) to conclude that 
[F]irst, quarrels arise between men because they live together in society. Secondly, each so-
ciety has customs which shape the form which these quarrels take. But, thirdly, to some ex-
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tent, custom also directs and controls the quarrels through conflicts of allegiance so that de-
spite rebellion, the same social system is re-established over wider areas of communal life 
and through longer periods of time. 
It would appear that intra group conflict such as intra-ethnic or intra clan con-
flict could be managed more effectively than inter group conflicts since within 
one community, members are more likely to share understandings over a wider 
range of norms and values, including the causes and possible solutions to the 
conflict than people in two different communities, which would require external 
intervention (Swartz & Jordan 1980). 
Some aspects of conflict management strategies 
in pre-colonial African societies 
There are many scenarios describing how traditional mechanisms of conflict 
management operated. A review of several of these should demonstrate our ear-
lier assertion that both conflict and mechanisms of management are universally 
found, but are culturally constituted, allowing communities to contain the con-
flict. When there is more diversity in composition, opinion, interests, goals, val-
ues and norms, this is more complicated.  
Coser (1967) for example, contends that when conflict occurs among people 
who share some understandings in form of attitudes, needs, moral and perceptual 
worlds and symbols of power, authority, personal integrity, and so on, it is more 
likely to become contained. He states that  
[W]henever wars have been strictly limited, as in an eighteenth century warfare, some visible 
event, such as the taking of a particular fortress, the reaching of some natural barrier, and the 
like, symbolized to both parties that the desired objective has been reached by one of them 
and that the conflict could now be considered solved through the subsequent acquiescence of 
the loser. When such mutually acceptable symbolic clues are not available, the resolution of 
the conflict will be more difficult. (Ibid.: 45) 
In African societies, common symbols were not in short supply. People lived 
close to one another physically, they were related to one another consanguine-
ously, affinally and in other ways, and there was also the need to resume normal 
productive and reproductive activities to practical everyday needs (Fred-Mensah 
2002). All these factors exerted pressure for a quick solution. In this way, con-
flict was not usually viewed as a single event but as the culmination of a process. 
This is partly why every incident of conflict needed not to be resolved for normal 
village life to persist. The phenomenon of refugees today is a sign that protago-
nists are less tolerant and cannot permit the normal process of activities while so-
lutions are being sought by the authorities concerned as if it was in African 
societies in the past. Among the Azande of Sudan for example, while a more last-
ing solution was being sought, normal village life resumed under certain condi-
tions. If there had been murder for example, members of the two households, 
 Precolonial models of conflict management 219 
 
lineages or clans involved prohibited certain common activities that were consid-
ered ritually and morally polluting. The two parties put a moratorium on sharing 
of food, drink, utensils, sexuality and so on, until the conflict was resolved 
through compensation and re-conciliation (Evans-Pritchard 1974: 154). The dis-
tance of the relationship, the intensity of intermarriage among the communities 
involved and the compliance with the rules such as the release of the sharp in-
strument used in wounding the opponent and so on, made the difference between 
prolonged and short span feuding. Various African Societies therefore, had rules 
for managing conflict, and when it escalated, bringing about reconciliation. 
 
Rules governing the use of violence 
The use of violence implies failure to maintain peaceful co-existence, but it does 
not automatically mean that the same goal cannot be pursued by peaceful means. 
In many African societies, war was a sacred, almost religious activity, which was 
surrounded by much consultation among the living and between the living and 
the supernatural. Like in modern warfare, it was surrounded by a code of ethics 
in terms of what should be done, when, by who and why. There were severe pen-
alties for a breach of the code of ethics. Thus, even though pre-colonial Africa is 
portrayed as having preoccupied itself with the use of violence, it is not a history 
of mere anarchy. 
In many communities, the use of violence was, regulated in terms of who 
should go to war, who should be attacked, when and the choice of weapons to be 
used. For example, Evans-Pritchard (1974: 151) pointed out that among the Nuer 
of the Sudan,  
[B]oys fight with spiked bracelets, men of the same village or camp fight with clubs, for it is 
a convention that spears must not be used between close neighbours lest one of them be 
killed and the community be split by a blood-feud. 
It was different when the Combatants were from other villages, clans or ethnic 
groups. He states, “when a fight starts between persons of different villages it is 
with the spear; every adult male of both communities takes part in it …” (Ibid.). 
Among the Kalenjin, apart from other regulations, there was a Code of ethics 
governing surrender during a fight. A man being pursued and feeling helpless 
had a number of options: 
- He could pluck some grass, climb a tree and throw the grass towards his pursuers or simply 
hold it above his head. In Kalenjin Culture, grass is a symbol of nourishment from the earth. 
It nourishes livestock, which in turn nourish human beings through milk, blood and meat. 
One was not therefore expected to harm a person who invoked the protection of the life giv-
ing element, grass. If that were to happen calamities would occur such as thunder, drought, 
famine and disease. 
- He could alternatively run into a crowd of women or children. In many African societies, 
women and children, because they were normally unarmed, were not supposed to be at-
tacked. They could however be abducted and taken away, not necessarily as prisoners of war 
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for ransom but to become members of the enemy village. The women and girls were married 
off for bride-wealth by their captors, but the boys were adopted as children of the abductors. 
Such boys were given rights to life and property and cases of such boys becoming prominent 
in leadership, ritual activities and acquisition of wealth are prevalent. 
Killing women and children in war, killing an enemy before a signal to begin 
fighting had been given, raping women, willful destruction of crops, wanton 
burning of houses and stores of food, these were dishonorable acts that were pun-
ished in some societies (Stig 2007). This is why even when a man abducted a 
woman/girl, except for purposes of marriage, he could not act as husband as this 
would be taking advantage of a person under one's protection. Instead, she was 
given to another man in marriage in exchange for bridewealth. On the other hand 
in many communities, sexuality and beer drinking were considered as some of 
the worst enemies of a man's strength (Akong’a 1986: 157). A newly married 
person or one whose beer had just matured for drinking, could not be permitted 
to go to war as they were ritually vulnerable. It was believed that they would 
definitely be killed in war sparking off reprisals and feuds.  
Raping women on a raid was also considered open invitation of bad omen. 
During the post-election violence in Kenya in December 2007 to February 2008, 
many men, women and children, including those that were physically and emo-
tionally handicapped and assumed to belong to “other” ethnic groups, were 
raped, some in front of their spouses, children and other close relatives and 
friends.  
Rape is one of the worst crimes against humanity as it dehumanizes and hu-
miliates the victim. When it happens in front of close relatives who are not sup-
posed to see the person naked, this is is considered as contempt of all the 
members of the group to which the victim belongs. It underscores the helpless-
ness of the victim and the entire group to which the victim belongs. Of course, 
the act of rape in the past would result into immediate mobilization of forces and 
a revenge attack. In the past, rape was avoided in order not to provoke vicious 
revenge attacks. On the other hand, it was probably the fact that it was considered 
as torture with long term consequences that rape was considered illegal in con-
flict situations.  
What is evident is the fact that in many African societies, when conflict ex-
ploded into violence, it was not free for all. Preservation of life and human dig-
nity and the protection of the livelihood of people, were important.  
If the colonial administration and missionaries had wanted, they would have 
learned a lot about African’s moral approach to the use of violence within the 
traditional setting. Even in the much misunderstood institution of wife beating, 
there were rules about who should be beaten, or which part of the body, where 
and when it should be done. Scanning through the so called Geneva Conventions 
reveals that what was codified as guidelines for humane treatment of the 
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wounded, prisoners of war and protection of civilian life in time of war (Aca-
demic American Encyclopedia 1980: 96) has been practiced in many African so-
cieties for generations before. Unfortunately, and as pointed out earlier, the 
current ruling elite do not want to learn from Africa’s past about how, even in the 
use of violence, one could still remain moral and dignified both as the perpetrator 
and the victim. The use of violence witnessed in recent times after independence 
in African countries such as in Uganda, DRC Congo, Burundi, Ruanda, Ivory 
Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and more recently Kenya and Zimbabwe 
are acts that cannot stand the test of any moral code, leave alone the much cele-
brated Geneva conventions. It is also unfortunate that in Africa as in much of the 
rest of the world, there are no longer shared sacred symbols of peaceful co-
existence. Churches, Mosques, homes and acts of humble submission are no 
longer appreciated as genuine acts of surrender. This makes it impossible for 
people in desperate situations to find a refuge as witnessed in Kenya during the 
post-election violence early in 2008. Not only are there conflicts over rules, but 
the rules governing the conflict are also not adhered to. We need to search for 
these rules and see how they can be used and modernized for the management of 
future conflicts. 
 
The structure of society for conflict prevcention and management 
We have already alluded to the fact that the incidences of conflict and the poten-
tial for resolution revolved around fusion of kinship and residence-based alle-
giances; and fission the crumbling of alliances to pursue individual goals after 
restoration of peaceful co-existence (Evans-Pritchard 1974; Turner 1972; Gluck-
man 1956). Individuals, categories of individuals and groups, creating both hori-
zontal and vertical relationships, minimize conflicts while facilitating law and 
order. Such factors as ownership and use of a territory, age, sex and marriage 
provided individuals with not only identity but also a point of reference in one's 
interaction with others, giving each individual and collectivity a social and psy-
chological status. A status is usually associated with an appropriate role or expec-
tation and is the building block of social structure. Social structure is therefore a 
medium through which culture, status, roles, social honour, power, prestige and 
other scarce resources are distributed in society. It is a significant source of self 
and social control (Akong’a 1988). In the following, we will present a number of 
institutions that, within social structure, facilitate the management of conflict.  
 
Avoidance and joking relations 
According to Boulding (1962), avoidance behaviour increases the social distance 
among people more likely to experience conflicts between each other, but who 
cannot afford to be in conflict. It is suggested that avoidance behaviour regulated 
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interpersonal relations and attitudes among some unequal categories of in-
dividuals among whom instances of conflict and incest were not only highly 
likely but were taboo and would be extremely embarrassing to those involved. 
This is one area of life in Africa where marriage divided rather than united cer-
tain categories of people. In many African societies, marriage was considered as 
an event which practically united two people together with their clans (which 
were usually exogamous especially, in patrilineal societies), while creating sym-
bolic and practical social distance among them. One’s affines became a welcome 
addition to one’s allies but they also posed a dilemma because they were a spe-
cial category of relatives. This is partly why their social interactions were gov-
erned by intricate regulations including taboos. Among the Luo and Luyia of 
Western Kenya for example, a marriage partner had to be drawn from clans other 
than one's own, the clan of one’s mother and that of father’s mother. In patrilin-
eal, patrilocal societies, wives or husbands were therefore, drawn from clans 
without common blood relations, thus, with high potential for conflict. This is 
partly why among some categories of in-laws especially, sons and mothers-in-
law, avoidance behavior was institutionalized. In avoidance behavior a son and 
mother-in-law were not expected to transact any business in face to face contact, 
be in a house without a third party, be in a closed house, or use common facilities 
such as the bathroom or toilet which required some measure of nakedness. 
Avoidance behaviour took into account kinship relationship, age, sex and 
status. Among the Swahili of the East African Coast for example, the household 
space is segregated on the basis of age and sex. Children are not expected in the 
presence of adults when a person who is not a member of the household is visit-
ing because they can tarnish the honor of the household. On the other hand, no 
two people of the opposite sex, except husband and wife, can pass time together 
in one room without a third party. One would have thought that this was an Is-
lamic practice. But among the Nyakyusa of Tanzania, fathers and their sons lived 
in separate villages in order to prevent daughters and fathers-in-law on the one 
hand, and step mothers and step sons on the other, from being in the same physi-
cal space (Wilson 1967). The two societies therefore, practice the same principle 
with varying degrees of extremity.  
It is suggested that avoidance behavior regulated interpersonal relations and 
attitudes among some unequal categories of individuals among whom instances 
of conflict and incest were not only highly likely but were taboo and would be 
extremely embarrassing to those involved. This is one area of life in Africa where 
marriage divided rather than united certain categories of people. According to 
Mafunga there is usually, co-occurrence of institutionalized avoidance behavior 
and joking relations (Mafunga “B” 1988). Symbolic joking took place among in-
dividuals that were structurally equal as peers, but at the same time unequal in 
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terms of status. For example, joking relations may exist between brothers-in-law 
who could be equal in age or generation but unequal structurally because, in 
patrilineal societies, wife givers are in a relative inferior position to wife takers. 
Their relationship is therefore filled with cynicism. 
On the other hand, grandparents and grandchildren regardless of sex, struc-
turally stand in relation to one another as equals but in alternate generations. 
They can therefore joke with each other (Akong’a 1995). A keen observer in 
modern boardroom committees would notice quite clearly that the more emotive 
the agenda for discussion, the more aggressive the joking relations (pecking or-
der) before the meeting. The jokes preceding important meetings are consciously 
or unconsciously supposed to provide the stakeholders with an opportunity to 
size each other in terms of levels of equality or inequality as preparation for the 
actual discussions or negotiations. A party that is not willing to risk simulating 
the anticipated situation through jokes or one which takes jokes literally as a per-
sonal affront is not liable to share common symbols with their opposite number. 
Compromise is therefore unlikely. Thus, a part from communicating certain 
symbolic forms that may have practical significance in the specific or future in-
teraction, joking relations can be for pure entertainment and in communicating 
messages that would otherwise have been considered as an affront or hostile if 
taken literally. This is partly why in the past, the use of metaphors and proverbs 
in emotive discussions including judicial matters, issues that were subject to di-
verse interpretation, in conveying information that would arouse anger, embar-
rassment or helplessness if said plainly, was common. 
For the purposes of this discussion therefore, the assertion that joking relation-
ship is “incompatible but complementary to avoidance behaviour”, is probably 
true (Mafunga “B” 1988). First, they do not apply to the same categories of indi-
viduals. For example, mothers and sons in-law who are expected to socially 
avoid each other have no opportunity of joking with each other. However, each 
of the parties obligated to avoid one another can seek out the joking partner of 
the other in order to pass a message that would otherwise have been considered 
offensive if it had been communicated directly (Ibid.). In both avoidance behav-
iour and joking relations therefore, order is maintained and a breach restored, 
partly through ritual gift giving and the use of a third party acceptable to both 
parties. This is completely absent and untenable in modern judicial system as a 
mechanism of managing and resolving conflict. 
 
Age grade/set system 
Despite the fact that some African Societies are presented as having been class-
less, there were subtle forms of stratification through which law and order were 
maintained and conflicts resolved. Age grading was one of them. In most African 
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Societies, children were at the receiving end, to be seen, sent and provided for 
but without voice to express their opinions. They were therefore expected to be 
obedient and respectful to adults and those in positions of responsibility. The 
male youths had more freedom of action, especially as defenders of the commu-
nity and in looking after livestock, but they had to do this with the authority of 
elders. A raid into the neighbouring community had to be sanctioned by elders 
after ritual divination and blessings. This was partly because they were going to 
operate outside their own moral community. They were as good as dead until 
they came back alive. On return, they were cleansed before re-integration with 
their families, symbolizing rebirth. Among the Kipsigis, they were met at the 
outskirts of the village by women holding grass in their hands as a symbol of 
peace (Hollis 1969).  
In those communities that had no territorial leaders, and especially those that 
were pastoral age or generation systems operated frequently. This is a system by 
which all young men and sometimes, women of the same age were initiated to-
gether, acquiring the same age set name. An age set is in some societies a genera-
tion set because the distance from one set to the other was a generation since 
initiation was usually not carried out every year as in some societies today. In 
many societies, the generation set system was a system of super and sub-
ordination in that individuals in earlier sets had to be respected by those in sub-
sequent ones. In fact, one of the major functions of a generation set was to bring 
up the next set as the members of the immediate earlier set had the responsibility 
of socializing the younger on a formal basis during initiation. If members of a set 
did not behave well in general, their leader and those members of the earlier set 
supposed to be their mentors were held responsible.  
Evidence of stratification comes from the fact that a man could never be in the 
same set as one's father. Even in situations where a young man entered the same 
set as classified as “father”, kinship relationship superseded other relationships. 
Such boys for example, could never be permitted to share a sexual partner, as this 
would have been considered incest. In fact a man could not marry from a genera-
tion that corresponded with those above his own as all its members were classi-
fied as his mothers. He could also not marry the daughter of a man from his own 
generation set as she was classified as his daughter. Women usually joined the 
generation sets of their husbands. It was therefore, common to find a young girl 
married to an old man being accorded more respect than her own mother because 
of structural positioning vis-à-vis the generation set of the husband. In a polygy-
nous household however, the first wife was more important in ritual activities 
such as sacrifices, planting, harvesting, and in deciding inheritance for one’s sons 
even though the younger wives were a man’s favourite. 
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Secondly, each generation set had a role to play in society. The young men de-
fended the society as warriors while the elders participated in ritual activities. In 
between were married men and women who took part in productive and repro-
ductive functions. Thus, while the youths provided deterrent military force, the 
elders participated actively in restoring peace through arbitration, wisdom and 
ritual. Escalation of conflict today and the apparent lack in effectiveness of arbi-
tration and conflict resolution can therefore be partly attributed to the transforma-
tion of the structure and functions of African society. Kamenju et al. (2003: 45) 
observed that, “unrestrained conflict escalation is therefore a sign of the elder’s 
inability to exercise their institutional role of conflict management …” because 
of status inversion. Suda (2003) has the same view that the high incidence of vio-
lence among pastoralists is partly evidence of a generation gap whereby the 
younger are no longer subject to the ritual power and authority of the older gen-
eration (Ibid.: 287). Thus, the use of clan elders in managing and resolving inter-
clan and inter-ethnic conflicts whenever they occur cannot work without involv-
ing the fighters who have a big stake in the conflict and the consequences. 
 
Special friendship arrangements 
There are many pseudo kinship arrangements that played roles similar to those 
played by kinship networks in African societies. Prominent among these are 
blood brotherhood, stock associate ship and special friendship arrangements. 
Blood brotherhood is no longer common today but it involved two men literally 
sharing their blood by performing a ritual by making small cuts to produce blood 
on which meat was dipped and consumed by the parties involved. Such a ritual 
bound the two, their families and to some extent, their clans in a special bond of 
friendship. It was common in mobile communities more particularly, those that 
were pastoral. Such a relationship enabled a man to receive special treatment 
such as grazing rights. In fact a blood brother had the obligation of ensuring the 
security of a blood brother in spite of a feud between their two communities. Fur-
thermore, a blood brother could not marry the daughter of his counterpart since it 
would be considered as incestuous. Not everyone however, endeavored to estab-
lish such alliances without careful consideration. This is because, unlike one’s 
biological brother, one was under obligation not to hold back any secrete from a 
blood brother. Herbalists for example, had to be strategic in their alliances if they 
did not wish to reveal the recipes of their secret herbal concoctions. 
Stock associate ship on the other hand is still a very common phenomenon and 
although in literature it is commonly believed that it is a pastoral mode of adapta-
tion, it is very common among agricultural communities which practice mixed 
farming also. Those involved are not necessarily related through kinship, but it is 
based on trust and the desire to multiply one's herd with less risk, while providing 
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subsistence to families of one’s stock friends who use milk, blood and other 
products without reference to the owner. When the herd is repossessed by the 
owner of the original cow, a female calf is retained as compensation for the labor 
provided and as goodwill. Stock associate ship is therefore, one of the easiest 
ways of starting one’s own herd although it can take long for one to start using 
the retained female calf as a nucleus for one’s own herd. It is interesting to note 
that the Kenya-Finland Livestock Development Programme in Western Kenya, is 
modeled on this principle (Akong’a 1996). The project gives a pregnant grade 
cow to a woman, who is expected to raise it, if female, to be in calf before it is 
given to the next recipient. If the calf is male, it is sold and a female calf bought 
for handing over to another beneficiary. Since it is based on the principle of a re-
volving fund, the payment for receiving the cow is to raise the calf to the point of 
pregnancy. The assessment of this programme was that it was a viable mecha-
nism of transferring rights of ownership of animals in a community partly be-
cause of common public knowledge about who had received the cow and who 
was the next recipient. The missing information was when, rather than whether a 
calf would be transferred to the next person or not. Stock associate ship has not 
been observed among affines whose relationship is cemented by the transfer of 
livestock, besides other gifts as bride wealth and the birth of children especially, 
sons. 
In some communities such as the Turkana, two individuals regardless of gen-
der, can also enter into a special dyadic friendship known as “lopae”. One’s part-
ner becomes the “best friend” with whom one can exchange feasts, animals, 
grains, and other gifts (Renfrew 1990). Accordingly, such special friendship net-
work, like stock associate ship, can be a source of investment capital in form of 
animals, an insurance against risks such as theft, drought, famine and physical 
danger, for one or both partners. In all cases, it is expected to be a source of fa-
vorable attitudes, goodwill and cooperation, providing another avenue for mini-
mization and resolution of conflict. 
 
Ritual process and the use of safe havens 
In African societies, the use of ritual in exerting pressure on leaders to act ration-
ally and objectively was a very powerful tool for conflict management and reso-
lution (Gluckman 1956, 1963). Among the Zulu for example, the annual harvest 
ritual took a political dimension when commoners were provided with an oppor-
tunity to question, even insult the King but not to question the system of leader-
ship. The reversal of gender roles in the same society questioned the dominance 
of men and the subjugation of women by men. These rituals provided safely 
valves for pent-up psychological and social frustrations, which ultimately en-
sured the persistence of the system. It is sad to witness common citizens being 
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beaten and shot to death in demonstrations considered by the authorities as ille-
gal, when there are no occasion to vent-off or channel their frustrations. It points 
to the fact that some African Societies were more proactive, more practical and 
even scientific in the manner in which the common population was handled than 
in the repressive modern political systems which do not tolerate alternative opin-
ions and do not provide fora for such alternative opinions. By its very nature rit-
ual behavior mystifies reality and renders it unquestionable by raising it to the 
level of the supernatural. This is partly why conflict management was part of rit-
ual process, culminating in a sacrifice and a common meal as part of recon-
ciliation, cleansing of evil and re-integration of the community. 
Divination, the use of the curse and administration of oaths or a threat of these, 
exacted the facts of the case in a public forum. may have been part of bringing 
conflict to the level of public knowledge. Focus was not therefore on punishment 
for wrongdoing but restitution and reconciliation (Massam 1968; Evans-Pritchard 
1976). This is partly why ritual leaders were quite instrumental in maintaining 
restraint in conflict situations. Usually, their compounds provided a safe haven 
for this where no one had the right to hurt another. If such elders drew a line be-
tween the combatants, they stopped fighting (Evans-Pritchard 1974; Beech 
1969). If a person was being pursued among the Luo and Luyia for example, and 
ran into another person’s house, it served as a safe haven or sanctuary until elders 
arrived to investigate the case. This was out of the fear that if the person was 
killed in someone else’s house or compound, the home would be haunted by the 
ghost of the victim. In fact, it was symbolic of the fact that the pursued had put 
himself/herself at the mercy of the male owner of the house, who had the right of 
confronting the pursuer if he/she insisted on entering the house or compound. It 
was considered an invasion of the privacy and sanctity of the home, while pro-
viding the pursued with a temporary safe haven. 
Thus, some African societies have held in awe certain ideas, objects or spaces 
such as places of worship, be they modern churches, mosques or sacred groves, 
caves and trees among others. The desecration of such phenomena as places of 
worship, people’s houses, and stores of food, among others, especially by burn-
ing or willful destruction or as hideouts for immoral purposes, was believed to 
elicit severe supernatural sanctions such as madness among the perpetrators. This 
is partly why the pursued was sure of being safe if he ran into any of these places 
considered sacred or sacrosanct. 
Recent happenings in the world have challenged these beliefs and practices 
making it very difficult for an individual in danger to find refuge. There have 
been cases whereby the police pursuing a criminal have violated the sanctity of 
churches or mosques; certain church leaders have engaged in mass murder of 
their adherents such as it happened in Uganda (Kabazzi-Kisirinya et al. 2000) 
228 Joshua J. Akong’a  
 
and so on. During the post-election violence in Kenya in 2008, many places of 
worship such as churches and mosques to belong to people from other communi-
ties were burned down. What was considered even more outrageous both in 
Kenya and internationally, was the burning of a church near Eldoret city in the 
Rift Valley Province of Kenya, in which 35 of people, mainly women and chil-
dren who were taking refuge there died. Around the country, many other public 
utilities such as schools, which are very handy during times of emergency to pro-
vide people with temporary accommodation, and bridges, were also burned down 
or destroyed. According to Persell (1987), such acts of desecration and destruc-
tion can only be explained by the process of secularization by which the belief in 
the supernatural or sacred power and authority is eroded due to increasing levels 
of tolerance of rationality, western oriented education, cultural and religious di-
versity and modernization. 
In some indigenous beliefs and practices, the use of ritual tried to shift expec-
tation and intervention from the mundane to the supernatural realm. This is not 
something that is unique to Africa as people from all continents of the world 
have at one point in time and place have invoked supernatural intervention 
through the belief and practice of witchcraft, magic, divination and prayer in the 
course of pursuing their private or collective goals. What is common in African 
communities however, is that witchcraft accusation is usually considered a hos-
tile gesture, which breeds conflict between the accuser and the accused. In con-
flict situations, witchcraft and sorcery were (and are still being) in the belief that 
one’s enemy or partner would be rendered powerless, in thought, word, deed and 
even in physical existence. Such supernatural powers are therefore deployed to 
secure one’s goals such as obtaining wealth, love, employment, and keeping 
one’s rivals at bay. It has also been used to disable the enemy (combatants) so 
that a battle was not only a clash of human resources, weapons, food supplies and 
strategy, but also the potency of the magic in use. This is partly why in Africa 
most rebel groups start off with ritual activities such as oath taking aimed at unit-
ing its members and giving them confidence that they are immune from harm 
against the weapons of their enemies. 
By their very mystical, sacred and threatening nature, witchcraft and magic 
therefore, elicit both positive consequences as evidenced by success or negative 
consequences as evidenced by failure, injury and death. In this way, the use of or 
belief in witchcraft and magic have generated both hope and despair, respec-
tively. During the post-election violence in Kenya for example, there was wide-
spread looting and destruction of property at the coastal towns and especially in 
Mombasa. However, a businessman who had lost a lot of property went public 
that he was invoking a curse used by muslims (Ahl Al-badri) and that only those 
who returned the looted property would be free from the deleterious influence of 
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the curse. In a few days, he and other business people in the town had recovered 
many of the things that they had lost. These incidences were widely covered in 
the electronic and print media and it is hypothesized that the fear of the curse 
minimized violence to the extent that eventually, there were no Internally Dis-
placed Persons (IDPs) there as witnessed in other provinces (Letiwa 2008). In his 
discussion of the curse (kithitu or muma) among the Kamba of Eastern Province 
of Kenya, Penwill writes: “the accused is forced to swear to the magical para-
phernalia (kithitu). If he refuses, he is found guilty, if not it is with him till the 
outcome, usually in a specified period of time” (Penwill 2005: 57). Either he dies 
or a close relative dies or is prone to frequent and unexplainable misfortunes. As 
Penwill points out, when someone invokes the curse or ritual, “the dispute has 
been sent for arbitration out of the human sphere”, an appeal can only be made 
through the person who made the invocation (Ibid.: 57).  
 
Arbitration/mediation 
The existence of an arbiter acceptable to both parties was and still is important. 
In the past, arbiters had distinctive features. They were mainly prophets per-
ceived as imbued with supernatural powers so that even though their counsel was 
advisory, it could not be ignored without dire consequences. In fact, they were 
considered selfless, interested mostly in the welfare of the community at large 
(Boulding 1962). One of the most powerful instruments for influencing compli-
ance was the power of the curse (Peristiany 1939; Massam 1968). Otherwise, the 
personal attributes of arbiters in general included “patience, the ability to with-
stand frustrations (and) a willingness to endure the experience of being a target 
for hate or displaced aggression” (Doob 1975: 136).  
Rothchild & Hartzell (1990, quoted in Oucho 2002: 188), identify several pre-
conditions for the success of negotiations, especially, those involving third par-
ties: 
(a) There should be identifiable bargaining parties to the conflict; 
(b) The bargaining parties should be determined to find a practical solution to the conflict; 
(c) The arbiter/mediator should be external to the conflict; 
(d) The arbiter/mediator should be on the scene. 
When Kenya was shocked by post-election violence, there were only two ma-
jor options to save the country from civil war. First, an appeal to God was made 
to intervene and have the politicians and their supporters to act with restraint. In-
dividuals and groups of individuals organized prayer meetings wherever and 
whenever it was possible. Secondly, within the same week of the outbreak of vio-
lence, the country started receiving external personalities, and telephone calls 
from prominent international diplomats. Among the first ones to arrive was the 
Nobel peace price laureate, Bishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa. He stayed in 
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the capital, Nairobi for several days as a pariah as no government representative 
wanted to talk to him. Then came the South African businessman, Cyril Rama-
phosa, dubbed as an astute negotiator who made a difference during the negotia-
tions for the end of apartheid in South Africa. Again, no one wanted to listen to 
him, the government accusing him of being a business associate of Raila Odinga, 
whose party was disputing the results of the presidential elections. When the 
Chairman of the African Union, the President of Ghana, Mr. John Kufuor ar-
rived, he was reported by top government officers as having come into the coun-
try to take a cup Kenyan tea. This was a process of neutralization, thus trivial-
izing his mission and capacity to contribute to the issue. 
As the security situation in the country degenerated, arrangements were made 
by the African Union in consultation with other international players such as the 
United Nations and the European Union, among other organizations and coun-
tries, to send into the country a team of three eminent africans led by the immedi-
ate former Secretary Generalof the UN, Dr. Kofi Annan. The others were the 
immediate former President of Tanzania, Benjamin Mkapa and Graça Machel, 
the wife of the former President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela. This finally 
made a difference and a process of negotiation started. Clearly, in all of this, the 
government dominated by one of the parties in the conflict did not want media-
tion to start until the very last moment when the conflict threatened their own po-
sition.  
The purpose of providing all these details is to underscore the importance of 
an external mediator in a volatile situation and the difficulty of arriving at a per-
son or persons that are acceptable to all the parties involved. It is a sensitive 
process, partly because not all the protagonists in a conflict are always interested 
in peace. Some players even invest in chaos in order to pursue their individual or 
communal interests. In the Kenyan situation, the international community had to 
send none other than the former Secretary General of the UN, himself an African, 
the former president of a neighboring country which had a stake in a peaceful 
Kenya, and Graça Machel who had led NEPAD peer review team to Kenya when 
Kenya became the third country to be reviewed on voluntary basis. These were 
personalities that had immense influence on the top politicians in the country and 
the government and were not coming as individuals per se but as representatives 
of very powerful international political, economic, military and humanitarian in-
terests. The strategic importance of Kenya to the Western and Eastern interests 
was too high to leave it to go the DRC Congo or Zimbabwe way. When the talks 
seemed to break down, the American Foreign Secretary, Condoleeza Rice, was 
dispatched from Tanzania by the President of the United Stages, George W. 
Bush, who was at the moment visiting Tanzania. The President of Tanzania, Mr. 
Kikwete, was also dispatched within hours of the departure of Condoleeza Rice 
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to add to international and internal pressure for the conclusion of a peace agree-
ment, which paved the way for the formation of the Grand Coalition government 
that is in power today. These dramatic events which took place within a few 
weeks of the breakdown of law and order demonstrate Boulding’s (1962: 325) 
assertion that if mediation has to succeed, the conflict must be arrested when still 
young. 
Conclusion 
This brief survey of the structural and normative aspects of the African Society 
therefore, indicates that in any one society every individual was a node in a web 
of relationships, which triggered both conflict, and mechanisms of its resolution. 
What this means is that modern Africa may have lost one system of concept-
ualizing, managing and resolving conflicts, but it has not fully taken control of 
the new partly because of new circumstances and the negative attitudes the ruling 
elite have towards traditional institutions, practices and ideas, some of which are 
quite functional in modern circumstances. The logical conclusion therefore, is 
that there are positive elements in both the traditional and modern systems of the 
administration of law, order and justice. When it comes to conflict and its man-
agement, complementary aspects from both systems could be harnessed, ensuring 
that as many stakeholders, including elders; young men; women (including those 
widowed and raped during the conflict) and those orphaned by conflict are con-
sulted and involved so that their voices are not ignored.  
The implication is that shared culture in form of understandings, beliefs and 
symbols not only restrain people from getting into conflict situations, but also 
enable those in such circumstances to come to some agreement faster than would 
have been the case. Culture on the other hand may not bring about positive con-
sequences as implied because adherence to one’s culture can lead to what others 
may consider negative consequences. This is more common in multi-clan, multi-
ethnic, multi-racial or multi-cultural situations in which consensus is difficult to 
engender (Gluckman 1960). As Emile Durkheim would say, the rapid erosion of 
indigenous culture may lead to loss of solidarity and more incidences of conflict 
since it provides room for diversity of composition, opinion, belief, etc while its 
persistence prevents the emergence of countrywide common symbols, culture or 
consensus. 
There are therefore lessons that African societies can learn from modern West-
ern and Eastern countries: 
 The value and primacy of common utilities such as places of worship, schools and private 
houses which in times of emergency provide safe havens for the preservation of life and 
property. There is therefore an urgent need for civic education  concerning the importance of 
these utilities. 
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 People in Africa, more especially, should be educated about the sanctity of human life, and 
tolerance for diversity.  
Transformation of these into common virtues and symbols would be one of the 
beginnings of minimization conflict. The construction of kinship as a cross-
cutting institution for example with which the individual and community can be 
nurtured in terms of welfare and identity would also be a major step in the right 
direction. 
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